

IBN BAJJA'S BOOK

TADBIR AL-MUTAWAHHID

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Ibn Bājja's Book Tadbīr al-Mutawāḥḥid
An Edition, Translation and Commentary

Institute of Islamic Studies

Master of Arts

SUMMARY

This thesis is divided into three main parts. The first being an introduction and introductory study of Ibn Bājja's Book Tadbīr al-Mutawāḥḥid, the second an English translation of the book and the third an appendix which includes a new edition and index of the Arabic text. The thesis also includes notes for each of its parts. All this has been accomplished based on two Arabic MSS. and French extracts of a medieval Hebrew translation.

This thesis is an attempt to contribute in the revealing of the ideas and philosophy of Ibn Bājja. It includes the first complete English translation of any of Abū Bakr's works.

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An Edition, Translation and Commentary

By

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PREFACE

Reading Tadbīr al-Mutawāḥḥid as it stands edited by Miguel Asin Palacios and published in Spain shows the need for a new edition of this book. Hence the Tadbīr has been reedited in this thesis before being translated. This has been done based on two MSS. and French extracts of a medieval Hebrew translation. The first MS. is Pococke 206 (see introduction) which is unvocalized and difficult to read; the second MS. is a resumé of the work. In addition to the edition and translation this thesis includes an introductory study, notes for both the study and the translation and an index and notes for the Arabic text.

The two main difficulties which face any scholar in studying Ibn Bājjā or any of his works, are the scarcity of articles concerning this philosopher and his writings and the fact that few MSS. of his works are still in existence. Thus this thesis is an attempt to contribute in revealing the ideas and philosophy of this man. It includes the first complete English translation of any of Ibn Bājjā's works.

It is a happy privilege to express here my gratitude to

all my friends and colleagues who contributed to this thesis. I am particularly indebted to Professor John A. Williams, Director of the Department of Arabic Studies at the American University of Cairo, who undertook the task of obtaining and bringing me a microfilm of the Cairo MS.; to Dr. H. Landolt of the Institute of Islamic Studies for reading the Arabic text against the MSS.; to Professor C. J. Adams, Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, who followed closely the progress of this thesis and gave generously of his time to read and discuss the translation; to Mr. J. W. Fiegenbaum and Mr. D. Waines of the Institute of Islamic Studies, Mr. E. Hansen of the Psychology Department and Mr. A. Dessouki of the Department of Political Science for their essential contribution in revising this work and suggesting changes and alterations.

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PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

AND

INTRODUCTORY STUDY

OF THE

TADBIR

IBN BAJJA'S BOOK

TADBIR AL-MUTAWAHHID

INTRODUCTION

In the last quarter of the fifth Islamic Century (towards the end of the eleventh century) during which Abū Bakr b. Ṣā'igh known as Ibn Bājja (Avempace) was born (no specific date is given) and grew up, the good days of Islamic Spain had already passed and the kings of al-Tawā'if (the party - kings) had taken over. Almoravids at that time came as rescuers, but they were not genuine. The traditionists were in power, while philosophers were suffering persecution. Ibn Bājja, skilled in philosophy, logic, astronomy, medicine, botany, mathematics, music and in general all practical and theoretical knowledge of his time, in addition to poetry and literature, had to fight his own way.

Most of Ibn Bājja's essays are brief commentaries on Aristotle's and al-Fārābī's works. His original thinking appears chiefly in three of his treatises: Tadbīr al-Mutawahhid, Risālat al-Wadā' and Risālat al-Ittisāl. Many of his essays and treatises are short and incomplete; he would start on one subject and before finishing it start afresh on another. Thus, we find in his writing, many statements similar to the following: "We shall speak about in on another occasion", "We shall speak about this in a more suitable

place", "We leave it now" and "We shall explain this point if we come to its occasion".

Abū Bakr's main concern was to get nearer to and be acquainted with Greek thought, and to be skilled as much as possible in ancient sciences. In pursuing truth and perfection he found his way in communicating with the active intellect.

Tadbīr al-Mutawāḥḥid, which is our essential concern, represents the main characteristics of Ibn Bājjā's writing and thinking. The starting point in Abū Bakr's thinking as represented in the Tadbīr, as well as elsewhere, is to differentiate between form and matter. Without such a distinction any kind of movement is impossible. Yet the forms have different levels, they start with the corporeal forms (forms of corporeal objects) and ascend to the intelligible forms which are completely free from corporeality. The corporeal forms are contaminated with multiplicity, while the high spiritual ones are purified by unity and oneness. The science of ascending from the low forms to the high ones, or from particularity to universality, along with the aid of the enlightening active intellect, are the means by which man may attain perfection and happiness.

In addition, thinking is God's gift to man, by which he may attain eternity. The individual spirit is corrupted and cannot continue to exist after this life, for individuality is essentially related to corporeality. It is the rational soul which can continue to exist after life, for it can surpass individuality to universality. This means no individual existence is possible, nor punishment can take place after life at all. It is evident that Ibn Bājjā takes the side of rationality in opposition to religion and religious experience. Hence he attacks al-Ghazālī who thought that truth and happiness are attainable by mystical means.

The great majority of people remain in the darkness of corporeal forms, and only a few individuals can see the light and attain perfection, happiness and eternity. These are the philosophers of the perfect city which if it does not exist, the philosopher is advised to withdraw to his own city within the imperfect city itself.

The knowledge of Ibn Bājjā's thinking had been confined and limited both in the East and the West, (probably less so in the West, for some of Ibn Bājjā's works were found in Latin and Hebrew)

until S. Munk translated the Hebrew extracts from Tadbīr al-
¹
Mutawāḥḥid into French a hundred and eleven years ago. After
 that no valuable known work has been done although two main MSS.
 of Ibn Bājjā's were found in Europe, one in the Bodleian library of
 Oxford and the other in Berlin. The Berlin MS. was shifted to East
 Germany during the Second World War and, afterwards, lost along with
²
 another MS. which was owned by an Iraqi called A. R. al-Ḥusnī.

In 1945 D.M. Dunlop edited and translated the first part
 of Tadbīr based on the Bodleian MS. He had intended to do the same
 with the whole book, yet he did not; probably because Assin
 Palacios, who has already been working on the book, published his
 edition and translation based on the same MS. just after D. M.
³
 Dunlop had declared his wish. Assin Palacios has made the largest
 recent contribution in publishing Ibn Bājjā's works. He first
 published Fī'al - Nābāt (Las Plantas), then Risālat al-Ithasāl (La
 union del intelecto Con El Nombre) then, Risālat al-Wadā' (Carta De
 Adiós) and finally Tadbīr al-Mutawāḥḥid (El Régimen Del Solitario)
⁴
 in 1940, 1942, 1943 and 1946 successively.

Only one short MS. of Abū Bakr's (a resumé of the Tadbīr)⁵ was known to be preserved in the East, after the MS. owned by A. R. al-Ḥusnī was lost. Yet last summer I came across a MS. of Ibn Bājjā's Fi al-Tib (concerning medicine) which is preserved in Morocco, and which is not mentioned in any Western source I have ever seen. I was unable to examine the MS. for more than a few minutes, therefore I do not know which of his medical books the MS. is. It is well written, decorated and includes coloured pictures of old Arabic medical tools and instruments. After I had seen this MS. exhibited in the Moroccan Pavillion at Expo 67 I wrote to Morocco inquiring about it, but I am still awaiting a reply. There is no Oriental published text of Ibn Bājjā's works except his treatise on the soul - based on the Bodleian MS. and edited by M. S. Ḥasan Ma'Sūmī.⁶

The Bodleian MS. Pococke 206 which I used to reedit and translate the Tadbīr is entitled Majmu'at min Kalām al-Shaykh al-'Imām al-Kāmil al-Fāḥil al-Wazīr...Abī Bakr Muḥammad Ibn Bājjā al-Andalusī. This MS. is composed of 222 folios. The date of the transcription given on folio 120 indicates that:

This MS. has been written by 'Al-Qāḍī al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. al-Naḍar at Qūs in the month of Rabi', 11, 547/1152 and was collated with the original copy of Ibn al-Imām which the latter had read with the author and had finished reading on Ramādan, 15, 530/1135, i.e. nearly three years before the death of Ibn Bājja. 7

Another date given on Fol. 118 confirms the above mentioned information and states that b. al-Naḍar collated the text with the original written by Ibn al-Imām. Ibn al-Imām, being a friend and pupil of Ibn Bājja, was requested by the latter to rewrite and reorganize his works. Abū Bakr, himself, after reading the collection of Ibn al-Imām told the latter that he had found his own works difficult and does not explain his ideas easily, nor are the ideas understood except with great trouble. Therefore, I believe that Ibn al-Imām was the best person to revise the text which one should trust without hesitation, except that the text may not be the original which Ibn al-Imām had revised, rather a second or third copy made afterwards. 8

Tadbīr al-Mutawāḥḥid covers 35 pages of the MS. starting from the middle of Fol. 165. The MS. is evidently very old and in some places the paper is badly damaged. The text contains many grammatical errors due to the scribe or the original collection of Ibn

al-Imām. Sometimes some illegible words are found. I have corrected most of the errors in my Arabic Edition with indications to each of them, and I tried to replace the illegible words by others suitable to the context and to the traces of the original. Words, with indications to each word also. The Hebrew version seems to have considerable additional material which I have indicated their places and have quoted as they are found in Munk's Mélanges, as much as possible in my notes on the text. The Hebrew version, different from the Arabic, is divided into eight chapters; I transferred them to both the edition and the translation and I called them Articles. Without alteration to the original division into chapters, which exists in both Arabic MSS. Munk's edition will be referred to by the expression "Munk" only. The short MS. of the Tadbīr which is found in Cairo (see note 5 above) and which I am using along with the Bodleian is well written, pointed and sometimes vocalized. I am going to bracket my indication to this MS. like this [MT] and in the Arabic text like this [م]. Asin Palacios' edition includes errors and misreadings either due to the difficulty of the text itself or to other reasons. I will mention this edition like this [AS] and in Arabic as follows [أ]. It may be important to mention here that my reading disagrees with that of Palacios' in over three hundred places, most of them are minor disagreements but some of them are substantial.

The English translation might seem a little uneven and abstract, but it is certainly much better and easier than the Arabic

text, for although Ibn Bājja was an eloquent poet and a gifted musician, his philosophical style is difficult and on many occasions unclear. He always tries to explain an idea or to elucidate a problem in a simple way, but often falls short in doing so and his attempt renders the text complicated and obscure, a fact which he was fully aware of. He always explains that he does not revise his writings, rather he leaves that task to his friends and pupils, especially Ibn al-Imām. His sentences are often not correct according to Arabic usage and the formal rules of Arabic syntax. This is particularly true of the pronouns, which on most occasions are not correct concerning the gender of the subject or the object.⁹ Ibn Tufayl after Ibn Bājja was aware of these facts as we shall see. Therefore, no wonder if the reader, who is not aware of the difficulty of the text, seems uncomfortable reading the English translation.

Finally this thesis is divided into three main parts, the first being an analytical study of the Tadbīr, the second an English translation of the book and the third an appendix which includes the reedition and the index of the Arabic text.

INTRODUCTORY STUDY OF THE TADBIR

[1] Who Is The Mutawahhid?

Tadbīr al-Mutawahhid is the answer to repeated failures of philosophers in practical politics, the failures which consequently lead to the obsolescence of their theories. It is the tragic retreat and the unavoidable defeat of theorization facing reality. The book is also a courageous attempt to adopt the truth, that which philosophers before Ibn Bājjā - and even after - have either missed or refused to admit. It is an attempt to reconcile and harmonize philosophy with life or metaphysics with physics. It is in addition the realization of the author's anxiety and his reflections on the impossibility of living in a perfect state; for if the state were perfect, then the usefulness of all the Tadbīr would disappear.² The Tadbīr is Ibn Bājjā's own life and own picture as portrayed by his awareness and keen insight, as well as his personal reaction and original view concerning the role of the philosopher.

Al-Mutawahhid may be translated as the man who remains alone, by himself, apart from others; the solitary person who does not associate himself with other people. It is also an epithet applied to God, The One, The Sole One, He whose attribute is unity in essence, and

who has no like nor equal. The Arabic verb, Tawahhada means, to be or to become alone, with none to share or to participate with him; and Tawahhada bil 'Amr means to be unique in a certain affair.

Similarly Tawahhada bil Ra'yi means to be or to become alone without any to participate with him in his opinion.³

Accordingly Ibn Bājja's Mutawahhid is the lonely philosopher,⁴ or philosophers, living in one of the four imperfect cities, where he is unable to live a normal life; by living in an imperfect city "he lives in unnatural circumstances and unfavourable conditions".⁵ He is like a mystic - in being a "stranger",⁶ a different and unreal citizen - although he is not a mystic, and is against mystics and mysticism.⁷ He displays no loyalty to his city, for he is not a real citizen of it. Rather, he has his own natural and normal city in his mind, a city on a different level to which he travels in his thoughts and to which he is loyal; for,

Happy people, if they exist in these (imperfect) cities have only the happiness of the solitary man; and the sound Tadbīr (for them) would be the Tadbīr of the solitary, whether there be one such solitary person or more than one, so long as neither a nation nor a city agrees on their view. These are the persons meant by the Sufis when they speak of "strangers", for although they live in their countries and among their comrades and neighbours they are strangers in their views and have travelled in their thoughts to other levels which become for them their countries. 8

Hence he is one of the Nawabit⁹ (weeds - wild flowers) which "grow up spontaneously among sown crops" without being cultivated or cared for,

Like the savages who live outside organized communities, and the madmen, criminals, and anarchists who live within them, he does not agree with the opinions of the citizens of imperfect communities. But, unlike these, he opposes the opinions of the citizens of imperfect communities, not with worse opinions, but with true knowledge. He has to live in the imperfect community; yet he is not a true citizen of such a community. 10

The Mutawahhid, then is an exceptional man who looks around him and discovers that everything in his milieu is contaminated, unclean, unnatural for him and unhealthy. The main reason which leads to this conclusion, is the imperfection of the city, and the main reason for this imperfection is that the actions of its citizens are not based on thinking and reasoning. Irrationality in its different manifestations creates four main types of cities; irrationality in the city - any of the four and their composites - is Ibn Bājjā's justification of the philosopher's withdrawal into himself. It gives the Mutawahhid the right to cease hoping and dreaming about the perfect and virtuous city and to isolate himself from association with others, although he lives among them.

It is evident, however, that the Mutawāḥḥid should not withdraw before realizing completely that there is no hope to live in a perfectly virtuous city, but Ibn Bājjā is relatively realistic; he knows from his own experience and from that of others that such a city is nothing but Utopia. He wants his discourse to be of practical use, ¹¹ he wants to find a "régime" ¹² or a path for the Mutawāḥḥid to follow. This "régime" starts where other philosophers have come to end, for the Mutawāḥḥid

Is obliged in some ways of life to retreat altogether from the society of men as much as possible for him. He should not mix with them except in necessary matters and in necessary measure. Or, he should emigrate to ways of life in which the sciences are (practiced) - if such (way of life) does exist -. 13

This means neither that the philosopher may attain the highest perfection through isolation nor that isolation is good in essence; but why should one speak about highest perfection if it is unattainable in any case, and why should one rebuke isolation "If it is good by accident". In addition, Ibn Bājjā is fully aware of the subtleness of his stand; he knows that man is social and political by nature, but he knows that the ideal city is only an ideal. He also realizes that "Isolation is evil", but he realizes that this is "Only so in essence". Furthermore, he knows that the philosopher cannot attain perfection by isolation, but he knows that by isolation he

comes closer to perfection, because by isolation he advocates his efforts to be better prepared for conceiving what comes from the "active intellect". Isolation moreover, frees him from being occupied by society and its "corporeal actions".

This picture of an isolated man who hides his ideas, role and identity, is not strange or unusual in Islamic culture. It had appeared before Ibn Bājjā in a variety of manifestations, since it is natural to find that the true opinions of an intellectual group differ from, or contradict, the opinions of the majority, or the whole of society which adopts and follows certain strict dogmas. A dogma which interferes in the individual's life in a way that brings and incurs the wrath of the community upon any difference and exposes the life of the individual to grave danger.

This was certainly the case in the Islamic community where philosophers were condemned and persecuted as sanctimonious unbelievers holding certain doctrines; 14

especially upon al-Ghazālī's violent attack on philosophy and philosophers, 15 where Ibn Bājjā lived. 16

The Ikhwān al-Safā' (the Brethren in purity) are a good example of how a group of intellectuals and thinkers have hidden themselves instead of hiding their beliefs. They thought that they can still play the role of leaders from behind the curtains, and govern

the community in spite of the factual existence of another government. Even if they cannot play that role, they still are leaders, because the leader "Imām" is a leader in his essence and his art,

Whether or not anyone exists who accepts him, whether or not he is obeyed, whether or not he finds a group to help him achieve his purpose - just as the physician is a physician in his essence and his ability to cure the sick, whether patients existed or not, there were tools for him to use in his practice or not, and whether he was rich or poor. 17

The main difference between the Imām of Ikhwān al-Safā' and the Mutawāḥḥid of Ibn Bājjā, is that the Mutawāḥḥid has lost all hopes in living a normal life in a normal city. He starts from this axiom and establishes himself to accept his fate and make the best of it. He is a resentful, indignant, hopeless, helpless and passive philosopher.

The hidden Imām of the Muslim Shī'ites is another example of how the leader may withdraw. Like our philosopher who renounces his leadership - for a while at least - or conceals it, is the hidden Imām who instead of manifesting his Imāmship, he assumes the role of a secret leader. Since the Imām has faced a period of disturbance and confusion, he ought to withdraw and wait until the end of the time, when suitable conditions are established.

The secret life of many mystics, the "strangers"; the withdrawal of Bishr B. al-Hāfī, who turned his back on society and disappeared into the desert, etc. are other examples and pictures of

our Mutawahhid.

Our Mutawahhid is a wise man, who realizes - from the very beginning - and before becoming involved in unrealistic attempts, and before wasting his time and losing his freedom, his life and all his philosophical happiness and blessedness, that he ought not associate with people of corporeal life. He ought not mix "corporeality" with his "spirituality" or, to put it in a better way, not mix corporeality with his "intellectuality". Hence he should seek his own "régime"; a "régime" of the philosopher who has decided to live in an imperfect society. This philosopher should lay the foundation of his own society, own life, and he should decide upon the rules according to which he can manage, live and even address others. He can make the best of all that only by having his own "régime" or Tadbīr.

[2] What is Tadbīr?

The term Tadbīr (régime) says Ibn Bājja is used with different meanings. "The most common meaning, in general, is to indicate the arrangement of actions in relation to an intended end". Thus it does not refer to a person who "performs one single action by which he intends a certain end". The action known to be "single action" is not called Tadbīr: while the action which is manifold and which belongs

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to a Tartīb (arrangement) is a part of the Tadbīr. The term Tartīb is often used in the book to mean Tadbīr, for Tartīb is

Sometimes used as signifying the mode of construction
or also the prescribing, or observing of a particular
order in any performance etc. 20

Hence Tadbīr is used in relation to God, because God is the Mudabbir (manager, ruler) of the world; or in fact this term "is used in an analogical way" for man, because Tadbīr refers originally, to God; therefore the real Tadbīr is God's Tadbīr. In addition the Tadbīr "might be potential or actual" but it indicates what is potential more frequently and evidently, because the Tartīb is of potential affairs and it must be "intellectual" too. Thus "it exists only for man", for man is the only rational animal. Moreover, the Tadbīr is used in two senses, either general or particular.

When the expression Tadbīr is used in a general sense - as we use it - it indicates the "régime" of the cities; and when it is used in a particular sense, it is divided into correct and false. 21

Ibn Bājja makes clear from the very beginning of his book that he means by Tadbīr either: the "régime" of the City which is the general meaning of Tadbīr used among people, or the "régime" of any single man which is the particular meaning of Tadbīr as used in our book. In any case the Tadbīr has three main characteristics:

- a) It belongs to man only
- b) It refers mainly to potential "régime"
- c) It may be correct as well as false

It is human because it cannot stand without man and his reasoning. Rationality is man's main quality which plays the essential role in Tadbīr al-Mutawāḥḥid, for it places man at the vertex of the pyramid of created beings. These created beings have different ranks which are designated for them in accordance with their nearness and distance from rationality. Animals share with living beings (plants) "The actions of the nutritive and generative souls as well as the soul of growth", and in a similar way, man shares with irrational animals

All these faculties as well as perception, imagination, memory and the acts resulting from them. These constitute the animal soul.

But man is distinguished from all other beings by the rational faculty. Thus he is the only one who possesses rationality and which contains
22
what distinguishes man from the irrational animals.

Ibn Bājjā goes into a lengthy discussion about the difference between man and others in order to show the importance of the fact that man possesses rationality. It is important because it is the cause of choice, which is a necessary condition for having Tadbīr

Thus, man's special actions are actions of choice, or in Ibn Bājja's own words, "The human actions by which (man) is particularized are those which are governed by choice because everything which man does by his choice is a human act, and every human action is an act of choice". Then Ibn Bājja adds: "I mean by the expression, "choice",
 23
 "the will which is the result of deliberation".

Rationality is Ibn Bājja's main theme, not only in the book of Tadbīr, but also in many of his works. Risālat-al-Wadā' (The Letter of Fare Well) and Ittisāl of 'Aqī bi-l-Insān (Contact of Reason [That is the active intellect] with man ['s intellect]) are two treatises in which we find that rationality is our philosopher's central point. This leads us to question why? And if we do, the answer is: for the happiness, perfection and blessedness of man, the philosopher or the Mutawāḥḥid. If man seeks his perfection through wealth, he is a dreaming man; or through health, he is a servant of his nature - explains the philosopher. A Higher level is that of the man who seeks his perfection by acquiring moral virtues. He rises to the level of most noble irrational animal, because he reaches the level of being Mudabbar (ruled) by others. He needs a Mudabbir (ruler, manager or a person to set the régime). Still higher, is the level of the person who aims towards his perfection by attaining the perfection of practical arts. This man is Mudabbir (ruler), yet his Tadbīr keeps him "servant

of other men, for he is still headed or ruled by others". But when a man becomes perfect essentially, with no need of others, he is the Mudabbir of his own affairs and the Centre of the whole existence. Every man has to choose his own state, and the philosopher normally chooses
 24
 the highest.

In the Ittiṣāl as well as in the Tadbīr, Ibn Bājjā refers to a slightly different classification. Different from Ibn Rushd who believes that there are two main methods for mankind to attain happiness through the contact with the intellect;
 25
 Ibn Bājjā speaks about three methods; that of the Jumhur (common people), the method
 26
 of the scholars and the way of the happy people or the philosophers.

The common person is occupied by particular objects of perception, by the individuals such as the particular form of a horse. The particular form is the concept which occurs in the *Sensus Communis* and other faculties such as the imagination and the recollective faculty. He perceives the individual horse or, let us say, the spiritual form of a particular horse. It follows from this that the particular form of the horse which exists for Zayd is different from that of ʿAmr and that both these forms are not eternal since they depend on the existence of the individual which they represent. In addition, these forms dis-

appear with oblivion and forgetfulness, for the forms which are obtained by the common person are corporeal and depend on corporeality.

The scholars are different because they can observe two kinds of relations of the spiritual forms. The one is the particular relation of the spiritual forms which is the same of that of the common person. The second is the universal relation of the particular spiritual forms. They observe the universal relation yet through an intermediary. The happy person or the possessor of the Tadbīr is the one who observes the reality of things or the intelligible spiritual forms and the rational concepts. This is the person who is directed towards the theoretical knowledge and who is divine and superior, for

Through corporeality the philosopher is an existing man (only), through spirituality is a higher being and through rationality is divine and superior. The possessor of wisdom (the philosopher) then, is necessarily a divine and superior man. 27

It is evident that Tadbīr, according to Ibn Bājjā should be connected and based on a theory of knowledge. Thus he goes into lengthy discussion of the different kinds of the spiritual forms, for the spiritual forms are the concepts according to which our type of knowledge is determined. This makes our philosopher's theory of knowledge of three main levels. The first of which is the comprehension

of the forms or corporeal objects which is limited by the external senses. The second is the comprehension of the particular spiritual forms or forms having two kinds of relation; the one is the relation between a form and its particular object; and the second is the universal relation of that form. This universal relation is between the form and the different persons who comprehend it. Such a form is called an intermediary form, a name which was used by Ibn Rushd after
 28
 Ibn Bājjā to refer to the same thing. An intermediary form is that which passes through the Sensus Communis and through the imaginative faculty. The third is the comprehension of the intelligible forms which belongs to the philosophers only and by which the Tadbīr takes place. Among Ibn Bājjā's three categories of knowledge and men, only the philosopher can see the truth and observe "The light coming from polished bodies". They are the happy ones who have direct view of the sun such as the case of Aristotle. First there are those "who see only such light as is reflected from bodies". Then there are those seeing "The sun in a mirror". Finally there are the happy persons who
 29
 are "likened to the sun itself".

This theory of knowledge is explained in different ways in many of Ibn Bājjā's works, but in the book of Tadbīr it has a special role. Thus it is explained in detail which we do not find in any other of his books or essays. It covers over a half of the whole book.

In addition, both Ibn Bājjā's theory of knowledge and the Tadbīr are connected with his understanding of the soul and its division, because the soul is the faculty, which comprises different faculties, by which man attains different levels of knowledge. His level of knowledge depends on his faculties and abilities, and his Tadbīr or management depends on his knowledge. In other words, the spiritual forms vary in accordance with man's faculties, and Tadbīr varies in correspondance with his spiritual forms or concepts.³⁰

As mentioned before, the faculties by which the corporeal forms are perceived are the external senses. The particular spiritual forms belong mainly to the imaginative faculty. But the intelligible forms belong to the rational faculty.

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In his book Ilm-l-Nafs (concerning the soul) Ibn Bājjā inquires into the nature of the rational faculty, where he asks whether this faculty is always actual or is sometimes potential and sometimes actual. If the second alternative is true, says our philosopher,

Then it must possess matter, and if it has matter then it has a mover, since everything moved has a mover.
Now, what is this mover and what is its nature? 32

The answer to the last question is to be found in the Ittiṣāl, that is the active intellect, which by its connection with man's intellect,

the sound Tadbīr becomes possible. The answer to the question concerning the actuality and the potentiality of the rational faculty is in 'Ilm-l-Nafs itself. It is that this faculty is sometimes potential and sometimes actual and "the transition from potentiality to actuality is a change, and so there must be one who causes change, since all that is moved has a mover, as we have shown before".

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Through this way Ibn Bājjā introduces the active intellect, the connection with which is the final goal of the philosopher as shown clearly in both Ittisāl and Tadbīr as well as in Risālat-l-Wadā'. Yet the contact or connection with this intellect is not possible in all times nor for every man. Thus the rational faculty is sometimes actual and sometimes potential; and the Tadbīr (régime) is sometimes correct, sometimes not.

In Ibn Bājjā's classification of men, the supreme philosophers only can achieve union with the active intellect, and acquire certain knowledge in all fields. For such philosophers the rational faculty is always in actuality, and by such knowledge the city is perfect and the citizens are happy. But unfortunately the philosophers are very rare, especially in Ibn Bājjā's time, as he likes to stress on every possible occasion. Thus the sound Tadbīr of the city

is a mere idea in the philosopher's mind. He cannot alone bring the sound Tadbīr of the community from potentiality into actuality, yet he can have his own Tadbīr or self-government. This makes the Tadbīr of two main types; that of the whole community which is imperfect, and the other is of the philosopher who should choose solitude and loneliness and live in a country of his own. But even this does not solve the problem completely. The sound régime of the city is still a matter of potentiality and the philosopher still lives in unusual, unnatural and abnormal conditions. Thus he must assume the ideal Tadbīr in a community which is not ideal.

The proper application of the Tadbīr is the ideal and perfect city, says Ibn Bājjā.³⁴ He refers to Plato's Republic and explains that Plato has clarified the meaning of correctness in relation to the city. He has undertaken the task of explaining wherefrom error affects the city, as well as the task of pronouncing the merit, ignorance and vice concerning it. Plato's virtuous city, confirms Ibn Bājjā, knows neither doctors nor judges; its citizens are united in mutual love and never quarrel among themselves. Further, all actions in the perfect city are proper and correct; that is why its people do not eat harmful foods. They live on a sound diet, and they do not need remedies for more than extracting teeth and similar things.

It is clear that in the perfectly virtuous city every citizen is giving the best of that for which he is prepared. All of its opinions are correct, none are false. Its actions are exclusively and absolutely virtuous ones. 35

Opposite to this city we find the four imperfect cities.

Ibn Bājjā sometimes calls them simple cities which need both the art of medicine and that of jurisprudence. The further the city is removed from being perfect, the more it needs these two arts and the more honourable is the rank of people of both these. Al-Fārābī in his virtuous city, does not make any reference to these two kinds of people. It is a Platonic idea which Ibn Bājjā has taken directly from the Republic, or at least other work of the Greek philosopher. The main interest of the author of the Tadbīr, is the perfect city or the régime of the philosopher in his solitude. Thus he does not speak in detail about the imperfect cities. He enumerates them only once, and he gives names which were used by al-Fārābī and originally by Plato. Ibn Bājjā must have read the Laws of Plato as has been summarized by al-Fārābī, for he echoes the same language and vocabulary. 36

When Ibn Bājjā speaks of imperfect cities in names, he mentions the following three; the democracy, tyranny and oligarchy as well as a fourth city called 'Imāmiyya'. The last one needs some dis-

cussion, for the Arabic expression 'Imāmiyya is related to Imām meaning the religious leader who is supposed to be perfect and inspired - at least for the Muslim Shi'ites to whom Ibn Bājja seems to be very close. This makes one wonder whether Ibn Bājja means 'Amāmiyya instead of 'Imāmiyya, meaning the front-city or the first one. That is to say the first and highest city among the four imperfect ones. Miguel Asin Palacios' reading does not help at all, since he reads 'Iqāmiyya which is unusual term to be used for a city. The Hebrew translation of Tadbīr al-Mutawāhhid seems to have a part of the answer, for the translator Mūsā-l-Narbōnī uses an expression "which literally means priestly" or 'Imāmiyya. Another part of the answer is given by Ibn Rushd who uses this term from time to time. But the essential part of this is to be found by comparing this city as described in the Tadbīr with the imperfect cities of Plato. Ibn Bājja's Imāmiyya is "excellent in action and opinions", and "aristocracy is for Plato, together with monarchy, the best state, it would perhaps be more correct to think of timocracy". This is how the four imperfect cities of Plato would be completed, among which timocracy is "the least bad".

Speaking about imperfect cities leads us to speak about their citizens. The great majority of whom - if not all - are occupied by either corporeality or spirituality or a combination of both. However some rational citizens may appear from time to time in these cities. These citizens are called the Nawābit (weed) whose life in the imperfect community is completely different from that of the rational citizens in

the perfect city. The Tadbīr of the philosopher in the perfect city is to rule, a function which adheres to the philosopher in his normal life. Contrary to Plato, if such a function is not practiced the very function and duty of the philosopher does not make him out of place, affirms Ibn Bājjā. If the citizens deny the philosopher his prestige and his right to rule, he can still be a Mudabbir (ruler), for he can rule himself and have his own government. He still is the king, who can function and enjoy his role, he does not need the imperfect kingdom. He can have his own, for he is a king in essence, a positive conclusion in passive conditions.

To sum up, the Tadbīr of Ibn Bājjā is the self-government of the exceptional man who lives in unsuitable conditions which lead him to his chosen isolation. It is the "régime" of the philosopher living in one of the four imperfect cities outside his normal kingdom or outside the virtuous perfect city. Further, it is the rule by which the metaphysician can continue to attain his happiness and blessedness, or the way of life which should be followed by the individual thinkers in order to reach perfection and communicate with the active intellect. Simply, it is Ibn Bājjā's original way in choosing exile within the community.

[3] Historical Background

To exile oneself needs a reason. We may find this reason in Ibn Bājjā's life!

The tragic death which Ibn Bājja met when he was secretly poisoned throws the first light on his agitated and troubled life. The physician "Abū al-'Alā b. Zuhr" of Seville (died 525/1131) father of the famous "Abu Marwān b. Zuhr" (Avenzer of the Latins), was a great enemy of our philosopher. In an epigram aimed against Ibn Bājja he said:

"The Zindiq (unbeliever, atheist) must certainly be gibbeted, whether he who supports him wishes it or not:

The beam has long been prepared for him, and the spear has directed its point against him". 41

The elder Ibn Zuhr's rivalry with Ibn Bājja resulted in the death of the latter. This can be demonstrated easily by a couple of verses which "Ibn al-Imām" the famous disciple of Ibn Bājja composed expressing his feeling at the death of his friend and teacher, and showing the bad life and situation in the Andalus, he said:

"O the excellent land! how coveted a native land you would have been had there not flowed various calamities within you!

"(But this land possessed) saline water, entirely gloomy horizon, and the morsel of egg-plant prepared by Ibn Ma'Tub".

Ibn Ma'Tub was Ibn Zuhr's servant, who " under the instruction of his master, as is generally believed, poisoned Ibn Bājja by means of a drugged dish of egg plant". 42

But Ibn Zuhr was not the only enemy in Ibn Bājja's life who might have played enough role in disturbing the philosopher's life. Al-Fath B. Khāqān was another of Ibn Bājja's enemies. In his book

Qalā'id al-'Iqyān as well as in his Matmah, he attacks the philosopher severely, and even refuses to speak about Ibn Bājja except at the very end of his books. Ibn Khāqān devotes over six pages in his Qalā'id to cursing our author, he says:

he (Ibn Bājja), directed his mind towards the dimensions of the spheres and the boundaries of the climates; he rejected the book of God the all-wise, and haughtily cast it behind his back; (Sura 3, Verse 184) he wished to prove false that revelation which falsehood never does nor can attain. (Sura 41, Verse 42) and applied himself exclusively to astronomy. He denied that we should return unto God, and he declared his belief in the governing influence of the stars; boldly insulting the majesty of the intelligent and all-knowing God, he hearkened with audacious indifference to his threats and prohibitions, laughing to scorn these words of His: He who hath placed thee under the rule of the Qurān will surely bring thee again before him (Sura 28, Verse 85); he believed time to be a revolution (of vicissitudes), and considered man as plant or a flower for which death was the ripening, and for which the snatching out (of existence) was the gathering of the fruit. Faith disappeared from his heart and left not a trace behind; his tongue forgot (the praise of) the Merciful, neither did (the holy) name cross his lips. 43

This is how Ibn Khāqān goes on and on attacking Ibn Bājja and stirring people's opinion against him. It is important to note here that the attack on Ibn Bājja by his enemies and the claim that he was atheist led him to be "persecuted because of his atheism" as G. Sarton puts it in his Introduction to the History of Science a fact which is enough to make the philosopher give up any hope in getting along with this community.

Ibn Bājja, Abū Muḥammad Ibn Yaḥya al-Tujībī al-Andalusī al-

Saraqustī (native of Saragossa in Spain) known as Ibn al-Sā'igh (the son of the jeweller) and generally called Ibn Bājja (Avenpace or Avempace in Latin) Ibn Khallikān derives the word Bājja from a Frankish name meaning silver (or gold). It is, perhaps, an alteration of the Spanish word plate which may have some relation with al-Sā'igh, for it is believed that his father was a goldsmith.⁴⁵ The philosopher was born in Saragossa about the end of the fifth Islamic century, that is before 1106 A.D. but no precise date is given. He was the object of numerous accusations which were brought by the people of his time who tried to kill him on many occasions as Ibn Abī 'Ugaybi'a declares at the beginning of his biographical account of Ibn Bājja's life. Through Nafh al-Tib of al-Maqarī and other sources we know that Ibn Bājja the Wazir (minister) of Abū Bakr B. Ibrahim the governor of Murcia and then of Saragossa for around twenty years until the city, Saragossa, was taken by the Franks in the month of Ramadān in 512 A.H. (January 1119 A.D.) When Ibn Bājja left Saragossa to Valencia then to Xativa, where he became a Wazir then imprisoned by Abu Ishāq Ibrāhīm Ibn Tāshafin the Emir of that place. After prison, our philosopher left Xativa for Fez⁴⁶ where he was killed, in 533 A.H. (1138 A.D.)

Among the different contradictory biographies of this philosopher, given by different authors, one has to examine the data very carefully. Probably the two most accepted facts are: first, that he was persecuted, as we have seen, and second, that he lived in a period of unrest, especially for a free thinker. After the death of Hishām al-

Mu'tomid Billāh (427 H.) the last 'Umayyī Khalif in al-Andalus, the decadence of the Muslim domination of Spain commenced. The weakest period before the final defeat was between 443 H. and 479 H. during which the party-kings had taken over. That was just before Ibn Bājja was born. In 479 H. after the Muslims of Spain had almost lost every hope of regaining unity and strength, one of the party-kings went to Morocco and sought the help of Yousuf b. Tashafīn, the founder of Almoravids dynasty, against the Franks. Ibn Tashafīn was able to take over and give a new hope in the struggle against the Franks. But when Yousuf b. Tashafīn died in 493 H. and his son Alī b. Yousuf took over, the real power fell into the hands of the jurists and the traditionists. Alī b. Yousuf was not able to make his decisions without consulting the religious leaders, for he trusted them and needed as well their support while they were strong and had authority over the people. Ibn Bājja who lived in this period, accompanied and served Alī b. Yousuf, but he could not get along with the jurists and the traditionalists nor was he able to prevent his friend and protector Alī b. Yousuf, from being under their influence. He first predicted and then witnessed both the failure of the Almoravids dynasty and the vanishing of his hopes.

During the Almoravid dynasty, under which Ibn Bājja lived, the conservative traditionists were the victors of the almost continuous struggle between free thinkers acquainted with philosophy and the traditionists; or as they are sometimes called the Jumhūr (common

people) and the Khāssa (elite). This victory of the Jumhūr appears to have a special significance during Ibn Bājja's life. Two main elements show this. The first is that Ibn Bājja was the first philosopher in al-Andalus who cleared and opened the road for the philosophers after him such as Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Rushd and Ibn Khaldūn. The second is that he was the first philosopher to appear after the great attack of al-Ghazālī on philosophy and philosophers.

One may speak about Malik b. Wahaib and Ibn Ḥazm as other free thinkers of Ibn Bājja's time, for after the first books of philosophy, which Arabic Spain was introduced in the fourth Islamic Century (tenth century), no real advance was made until Ibn Bājja and the two others appeared. But both Malik and Ibn Ḥazm are unfavourably compared with Ibn Bājja. Ibn Ḥazm who lived before Ibn Bājja, left nothing concerning the philosophical books which were introduced to Spain during the rule of al-Ḥakam II, "except errors and alteration". Malik b. Wahaib the contemporary of Ibn Bājja left in writing "only a small amount of logic". He chose another path because he was afraid for his life, as some attempts on his life made him give up investigating rational knowledge and turn to "the religious sciences" only. Thus Ibn Bājja becomes, almost, the only man to go ahead with philosophy, for

He was the wonder of his age and the portent in the sky of his time...He was among the greatest investigators of his time, most of whom did not attempt to record any of their thoughts, and he was their superior in investigation and naturally more penetrating in making distinctions. 47

Al-Ghazālī's severe attack on philosophical thinking was expressed mainly in his Tahāfut al Falāsifa which, apparently, did not reach Ibn Bājja. Fragments of or at least the title and subject "Al-Munqidh Mina al-Dalāl", is the one book of al-Ghazālī's which reached our man in the west for certain. He mentions this book by name in Tadbīr al-Mutawāḥḥid as well as in Risālat al-Wadā'⁴⁸. In the Tadbīr Ibn Bājja explains that al-Ghazālī's method, which is that of the mystics, makes him one of the people of the second class only while he claims that he has reached the ultimate happiness and truth. This is just imagination and false opinions, confirms Abū Bakr. In Risālat al-Wadā', the Andalusian philosopher mentions another time that "al-Munqidh" has reached him, and he explains that al-Ghazālī's claim to have witnessed some divine matters and reached the ultimate happiness during his isolation is just false imagination. It is clear, he confirms, that this man did not surmount the stage of people of particular spirituality and that he is mistaken and tells mistakes.

It is very interesting to see how al-Ghazālī is conceived by a philosopher who lived immediately after al-Ghazālī (died 505 A.H.) and after the great victory of the traditionists over the philosophers and before Ibn Rushd. It is interesting, too, to see how a philosopher dares to stand up and speak not only about philosophy in an exalted way but also against Abu Hāmed himself, at the time in which other free thinkers such as Malik b. Wuhaib preferred to withdraw secretly after

the first threats. It needed the courage of a real free thinker to take such a stand. Little wonder therefore that the life of such a man should be a troubled one.

The accusation of Ibn Khāqān is not pure falsehood, if one remembers that Ibn Bājjā rejected many of the religious beliefs. One of which is that Ibn Bājjā made clear that there is no difference between individuals after death. The happy ones are not different and numerous in number, rather they are one. In "al-Ittiḡāl" the philosopher declares quite openly that the pure intellect is the only part of man which survives after bodily death. This theory that nothing individual continues to exist after bodily death, and other theories of Ibn Bājjā, along with his stand against al-Ghazālī at a period which was dominated by traditionists is sufficient reason to accuse him of heresy and then to give him a troubled life.

In conditions such as of these in which Ibn Bājjā had to live, and after losing his Wizārat (ministership), being imprisoned and having his home town taken by the Franks, it is little wonder that a person may lose his faith in others. Especially if this person holds certain beliefs in which he trusts to be the best, and especially if he is under the impression that common people are very close to animals and that only a few individuals appear from time to time and attain the truth. He was the individual of his time, the Mutawāḥḥid who was in exile, for other philosophers did not exist.

[4] Al-Mutawāḥḥid's doctrines:

In the last two pages of Tadbīr al-Mutawāḥḥid as it stands in the collection of Ibn al-Imām, the author introduces an idea or points to it very briefly which seems to be one of his important doctrines. That is his doctrine concerning the eternity of the intellect and the Rational forms on one hand, and the temporality of all other belongings of man including the forms of corporeal bodies and the spiritual forms on the other. This is explained very frequently by Ibn Bājja in the Tadbīr, but at the end of the book it seems to be his final considered conclusion. Taking into account the difficult mode of expression, the ambiguous illustrations and analogies and the repetition of detailed examples of the writer, one has to find out Ibn Bājja's conclusions.

As it was stated before, Ibn Bājja did not believe in individual afterlife. It may be said here that the Muslim Aristotelian thinkers and philosophers of the East, before our man in the West, also did not believe in individual afterlife. This is true to a certain extent, but

"Ibn Bājja was perhaps the first to have formulated a clear and consistent philosophic position on this point". 49

The expression "one", believes Abū Bakr, is used in various meanings. Man, for example, is called "one" although he is transferred

from one state to another; and mankind is "one" although some individuals are actually complete men and others are not. In contrast, the rational forms which are the universal ones, are believed to be "numerous". They are not "numerous", confirms Ibn Bājja; rather they are "one", for the intellect is "one" and its oneness unites all its manifestations. This doctrine of the Mutawāḥḥid is explained very clearly in Risālat al-Ittiṣāl. Ibn Bājja says,

In general, since this intellect is one in number, then the individuals who have contact with the intellect, are all one in number. As when one takes a magnetic stone...The Magnetic stone would attract the iron and the iron would attract other things etc. It is similar to the example of the ship which moves in accordance with the movement of its captain, yet it is impossible for corporeal things to be one as that is possible only for the intelligibles. 50

Through this oneness of the intellect Man can attain eternity, for man is partly corrupted partly not. All corporeal things and things based on corporeality are corrupted, while only rational existents are eternal. Ibn Bājja has a very clear statement which confirms this claim. He says:

It is (the intellect) one and not numerous, because it is free from any relation with the matter (corporeality)
Wal Nazaru Min Hādhihi al-Jiha Huwa al-Hayat al-'Akhira
 (Rationality in this respect is the future life). 51

Abū Bakr mentions another ^{way} for man's eternity which is connected with the first. The condition is eternity by being remembered in the minds of men. He believes that the minds of men hold memories of the possessors of different arts some years only. People of science survive in this

way hundreds of years, and philosophers thousands. This is the only afterlife of individuals. Al-Fārābī before Ibn Bājja, had made the intellect his central point, and considered it the head of the community or the king of the city;⁵² but he did not go as far as Abū Bakr did in exalting and even worshipping the intellect.

Ibn Bājja's concern about rationality and the intellect lead us to ask two important questions. First, how is rationality attained? Or, how one can communicate with the "one-intellect?" The second is a question which constitutes a central point, if not the central one, in Islamic philosophy: it is the question of prophecy and its place in the philosopher's thoughts.

As for the first question, it is evident that Abū Bakr does not give a method or a "path" if one may use the mystics' language. We do not know how one can become "rational", but it is clear that not every person can become one. It seems as if it is a matter of fate more than a matter of achievement through free will. Natural disposition plays the most important role in being able to contact the active intellect. Ibn Bājja does not explain why, rather he leaves Man alone facing his fate which is determined by the movement of the stars, or the spheres if we want to reduce the impact of the term. Here again we remember what Ibn Khāqān has said about Abū Bakr. However, Ibn

Bājjā speaks of another way of communicating with the "intellect", which is that man himself contacts the active intellect. Risālat al-Ittiṣāl mentions both ways equally; man ascends through the different types of forms, and through his rational forms he contacts the "other intellect" in an ascending way; and "since it is possible to have the opposite way, (the contact may) seem like descending" too. 53 Despite this, one's fate is still the main factor, for if the person's nature does not make him capable of conceiving more than the corporeal forms, he would not be able, in any way, to get in touch with the active intellect. Only the philosophers and the prophets can have contact with the active intellect, the philosophers more so by the way of ascending and the prophets more so by the way of descending.

This puts us right in the middle of the second question. Ibn Bājjā does not refer to the prophets when he speaks about men seeing the flashing light of truth, rather he refers to Aristotle and the other philosophers. He must have been aware of the fact that the readers who have the least knowledge of metaphysics would be inclined to identify men of the highest class, that is to say, men of the third stage in acquiring knowledge, with the philosophers more than with the prophets, even if he did not mention Aristotle by name. However, Ibn Bājjā rarely mentions the prophets, and when he does he chooses to do so with deliberate ambiguity. He completely fails to conceal his belief in the superiority of the philosophers over the prophets. He distinguishes

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between the people of true opinions and those who are inspired. The latter have a kind of intuition

"which enables them to arrive at true and certain conclusions without having to know the premises and the intermediate links of reasoning that lead up to these conclusions".

The former are the ones who know both the premises and the intermediate links, or in Abū Bakr's language both the "concept" and the "demonstration". Thus, "on this hypothesis the people who only see by the light coming from polished bodies could be the philosophers".

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The superiority of the philosophers over the prophets can be understood by different explanations. Both the perfection of the city and the perfection of the Mutawāḥḥid do not require any divine law; rather they require communication with the active intellect. This communication is not perfect with the prophets while it is perfect with the philosophers. Thus the city needs a philosopher more than a prophet. Perhaps the prophets are needed in the case of imperfect cities, when God sends his messengers and prophets to the people who do not have other means for contacting Him. The prophets provide the Sharā'i (laws) for those who are in need of them. The Sharā'i are God's gift to people, while His gift to those whom He desires is to draw them nearer to Him by providing them with the knowledge of His essence. That is the significance of man's intellect, God's dearest creation.

Ibn Bājjā never spoke about the Rasūl (God's messenger) in

the plural. This certainly has its significance, for "Muhammad" has no particular status which distinguishes him from other prophets as it is generally believed among Muslims. This departure from the common belief, alongside with our philosopher's attitude concerning the higher rank of the philosophers over the prophets, places him directly outside Islam. This is because the author of the Tadbīr wants to draw "the full logical consequences of the method of rational interpretation". He refuses any compromise between theological attitudes and philosophical interpretation concerning both future life and prophecy. This is natural, for if we try to discover the difference between his attitude and the attitudes of previous Muslim philosophers, we come to a very important result; it is a difference between rationalism and intellectualism, "if the attitude of the other Falāsifa can rightly be termed intellectualism, his is Abū Bakr undiluted rationalism".

It is true that both "al-Fārābī" and "Ibn Sīnā" connect the revelation with rationalization and identify it with the active intellect - as Ibn Bājjā does - in an attempt to solve the biggest problem of Islamic philosophy, but neither one of them draws the only logical conclusion which has nothing in common with the general belief of Islam. That is to say to put the prophets outside the perfect city and to be interested only in the philosopher and his happiness and perfection. Surely, the writer of the Tadbīr mentions the inspired people and the

prophet and does not ignore them completely, for they receive their inspiration from the active intellect, but he denies them any role in the perfect city, or at least he ignores it. He is only concerned about the Mutawāḥḥid and his Tadbīr, which cannot be accomplished except through rationalization.

Probably "Ibn Tufayl" after Abū Bakr, is the closest philosopher to the latter both in time and in being interested about the philosopher in his isolation. Ibn Tufayl the author of Ḥay b. Yaqzān 57 allows his philosopher to grow up alone in an isolated island where he can, only through his intellect, solve the philosophical problems and attain happiness and perfection. Ḥay was able through his sharp intellect and fine nature to reach the same results which any Aristotelian philosopher may know through studying and learning. Yet, fortunately or not, Ḥay agrees completely with prophets and religious messengers. Both reach the same results and attain the same knowledge, because Ibn Tufayl's philosopher becomes a kind of Robinson Crusoe who follows a mystic path and turns into a speculative mystic instead of continuing his intellectual discovery and remaining a rational philosopher. This is the departure point between the two men, Ibn Bājjā, the first philosopher in Islamic Spain and his successor Ibn Tufayl.

In the introduction of his philosophical romance Ibn Tufayl particularizes Abū Bakr by the larger account of that of other philos-

ophers. Perhaps he wants to show his indebtedness to Abū Bakr for having access to both Risālat al-Ittisāl and Tadbīr al-Mutawāḥhid.

He expresses his respect to Ibn Bājja by the following sentence which we choose from among many:

"There was none among them (i.e. the philosophers) of more penetrating intelligence, sounder in investigation or with truer views than Abū Bakr b. al Ṣā'igh" 58

Despite the fact that Ibn Ṭufayl was the first successor of Ibn Bājja, that he had access to the latter works and that he was fully aware of Abū Bakr's rational stand, he reached different results. His result was similar to that of all other Aristotelian Muslim philosophers, such as al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and even Ibn Rushd. For Ibn Bājja, the intellect; this was the beginning and the end.

[5] Conclusion:

Ibn Bājja does not mention Ibn Sīnā at all. He derives his political philosophy directly from Plato and al-Fārābī, but he does not agree with them in considering that political activity is the most essential duty of the philosopher. He believes that under unnatural conditions similar to his, which are unfavourable and not likely "to be changed for better in any foreseeable future" the philosopher ought to withdraw. It is evident that his stand concerning the philosopher's withdrawal is a shift of emphasis from the perfect city to the perfect individual who should commune with his fellow philosopher in spirit if not actually. Ibn Bājja's suggestion is very logical, because the final goal of the philosopher is union with the Active

Intellect, and that union is not "dependent upon living in the ideal philosophic city but could be achieved in solitude".⁵⁹

Perhaps it is noteworthy to formulate the difference between Ibn Bājjā and other Muslim philosophers by saying that all Muslim philosophers except Abū Bakr were convinced that the Muslim Sharī'a has equality with, if not superiority over, the ideal city of Plato. In addition, all of them, except Ibn Bājjā, try to intermediate between Sharī'a and philosophy, and try to identify the prophet with the philosophers or the Muslim leader with the head of the perfect city. It is a unique stand of a unique man.

Despite his platonic inspirations, thought and terms, Ibn Bājjā is not interested at all in the qualities of the ruler, his duties and his constitutional forms. We find no place in his thoughts for Sharī'a nor for Plato's Nawāmīs (laws). The Mutawahhid does not need the perfect city; and even if it exists, he is not obliged to live in it. He can become the nearest to God, only by knowledge gained by the speculative faculty and science. Ibn Bājjā ignores the insistence of Aristotle that man is social and political by nature with full awareness of that, for the city is not important when the metaphysician can through his striving intellect, unite⁶⁰ with God.

Finally, it may be useful to end our discussion concerning

Ibn Bājjā by hearing the opinion of another philosopher of him, for it is the most accurate account which we ever can find about Abū Bakr in the classical philosophical writings in Islam. That is Ibn Ṭufayl's opinion. He said:

Those who grew up in Spain endowed with superior intelligence, before the spread of logic and philosophy there, spent their lives in the study of mathematics, in which they made great advances, but were incapable of anything more. Then there grew up after - them a generation...then there grew up after them another generation, possessing greater insight and nearer to the truth: there was none among them of more penetrating intelligence, sounder in investigation or with truer views than Abū Bakr b. al-Šā'igh, except that worldly affairs engaged him, so that death cut him off before the appearing of the treasures of his knowledge and the divulging of the secrets of his wisdom. Most of his existing works are imperfect and unfinished, such as his book on the Soul, the Tadbīr al-Mutawahhid and what he wrote on logic and natural science. As for his finished books, they are short books and hasty treatises. He, himself, said so expressly, mentioning that "the idea which he attempts to prove" in the treatise on the Union "is not to be perfectly understood there except with great trouble and inconvenience", 61 and that "the arrangement of the exposition is in some places not according to the most perfect method, and he had not the time to change it". 62 Such is the condition in which this man's knowledge has reached us...

A page or two previously Ibn Ṭufayl had said apropos of the delight which accompanies the "union of the intellect with man" that Ibn Bājjā had not kept his promise to explain the nature of the union in detail.

PART TWO

TRANSLATION

OF

TADBIR AL-MUTAWAHHID

THE REGIME OF THE SOLITARY

From what he said - may God be pleased with him -

Concerning

TADBIR AL-MUTAWAHHID

(The régime of the Solitary)

Abū Bakr Ibn al-Ṣā'igh

- may God have mercy with him -

said:

ARTICLE I

The expression Tadbīr "régime" in the language of the Arabs, is used in many(different) ways, which are enumerated by their philologists. The most common usage, in general, is to indicate the arrangement of actions in relation to ¹ an intended end. Hence it is not used in relation to a person who performs one single action by which he intends a certain end. If a man believes an action to be single, he would not call it Tadbīr: if he believes it to be manifold and deals with it as an action having Tartīb (arrangement), then he calls that arrangement Tadbīr. Thus they say that God is the Mudabbir (manager) of the world. This Tadbīr might be potential or actual, but it more frequently and obviously indicates what is ² potential. It is clear that if the arrangement belongs to potential affairs it must be intellectual, for this is particular to the intellect and is possible through it alone. Therefore it exists only for man. When the expression Mudabbir (manager) is used, it is done so in an analogical way, for Tadbīr refers to priority and posteriority. The expression Tadbīr might be used as the name for the process of bringing this arrangement into existence - insofar as it is created. This is more frequent and apparent in man's actions, less so in the actions of the irrational animal. When Tadbīr is used in this way, it is employed in generality and particularity. When used in gen-

erality it refers to all man's actions, whatever they may be.

Although used in relation to both the professions (the practical arts) and the capacities,³ it is more frequent and evident in relation to the capacities. That is why [Fol. 165 v] it is used to indicate the arrangement of the crafts of shoemaking and weaving. When thus used it again possesses (both) generality and particularity. When it possesses generality it is employed in relation to all actions included in the arts which are called capacities, as I have summarized in the book of al-'Ilm al-Madanī ⁴ (Political Science) Possessing particularity, it is used in relation to the Tadbīr of the cities.

Some things for which the expression Tadbīr is used are above others in honour and perfection; the noblest of these is the Tadbīr of the cities and that of the home. Yet it is rarely used in relation to the latter, and then not without qualification and restraint. As for the Tadbīr of war and similar subjects, they are divisions of these two kinds. God's Tadbīr of the world is of a different nature which is very far from even the closest meaning. This is the absolute "régime", and the most noble. It is called Tadbīr only on account of the supposed similarity between it and God's creation of the world. Evidently this type of analogical term is farthest from being univocal; it is almost purely equivocal. The common people use it in an analogical way, while philosophers apply it in a purely equivocal way. They enumerate it among the analogical terms only insofar as an object is called by the name of its likeness. This type is not included among the analogical terms on account of its rarity. That is

why common people do not describe God's Tadbīr correctly. They say that His Tadbīr of the world is "correct", "precises", "perfect", and the like. These expressions imply more than just correctness. According to common people, "correct action" is the genus designated for all precise and perfect actions, the discussion of this is to be found elsewhere.

When the expression Tadbīr is used in a general sense, as we use it, it indicates the Tadbīr of the cities; when used in a particular sense, it is divided into correct and false. It is sometimes believed that the Tadbīr is free of these two opposites; when examined and pursued, however, it appears that they necessarily adhere to it. This is knowable even for those with the least knowledge of political philosophy. Therefore the two types which are characterized by the expression Tadbīr may be divided into correct and false.

As for the Tadbīr of the cities, Plato has clarified its nature in his Political Science (the Republic). He also clarified the meaning of "correctness" in relation to it and how "falsity" applies to it. He has undertaken the task of dealing with what had already been said concerning it, and has confirmed the meaning of virtue, ignorance and vice in relation to it.

As for the Tadbīr of the home, it is - as such - a part of

the city. He (Plato) has there explained that the home is natural for man alone. He has explained also that the best existence for a part is its being just a part; that is why he has not made the Tadbīr of the home part of Political Science. He has already spoken of it in regard to Political Science⁵ explaining there what the home is, how it exists, that its best existence is communal, and the nature of its communality. As for the home in cities other than the perfect city - namely, the four types which were enumerated⁶ - its existence is imperfect, and it has unnatural elements. That first home is the only perfect one, to which no additional element may be added without its turning into a defect, as in the case of a sixth finger. It is the characteristic of the perfect home that any additional element in it [Fol. 166 v] is a defect. It is its characteristic also that all other homes are imperfect and diseased in relation to it, because the states by which a home differs from the perfect home lead to its destruction and perdition. That is why these states are like sickness.

Some people have undertaken the task of dealing with the Tadbīr of these imperfect homes - namely, the sick homes. The declarations of those whose books have reached us are eloquent (i.e., unscientific). What we have said - that all homes, except the perfect one, are sick and distorted, and that they do not exist in a natural way but rather in an artificial way - is clear. That is why their virtues, except for those which they share with the perfect home are also artificial. The doctrine of the perfect home has a

necessary and known order. As a result of this shared part, the doctrine (of the imperfect home) is also necessarily scientific, since no home is devoid of many things - natural parts of it - which are in common with the perfect home. If a home were devoid of these it would be unable to continue to exist, and it would be a home in name only. Let us abandon this discussion and leave it to one who has free time to deal with it.

Furthermore, the perfection of the home is not among the things which are desirable in themselves; rather, it is desirable for the perfection of the city or for the realization of the natural end of Man. It is clear that concern for the latter case forms part of concern for Man's "régime" for himself. Either the home is part of the city and concern for it is part of concern for the cities, or it is a preliminary step towards another end and concern for it is part of that end. From this it becomes clear that concern for the régime of the home, as is well known, neither has benefit nor is a science. If it were so, it would be so only temporarily, as occurs (accidentally) in the literary books of the rhetoricians which they call psychological - such as Kalilah wa Dimnah⁷ and Hukamā' ul-'Arab⁸ (The Wise Men of the Arabs), which contain recommendations and admonitory discourses. Most of this exists as chapters of a book: e.g., in the chapters concerning the company of the Sultan, association with friends and so on. What is true in most of this is true only at a certain time and in certain types of way of life. When the way of

life changes, the ideas which are universal also change; they become particular after having been universal, and harmful and renounced after having been beneficial. You can see that clearly if you become acquainted with the contents of the books written on that subject and if you compare each idea with those of a later time.

The perfect city is characterized by the absence of the arts of medicine and jurisprudence, because relations among all the citizens are based on love and there is no dispute among them at all. When a part of it is devoid of love and disputes occur, then there is need for the establishment of justice and a necessity for someone to establish it; namely, the Qāḍī (judge). Further, all actions in the perfect city are proper; this is its characteristic. Hence its people do not eat harmful foods. Therefore they do not need knowledge of remedies for choking caused by (poison) mushrooms or other similar things. Nor (do they require) knowledge of how to cure (excessive) drinking, since nothing which is not properly in order exists there. Similarly, when the citizens forsake [Fol. 166 v] physical exercise, many types of sickness appear. It is clear that all this does not occur in the perfect city, where there is need for perhaps nothing more than extracting (teeth), etc., and in general, (to provide for) those sicknesses, the immediate causes of which are external and which the healthy body cannot by itself resist. It has been observed that severe wounds of healthy people cure themselves spontaneously; other instances prove the same. Therefore, the

characteristic of the perfect city is the absence of both doctor and judge, while one of the common characteristics of the four simple⁹ (types of) cities is to be in need of both doctors and judges. The further a city is removed from the perfect city, the more it needs them, and the more honourable is the rank of these two kinds of people.

It is clear that in the perfectly virtuous city every citizen is given the best of that for which he is prepared. All of its opinions are correct; none are false. Its actions are exclusively and absolutely virtuous ones; every action - outside it if it is virtuous - is so (only) in relation to certain existent corruption. Cutting an organ from the body is essentially harmful, but it may be accidentally useful for one whom an adder has stung; for his body regains soundness by cutting away the organ. Similarly, scammony is essentially harmful, but it is useful for one who has (certain kinds) of sickness. These matters have been summarized in the Nicomachean¹⁰ Ethics. It is clear then that every view - different from that of the citizens - which comes into existence in the perfect city is false, and every action different from what usually takes place in it, is wrong. The false neither has any definite nature nor is able to be¹¹ known as explained in the Book of Proof. As for wrong action, it is possible that it be done in order to achieve another goal. Books have been written concerning actions which are possible to be observed,

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such al-Hiyal of "Banu Shakir!" The contents of these books are in the nature of amusement and are intended as objects of wonder. They have no purpose concerning the essential perfection of man; concern with them is device and ignorance. Thus in the perfect city there is no place for the ideas of those who believe and act in a way different from that of the perfect city. Such is possible in the four other cities. There a man may fall short in respect to an action, and (still) be led (to the good) naturally or by learning it from another and performing it. It is possible there to hold a false opinion, and yet a certain man may recognize its falsity. (It is possible there also) to have false sciences in none of which the citizens believe or in most of which contradictions are accepted and that a man may, either naturally or by learning it from another, find the correct alternative of two contradictories. There is no name for he who discovers proper actions and learns correct knowledge not existing in the city. These men who hit upon correct views that do not exist in a city, or the contraries of which are held in the city, are called al-Nawābit (weeds).¹³

The more numerous their ideas and the greater their effect, the more does this name apply to them. Although this name is used specifically for them, it can be applied in a general way to any man who does not share the belief of the citizens of the city, whether true or false. This name was transferred to them from those plants which grow up spontaneously among the sown crops. Let us use it exclusively to mean those who have correct views. It is clear that one of the characteristics of the

perfect city is the absence of al-Nawābit (weeds) [Fol. 167 v]; whether we use this expression in its special sense - for there are no false views therein, or in the general sense - for if it had "weeds", it would become sick, lose its nature and cease to be perfect. The four other types of cities may have "weeds". This is the cause of the occurrence of the perfect city, as is explained elsewhere.

All the cities both at the present time and previously,¹⁴ according to most of what has reached us - except what Abū Naṣr tells about the early type of Persian cities - are composed of the five¹⁵ types. Most of what exists are among the four (imperfect) types of cities. Discussion of this we leave to someone who has time for dealing with the types that exist at the present time. The three groups (classes of people), the "weeds", the judges and the doctors, exist or can exist in these types. Happy people, if they exist in¹⁶ these cities, have only the happiness of the solitary man; and the sound Tadbīr (for them) would be the Tadbīr of the solitary, whether there be one such solitary person or more than one, so long as neither a nation nor a city agrees on their view. These are the persons meant by the Sufis when they speak of "strangers", for although they live in their countries and among their comrades and neighbours they are strangers in their views and have travelled in their thoughts to¹⁷ other levels which become for them their countries - and so on.

In this essay we intend to discuss the Tadbīr of this solitary man. It is clear that (by living in an imperfect city) he lives in unnatural circumstances. We shall discuss how he should guide himself to attain the best of his existences. Similarly the doctor - in the case of a sick man in these cities - discusses how to manage in order that the patient be well, either by preserving his health as Galen wrote in the Book of Preservation of Health, or by restoring it when it ceases to exist as I have written in the Art of Medicine.

This discourse is similarly applicable to the Mufarrad (solitary) "weed"; viz. how he is to obtain happiness when it does not exist, or how he is to eliminate the obstacles which prevent him from obtaining happiness or as much of it as possible, is measured by the limit of his insight or by what has settled in his soul. Preserving happiness, which is similar to preserving health, is possible neither in the three types of city, nor in what is composed of them. The view of Galen or others concerning this matter is like alchemy and astrology.

The one (the weed) establishes the medicine of souls; the other (the doctor), the medicine of bodies; the ḥukkām (government), the medicine of social relations. It is clear then that these two latter kinds of people are eliminated completely from the perfect city. Therefore these (two types of medicine) are not reckoned among

the sciences. Similarly, both what we are discussing (here) and its usefulness are eliminated when the city becomes perfect. Similarly the science of medicine, the art of judicature and other sciences derived from the imperfect Tadbīr are eliminated. Just as sound views in medicine rest upon the physical sciences and (sound) jurisprudence upon the science of politics, in similar fashion this (science) is based upon both the natural (physical) sciences and the science of politics.

ARTICLE II

CHAPTER:

Every living being (plant) shares some qualities with inanimate beings, as does every animal with living beings and every man with irrational animals. Living and inanimate beings share with each other the elements of which they are composed, like (the quality of) descending naturally but rising only forcibly, etc. Animals share [Fol. 167 v] these qualities with living beings since both are made of the same element. They also have in common the actions of the nutritive and generative souls, as well as the soul of growth. In a similar way, man shares all these faculties with irrational animals, as well as perception, imagination, memory and the acts resulting from them. These constitute the animal soul. But man is distinguished from all these species by the rational faculty and what cannot exist except through it. Thus he is the only one who possesses rationality. What distinguishes man from the irrational animal has already been investigated.

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Since man is composed of the elements, he is linked with necessary actions wherein he has no choice, such as falling from above, being burned with fire, and so on. Hence he is associated with living beings in one of their aspects - viz., the plant -

and this also links him with actions in which he has no choice at all, such as retention. A form of necessity might fall among these actions, like what a man may commit under the stress of extreme fear, and like cursing a friend and killing his father or brother over a matter of property. In these last actions, however, there is a choice. An account of all this is given in the Nicomachean Ethics.

All that exists naturally for man and all actions that are particular to him are governed by choice, and every action governed by man's choice is not found in other types of bodies. The human actions by which (man) is particularized are those which are governed by choice because everything which man does by his choice is a human act, and every human action is an act of choice. I mean by the expression "choice" the will which is the result of deliberation. The inspirations, revelations and, in general, intellectual affections (impressions) - if it is possible for the intellect to have affections - which are associated with man are particular to him alone. The conditions surrounding man's choice of actions which are connected with the animal soul should be established because the action of irrational animals is preceded by whatever affection occurs in the animal soul. Man might act that way also, as when he runs away out of fear. This (kind of) action belongs to man in respect to the animal soul. For example, one who breaks a stone which strikes him or a stick which scratches him performs animal actions. The man who, however, breaks a stick so that it may not scratch another or

because of certain deliberations which necessitated its breakage, performs a human action. The same is true for every action which man performs for no other purpose but the mere doing of it, or one which he performs with no purpose intended (in mind), at all. Yet if there is a purpose to be served of which he is unaware, then his action is animal and comes exclusively from the animal soul.

An example is that of a man who eats plums because of his desire for them and accidentally gets diarrhea of which he was in need. Such an act is (essentially) animal and accidentally human. If a man is aware of the nature of plums and eats them, not because of his desire for them but rather to stimulate diarrhea, and it also happens accidentally that he desires the plums, then such an act is (essentially) human and accidentally animal, for only accidentally was the useful action desirable. Animal action is that which is preceded only by a psychological affection in the soul, such as desire, anger, fear and the like. Human action is that which is preceded by something necessitated in the agent by the intellect, and it is the same whether the psychological affection precedes the intellectual act or follows it. [Fol. 168 v] What is important here is that man's motive is necessitated by the intellect as such, etc., whether the thought is certain or arbitrary. The motive of the animal action is the affection that occurs in the animal soul, and the motive of
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human action is the opinion or belief that exists in the soul.

The majority of human actions in the four "ways of life" and their composition, consists of human and animal elements. Rarely is the animal element isolated from the human, because it is necessary for a man in his natural state except in unusual circumstances, even though the cause of his motion be affection - to think how he should act. Therefore, the human part makes use of his animal nature in order to restrict its action. As for the human element, it can exist apart from the animal; medical treatment is part of this kind of element. But in the latter case (the human element) may be accompanied by certain affection in the animal soul.²⁴ If this affection supports a human view, then its realization is more frequent and stronger, and if it opposes a view, its realization is weaker and less frequent.

The man who acts for the sake of (right) opinion and judgment (truth), without any regard of his animal soul or of what takes place in it, deserves his action to be (considered) divine rather than human. Therefore, that man is of necessity excellently endowed with the moral virtues, so that when his rational soul decides upon something, his animal soul does not oppose it.²⁵ Rather it decides upon the same thing because the intellect has decided upon it. For the animal soul to be in this state is to have obtained the moral virtues. The moral virtues are the entelechy of the animal soul. Hence the divine man is necessarily excellently endowed with the moral virtues; for if he lacked these virtues and his animal

soul opposed the intellect, then his action would either be imperfect or defective or would not have existed at all. He would perform that action only when forced to do so and it would be very difficult for him, because it is the nature of the animal soul to hearken to and obey the rational soul, except in the case of a man who is not in his natural (state) as, for example, a man who has the character of a beast. Hence, one overcome by anger at the time resembles a beast in character. That is why he whose animal soul overcomes his rational soul, so that he is in accordance with his desire which continually opposes his intellect, is an evil man. The beast is better than he. It is well said of him that he is a beast, but he has a man's ability to think by which he perfectly performs that action. Hence his ability to think in that instance is an evil additional to his original evil. It is like good food given to a sick body. As Hippocrates says: "The more you feed a sick body the more you add evil to it".²⁶ We explained this in the commentary we wrote on the seventh of De Auditu,²⁷ and we have inquired into it there.

It is now clear what human, animal and [inanimate] actions are. These are all actions that exist in man, and each is a genus (designation) for what falls under it. As for the inanimate action, it is clear that it is a matter of compulsion and that there is no choice in it, as we have. It has no purpose at all. Hence, we cannot refrain from doing it, because we do not do it by our will.²⁸ Animal action also has no purposes, but it is done by our will.

That is why we can refrain from it whenever we wish. It is clear then that purposes are set in respect of human actions only.

ARTICLE III

Discourse Concerning the Spiritual Forms:

Al-Suwaru al-Ruhāniyya

The expression ruh (spirit) is used in the language of the Arabs to mean the same thing for which the expression nafs (soul) is used, but the philosophers used it in an equivocal way. Sometimes they mean by it the (natural) instinctive heat which is the first organ of the soul. Hence the physicians say that the spirits are of three kinds: the natural spirit, the perceptive spirit and the motivative spirit. They mean by the natural spirit the nutritive one, because in their art they apply the expression "nature" to the nutritive soul. The expression "spirit" is used for the soul but not for the soul as such, rather from the viewpoint that it is a motivative soul. "Soul" and "spirit" are different expressions but they have the same substratum. The expression "spiritual" is related to the spirit if it indicates the second meaning (i.e. the perceptive spirit). They indicate by it the immobile substances²⁹ which set other substances in motion. By necessity these are not bodies, but rather forms of bodies, because every body is necessarily in motion.

The pattern of this expression (rūhānī) is not Arabic. It is a (foreign) expression in the language of the Arabs, of a type which has no pattern according to the Arab grammarians because one says rūhī, according to their rule, (and not rūhānī. The philosophers use this form in rare expressions, such as Jismāniyya (corporeality) and nafsāniyya (psychicness). As for the expression hayūlāniyya (Materiality) it is also a foreign expression in their language. The farther the substance is removed for corporeality the more it deserves this name (rūhānī). That is why the philosophers believe that the substances which deserve this name more than any other are the active intellect and the substances which set the celestial bodies in motion.

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The spiritual forms are of (four) different types: the first is the forms of the celestial bodies, the second is the active (intellectus in actu) and the acquired (intellectus acquisitus) intellects, the third is the corporeal intelligibles, and the fourth is the concepts which exist in the (different) faculties of the soul, namely in the sensus communis, the imaginative faculty and the recollective faculty. The first is not material in any sense. As for the third ³¹ it has a direct relation with matter, and it is said to be material because it is constituted of the material intelligibles which are not essentially spiritual since they exist in matter. As for the second it is absolutely non-material since it has never at any time been necessarily material. Nevertheless, it has relation with matter,

because it either perfects the material intelligibles as in the case of the intellectus acquisitus, or it creates them as in the case of the intellectus in actu. As for the fourth type, it is in the middle, intermediary between the material intelligibles and the spiritual forms.

Since the first kind has nothing to do with what we are concerned with in this discourse, we leave it out. We shall be concerned here only with the absolute spiritual form, which is the intellectus in actu and what is related to it, namely, the intelligibles. We shall call these intelligibles the universal spiritual forms, and we shall call what comes below, down to the forms existing in the Sensus Communis, the particular spiritual forms. We shall explain later why we specify the latter as particular and the former as [Fol. 169 v] universal. The universal spiritual forms have only one particular relation, and that is with the man who conceives them. The particular spiritual forms have two relations. The first is particular, and that is their relation with the object of sense; the other is universal, namely their relation with the sense - organ that perceives them. An example of all this is the form of the mountain of ³²'Uhud as it exists in a person who has perceived it without actually seeing the mountain. That is its particular spiritual form because it has particular relation to the mountain. We call it mountain. It makes no difference to us whether we say "this is Mount 'Uhud" referring to it in its place as a visual perception or

indicating it as existing in the Sensus Communis after having been perceived in a particular perception such as the imagination. Its universal relation is its relation to each one of those who has seen the mountain, and many people have seen it. The matter of the particular spiritual form and its types is explained in al-Hiss wa-al-Mahsus (De Sensu et Sensibili) where they were investigated as natural phenomena. These two relations are discussed in that book without an explanation of their different types.

The human "régime" makes use of the different types of these relations as can be seen in what is explained later (in the book). It is clarified there ³³ that (the spiritual forms) existing in the Sensus Communis are the lowest level of spiritual forms, then come those existing in the imaginative faculty, then those existing in the recollective faculty. The highest and most perfect of the spiritual forms are those existing in the rational faculty. The first three of these are all corporeal, but the corporeality present in the Sensus Communis is greater than the corporeality present in the imaginative faculty, and the corporeality present in imaginative faculty is greater than that present in the forms of the recollective faculty. There is no corporeality at all in the form of the rational faculty. Hence, the particular relation between it (the rational faculty) and the person eliminated. Whenever there is a particular relation, corporeality occurs; and because of corporeality a particular relation occurs. When corporeality is eliminated (the forms)

become purely spiritual; nothing remains except their universal relation which is their relation with their individuals. Similarly, when corporeality is eliminated completely from these forms, they will have relation to it only in a different aspect.

It is clear now that predication is the result of the difference between the two relations. As for the universal relation it consist of predicating a universal (concept) of one of its individuals. The outcome is a particular proposition which has a universal predicate. As for the particular relation, its outcome is particular proposition, the predicate of which is a particular individual. The other types of propositions, whatever the relation (between their subject and their predicates), are discussed elsewhere. We have already explained all that in what we have written concerning the intelligibles.³⁴ Our claim that corporeality is included in these spiritual forms is discussed in the second part of the book De Sensu et Sensibili.

CHAPTER:

The different types of concepts (spiritual forms) which we have are either true or false, essential or accidental and certain or doubtful. It is clear - for one who has sight (knowledge) concerning the art of logic - that the certain concept is necessarily true (while) the doubtful concept could be false as well as true.

Our concern here is that we consider what is accidental [Fol. 169v] as part of what is doubtful and true. The spiritual forms of all types, can be viewed as true or false, because our senses could be false. An example of that is one who speaks to imaginary persons owing to hallucination or one who has a false taste due to certain sickness. Thus, man might have a true or false impression concerning the various spiritual forms. The best of the spiritual forms are those which are true or those which have passed through the Sensus Communis. We can have concepts of ancient well established matters without direct experience, such as the famous poet Umrū' l-Qays, as well as having concept of the imaginary world of Yajūg wa Majūg³⁵ without perceiving it. These spiritual ruṣūm (images) have not passed through the Sensus Communis, and thus most of them are false. An account of how they could be true is to be found in the second article of De Sensu et Sensibili.

It is a condition of these to pass through the Sensus Communis. If some true concepts have not passed through the Sensus Communis, then, some things taking their place should pass through it. These alternatives are either their names or what indicates them, which should pass through the representative faculty also and reside in the recollective faculty. These could be real as in the case of Umrū' l-Qays, or imaginary as in the case of Kalila wa Dimna.³⁶ The imaginary ones are found in fabricated stories. There might be another type of spiritual form which neither its person nor its name

nor what indicates it has passed through the Sensus Communis; this might be coming from the active intellect and by the intermediation of the rational faculty, especially concerning future events which are still in potentiality such as true visions and common divinations. An account of this is to be found in the last part of II De Sensu. These forms do not exist by man's choice nor has he any influence, which may concern our subject, in bringing them into existence. Furthermore they exist in the individual man only on rare occasions. Hence this type of existent cannot constitute an art at all, nor can such a thing be a human "régime". That is why it does not belong to our subject. Divine inspirations are similar to these. The person who has this type of inspiration is called "an inspired person". 'Umar b. al-Khattāb³⁷ - May God be pleased with him - is one of this group of people, according to what is related by the traditionists. The possessors of the true opinions belong to this group too, but the difference between them and inspired people is that one of the two parts which comprise (necessarily) every contradictory proposition (namely the true part) comes to the person of true opinion prior to the other part. This is necessary for all men, but with men (other than the possessors of true opinions) the false part (of the proposition) is prior, in most cases; they think that it is not derived from a syllogism. For the inspired person, on the other hand, the true part alone emerges without its contrary, and without a reminder which calls his attention to it. He does not have a desire for knowing that contrary (false part) neither by his intellect nor

through a syllogism. The correct part is not therefore a part of a contradiction at all, according to him. Confirmation only emerges before the possessor of the true opinion; and both conception and confirmation emerge before the inspired person. Aristotle has an account of all that in the II De Sensu et Sensibili. Qualities (of the inspired person) such as these exceed the natural custom; that is, they are divine talents. They cannot produce an art, because they exist in only a few people.

Most people belong to an intermediary position which is a mixed state. The best position among these various possibilities is to have most of one's opinions true and not confused, except in those cases where opinions are naturally confused. [Fol. 170 v]. The lowest of all positions is to have most of one's opinions false - that is, always to accept the least of them only; anyone occupying this position is known as a person of remote opinions. The opposite to this is to accept most of the opinions which belong either to a subject or to what is connected with it as true. These opinions are not articulated because of their obscurity or because of their multiplicity. Such a person renders opinions of equal truth and falsity or of less truth than falsity either necessary or most probable. This condition has no proper name and it appears mostly in a person of great experience, who gives attentive consideration to relations. Such persons are known as "experienced people". They can rarely be cheated, while the young (i.e. inexperienced) are more able to be

cheated. Aristotle has an account of that in Rhetoric.

The false spiritual forms are those which do not exist either because their subject do not exist, as in the case of proverbs, or because the subjects exist but have no predicates. The predicate in a false proposition can be tenfold.

(a) Impossible. The example of this is what the Arabs used to relate about Zargā ul-Yamāma³⁸ or Ta'abbata Sharra³⁹ and what the Christians used to relate about a group of people who have built temples, giving their names to them, then have been killed and brought back into existence and then burned and brought again to life; they used to see it as a divine affair. What has been told by the Arabs is also included in doubtful opinions.

(b) Possible in reality. The example of this is the claim that Zayd is a grammarian when he, in fact, is not a grammarian because grammar may exist as a possibility for a certain man even though he has not actually learned it. Yet he is thought to have learned it.

The certain predicates of particular forms are those predicates the individuals of which exist in the corporeal forms, and hence are perceived by (external) senses. These should necessarily pass through the Sensus Communis. It is sufficient with regard to certainty in some of them, to perceive them by one of the senses only. This group comprises the particular objects of sense such as colour

for sight, sound for hearing and so on of what was mentioned in the *De Sensu et Sensibili* regarding the necessary conditions of that. It is not sufficient in some others, namely, the common objects of sense, to perceive them by one sense only. Certainty can be achieved only when all the senses cooperate together, and they may require the rational faculty. Take for example the claim that a visible person is alive; it is not sufficient here to use sight alone without touch, because he might have fainted, or sight without the rational faculty, because he might have had obstruction in the veins, so that he does not breathe and loses all manifestations of life except those which touch can determine, for touch can lead to certainty in relation to them. Therefore we use the rational faculty for other things which can be perceived in him; for example, we open a vein and let hot blood flow out or place a piece of cotton or a mirror near his mouth in order to see the humidity of his breathing, because breathing could be so hidden that senses cannot perceive it. Certainty in the particular forms could occur through the (external) senses or through syllogism, as for example (the certainty that) a wall must have a builder. But syllogism recalls the rational spiritual form of a thing. Thus the form which occurs in the *Sensus Communis* is different from the shapes which the thing has now or has had before and which are perceived by sense. That is why the *Sensus Communis* varies in persons who have seen that construction in recalling the form of the builder. The reason for this difference is that the form has not existed in all three faculties which recall the

spiritual forms as they were in their corporeal existence. If the three faculties agree, [Fol. 170 v] then the spiritual form would appear to be tangible. Whenever the three faculties agree, truth becomes necessary and they reveal wonder at their union.

This is what the Sufis (mystics) thought to be the final end for man, and they used to say in their prayers: "May God unite you and assign your unity"⁴⁰ because, by falling short of catching the pure spiritual forms, they consider the previous spiritual forms instead of the pure one. And since these previous ones are false upon their separation, they felt that these are always true upon their unity. They thought that the unity of the forms is the ultimate happiness. When these faculties agree, they bring to the person unusual forms, and potential objects of sense which have excellent sight and soul of greater dignity in this world. Thus they thought that the (ultimate) end is to attain this state. Hence al-Ghazālī says that he has attained high spiritual experience and that he has witnessed the spiritual substances. He mentioned the greatness of his visions in⁴¹ the words of the poet.

"Something happened of what I do not remember"

That is why the Sufis claim that attainment of the ultimate happiness may occur without learning, but rather through devotion and dedication of oneself to the continual remembrance⁴² of God. When the person does that, the (different) faculties agree and the attainment of that state

becomes possible. All this is a matter of opinion. The effect of what the Sufis thought is unnatural phenomena. The end which they thought to be the ultimate end, if it were to be a true one and an end for the solitary man, then it should be obtained essentially and not accidentally, but it is in fact obtained accidentally (here) and not essentially. This means that the most honourable part of man is an appendage which has no role to play. It follows that this part (the intellect) exists in vain. This fact renders false, not only all doctrines and the three sciences which constitute theoretical wisdom (philosophy), but also the conceptual arts such as grammar and the like. The rational method is the essential way to attain the certainty of the predicates of the spiritual forms. Certainty might occur - accidentally - in the chain of traditions, but that occurs only through the agreement of the rational with the recollective faculty. If sense does not agree with both of them the form of a thing would not appear as it is in external existence. Take for example the certainty that the Nile⁴³ is in Egypt. If the Sensus Communis does not agree with the other two faculties, then the spiritual form of Egypt and the location of the Nile in relation to it in the Sensus Communis of the person who did not see them in their external existence is not certain. If they agree for a certain man,⁴⁴ then the City of Fustat, and the location of the Nile in relation to it would be for him as they are in the external existence. He would witness the objects of the spiritual forms (exactly) as they are in their existence. As for the spiritual forms which occur in

the recollective faculty of a thing and which the other faculties acquire from the recollective faculty, all these and their predicates are probable, except for forms certainty of which had occurred to them in the way which we have already mentioned, namely, accidentally. The false spiritual forms occur in many ways, sometimes, in the particular objects. These are accidental as in the case of a man who stays a long time in the smoke of pine wood, so his face becomes black in a way that it is thought to be actually black. Similarly in the case of sounds and all other objects of sense. The common object of sense, some of which are the illusions of the senses, like a person moving in the sea who would see the mountains also moving. Some of the magicians' arts are also among these. If something cannot be perceived, not because it is imperceptible, but because it is absent, or because the substance [Fol. 171 v] which possesses^{es} its spiritual form has decayed, it is considered absent in relation to the senses, although it is present in reality. This is even more so in the case of things which remain absent for a long time. Such things have other causes which are not difficult to enumerate, but counting causes lies beyond our concern. We do not aim here to count all kinds of "régime" but rather to ascertain the true "régime" which is the most excellent Tadbīr, for it is just possible that through it the Solitary man may attain essential happiness. As for the practice of lying it enters only into the attainment of happiness by the inhabitants of imperfect cities; yet not lying as such but lying by means of symbols. All

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this was investigated in the political sciences. Our (sole) concern here is the "Régime" of the Solitary. The false spiritual forms produce hypocrisy, cunning and other similar abilities. These and similar things have great importance in the cities existing (in this time) to the extent that the person who knows them is considered to be wise, and they are considered as wisdom itself. The common people consider these (vices) and other characteristics of imperfect cities to be rationality (itself), of which Aristotle speaks in the Sixth.⁴⁷ When they hear the conditions set by Aristotle concerning reasoning, that the reasonable person is virtuous, their minds reject what they hear. Many of them believe that this is frivolity, defective understanding and a kind of stupidity. Hence some people esteem Mu'āwiya more higher than 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib - May God be pleased with him - with respect to Firmness.⁴⁸ If all this is examined carefully, it appears that the reality is contrary to what they believe. We will clarify this later on.

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The essential conditions for the absolute spiritual forms is that the Intelligibles are their essential predicates. An account of this is to be found in the Demonstration. As in the case of the particular spiritual forms, they existed only for the corporeal bodies in a certain way. We do not need to set the condition that each of the rational forms exist through a corporeal object, as this condition was set for the corporeal forms. We need this condition for the existence of the corporeal forms only, because the spiritual

forms of corporeal bodies are particular as we have said before. These forms are accidental if they do not belong to corporeal bodies, as is evident in the case of colours or sensory illusions, or other similar instances which we have enumerated before. This may (sometimes) be due to the falsity of the rational faculty which shares these particular spiritual forms with the objects of reasoning, such as when two existents appear together in a certain time and people think that they are the same thing.

CHAPTER:

Since we want our discussion to be of practical use, we limit ourselves to that which fulfills this end. We will not include that which drives the soul to Tadbīr. Hence, in this chapter, we choose to discuss the type of propositions which are known as ⁵⁰ infi'āliya ⁵¹ in addition to the balāghiyya propositions which describe the fulfillment (attainment) of Tadbīr. When the concepts by which Tadbīr is fulfilled (attained) are conceived they are not merely independent entities (concepts) but they are accompanied by a shadow which belongs to the animal soul. It is because of the shadow that the animal soul desires the attainment of Tadbīr, and obeys and moves in accordance with the demands of Tadbīr.

In a similar way this occurs in all the arts, for example,

the art of calligraphy. The art of calligraphy subsists in the soul by means of the proposition which contains that art. The motive for bringing the action of that art into practice and the confirmation of that art and its action is due to other things which belong to the animal soul.

So we say: the form of every corruptible and existing body has three levels of existence; the first level is the universal spiritual one [Fol. 171 v] , which is the rational level, i.e., the species. The second is the particular spiritual level; and the third is the corporeal level. As for the particular spiritual level, it also has three levels; the first is the conceptual level, which exists in the recollective faculty; the second is the level of image, which exists in the faculty of imagination; and the third is the level of reflection, which exists in the Sensus Communis. Thus a form is either universal or particular. The universal form comprises the universal objects of reasoning, while the particular form is either spiritual or corporeal.

According to the discussion above, every man has different genera of faculties. The first is the rational one, the second is comprised of the three spiritual faculties,⁵³ the third is the perceptive faculty, the fourth is the reproductive faculty, the fifth is the nutritive faculty and that which belongs to it,⁵⁴ and the sixth is the corporeal faculty.⁵⁵ As for what man has of the sixth and

fifth ones, they do not belong to the essence of the living being (animal) at all; that is why some people call them natural faculties⁵⁶ and they call the fifth, the natural faculty.

As for the actions of the sixth faculty, they are absolutely necessary and they have nothing in common with free actions. And as for the actions of the fifth faculty, they likewise are not at all free yet (on the other hand) they are not absolutely obligatory (either), but differ from obligatory actions in that their motivating (causes) are in the body, and yet they require the object of motion which is in the matter, namely, the food; and generally speaking, the object of motion is like the healing of a wound and the like. As for the actions of the fourth they are also similar to those of the fifth, but they are closer to free will, because food is necessary for the sustenance of the body, while fecundation of the sperm in a fertile woman is neither necessary nor does desire lead necessarily (directly) to it. That is clear in itself. Thus, that which leads to fecundation is an act of free will. We will speak about the different kinds of actions later on. One (group of) people consider these actions to be actions of free will, while another group may consider them to be actions of obligation. As for the third faculty, its actions are similar to the previous ones. We consider them also to be necessary actions because they are emotions, but some of them are closer to free will, for example, sight, while some of them are closer to obligation, for example, touch. But we can, if we wish, resist being acted upon by

any of them, for we can escape from heat and secure protection from cold and the like. As for the second faculty, it has actions and emotions; the emotions which emanate (occur-spring out) from it are similar to sense, while the actions are voluntary ones if they are human and obligatory; if they are animal; as we have explained in our commentary in the VII De Auditu Physico. As for the first faculty, both affirmation and apprehension with regard to it are obligatory, because if they were voluntary, we would be able to run away from what harms us, and there would be no justification for Al-Mutanabbi's words: "I run away from it to lie (in vain)" ⁵⁷ if the actions which sprang out from it were absolutely voluntary ones.

Each of the faculties one through four or every faculty of the four ones, ⁵⁸ or a combination of them - has something to do with rationality and with free will (choice); and, since the human actions are voluntary ones, each of the actions of these four faculties has connection with rationality. The organization and the arrangement of man's actions are for the sake of rationality. They belong to rationality for the sake of the goal which people customarily call the result. ⁵⁹

CHAPTER:

Some human actions are voluntary in all their details; that is why it is possible for man to refrain from doing them whenever he

wishes as in the case of weaving, shoemaking and other similar arts. Some other human actions are voluntary in the majority of their details, but their goals are directed towards something else.⁶⁰ These are the human actions in which the rational faculty shares with an irrational element, and such actions include navigation [Fol. 172 v] and farming. Some human actions are only initiated by man. When man has initiated the action another mover takes the responsibility for the completion of the action. An example is procreation, for when man deposits sperm in the womb, he has nothing else to do with the formation of the child.

The first type of action takes the name, of the generic noun; this type is called "the arts and the professions". The second type includes farming and navigation, and it is called capacities. This type is explained in the book of political science⁶¹ (politics). The third type of action is composed of two different parts; the first part is like a cause which is voluntarily initiated by man, while choice has nothing to do with the second part. Hence, the voluntary part belongs to man's free will while the second does not.

CHAPTER:

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Some spiritual forms have states in the soul while others do not. Those which do not have states in the soul are those spiritual forms which occur in an abstract way and which are the result of com-

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monly existing species. For example, when a man sees a man, a spiritual form occurs in his soul. But this spiritual form does not have status ⁶⁴ or any effect in his soul. If the form of the man who was seen is recalled and remembered by the mind it is accidental. For when a man comes across a man who has common features and customary dress, the spiritual form occurring as a result of seeing that man is not recalled except accidentally, because when a part is recalled by the mind only a part of the totality is recalled, and this is accidental also.

When a man sees an individual of a species with which he is not acquainted, like when the people of the North see an elephant, the status of the spiritual form of that individual belongs to the species rather than to the individual elephant, and the form serves as a spiritual form for a species.

Among these forms which have no state in the soul, another type is illustrated by a man who sees a thief. Seeing a thief produces fear and effect in the soul. This effect is general because it is similar to that produced by any thief. Therefore this form also replaces the species. These forms do not call for discussion; they only have incidental importance, as we have said.

The forms which have states are also of different types. Some have natural states such as that of the son and the father; and,

generally, the mammals (animals possessing wombs) because they possess spiritual forms of their immediate relatives (parents and offspring) and there may be discussion of these. Other forms have natural states also, but their states are either of imperfection or perfection. The states of imperfection are, for example, deformity and sickness. Let us (here) call the form which has a state of imperfection "a form which does not have a state", as when we call a person of bad voice "a person who does not have a voice". The states of perfection are psychic and corporeal states. The corporeal states include a beautiful face and a well proportioned body. The psychic states include all (ethical) virtues. In general, when the states are natural and not acquired, they are either corporeal, psychic and intellectual virtues or the opposite of these. Among the states are those which are acquired. These are different types; either arts, capacities, manners, rational faculties or the actions of all these. Among these forms there is also a type which implies relationship; it is divided into dignity and vileness.

Each one of these two parts has benefit and harm for the possessor of the forms. We shall speak about (all) this in detail if we get that far.

Furthermore the spiritual forms are of different levels depending upon their objects. Some levels are more spiritual than others. The form residing in the Sensus Communis makes up the lowest

spiritual level, and it is the form closest to corporeality. That is why this form is expressed by Şanam (the image); hence it is said that the Sensus Communis has within itself the Şanam of an object of senses. Next, is the form existing in the imaginative faculty which is both more spiritual and less corporeal than the previous form. The psychic virtues are related to it. [Fol. 172 v] Next is the form (projected) in the recollective faculty. This form is the highest level of the particular spiritual forms.

By nature, each of these forms is dear to man, and it is rare to find a man without the influence of one of these spiritual forms. All man's actions, if he is a part of a city, are directed towards the city itself, but that is true only in the perfect city. In the four other cities or in any combination of them (we find) every citizen chooses any one of these (forms) as his final goal and is preoccupied with the pleasure of this goal. Then preliminary steps of the perfect city become goals of other cities.

ARTICLE IV

The human actions (are of three main categories:) 65

1. The goal of actions of the first category is to bring into existence the corporeal forms only, as in the case of eating, drinking, clothing oneself and seeking shelter. The elementary aspects of these actions are basic and necessary (to all species), but excess in the variety of food desired, the use of perfume, and, in general, everything which is desired for pleasure only is purely corporeal. These actions include getting intoxicated, playing chess and hunting for pleasure. The person who makes these actions his goal is purely corporeal, but this type of person is very rare. Such a person does not have respect for his spiritual form, nor does he feel it because of the excess of his corporeality. This type of person appears mainly among the successors of the highly ancedered families, and they are responsible for the downfall of nobility. Hence the dynasties of the different nations change at the hands of such persons. Any man can comprehend this on his own, if he gives thought to it. This is not a suitable place to discuss it.

All authorities and well-established opinions agree on rebuking persons of this type. The poet said concerning them:

Oh you, you got gray hair and did not abandon childish
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 manners.

These are the ones who incline to the earthly world and about whom
 God says:

...the tale of him to whom we gave Our revelations,
 but he sloughed them off, so Satan overlooked him and
 he became of those who lead astray. And had We willed
 we could have raised him by their means, but he clung
 to the earth and followed his own lust. 67

These do not pay any attention to the actions of the spiritual forms.
 When these actions come to their attention they disregard them. It
 serves no purpose to blame a person of this type or to ignore him, for

His likeness is as the likeness of a dog;
 if thou attacked him he panteth with his tongue out, 68
 and if thou leavest him he panteth with his tongue out.

These are, as we have said, rare, but they exist. Many are overcome
 by this nature, but they vary in their corporeality and spirituality.

2. The goal of actions of the second category is directed toward the
 spiritual forms, and this category of actions is of different types:
 - the first, is directed towards the spiritual forms of the Sensus
 Communis and this type is frequently associated with the first
 category. These actions are higher because they belong to the second
 category and lower because they belong to the first category. These
 actions are either acquired or natural. The acquired ones are states
 of the natural ones. The most pleasing one is clothing oneself. We
 find that clothing oneself belongs to the natural class while the
 colours of the cloth belong to the acquired class. The spiritual

forms of the Sensus Communis comprehend at one and the same time the clothes and the colours, as they are associated with the clothes, or other similar details of the setting they need not have to do with the clothes. The conditions of housing and the appearance of eating and drinking and their instruments belong to the acquired class. Both the acquired and the natural classes of actions are found combined in many people, and rebuking them becomes difficult.

It is possible to find some unauthoritative opinions [Fol. 173 v] which praise this type of action and consider it an honour. The value of this type is very high in some ways of life, while it is very low in others. These two classes are rarely found separated, but the natural one is more frequent. The acquired class is considered honourable because of its relation with the spiritual form. At the hands of persons of the acquired class of actions, the states (dynasties) fall (change) in most cases. However their claims to nobility are not lost, because some people consider persons with these acquired actions to be virtuous, especially when the majority of their actions belong to the spiritual forms. These acquired actions dominate some people to the point that they wear ragged underclothes while they are very concerned about their outer garments. That some do this is well known in the time in which I am writing this book. This used to be a common practice in this country during the period of the kings of the Tawā'if. Most of these are known as

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Al-Mutajammilūn and their way of life is called al-Tajammul. Hence it is said that al-Tajammul dissipates wealth, for they use it in order to fulfill their wish to impress the notables of the time. They praise and get praised by wealth. This class of actions (usually) brings the actor to disrepute and regret, but most people of the above mentioned way of life love it secretly while rejecting and criticizing it openly.

- The second is directed towards the spiritual forms of the imaginative faculty. And this type is of different classes too. Some actions of this type express a certain kind of emotion, such as wearing weapons in peace time, frowning and all other psychic dispositions. Another example is found in the histories of different nations where the kings obtain (and utilize) frightful instruments and wear weapons in their courts (in order to impress) when they meet common and foreign envoys. Some other actions of this type are meant for pleasure only such as smiling, amity and charity. Joking also belongs to this type as well as some sorts of clothing, housing and fashions which produce wonder. Eloquent talk and memorization of tales, proverbs and poetry are considered to be among this type. Still other actions have perfection as their essential aim; if some other aim is associated with them it is only accidental. These are the rational virtues, namely: the sciences and the intellect mentioned by Aristotle in the VI,⁷² and such actions as giving sound advice and making correct deduction. Some of the arts are included in these actions too, an

account of which will be given later on. In this type of action we find ideal (moral) virtues such as generosity, succouring, familiarity, good association, kindness, amity, honesty; and recognized virtues such as wealth, extreme jealousy, extreme pride as well as all that we have mentioned in the first type. These are meant to produce solemnity in the soul, to be followed by respect and all external interests. In some cases nothing is aimed at by these actions other than that the person likes to perform them, and performing them leads to the perfection of his spiritual form. In still other cases he may perform the actions because he is familiar with them or because he believes that he is familiar with them, and not for the sake of the spiritual form. When a person knows something very well, he can perform it in a better or in a more perfect way; but when he is not certain that he knows, he does not do it; and if he does perform the action, he does it only when obliged or unaware. The true actions among these do not have a proper name, while the accidental or false actions are named "Hypocrisy". This name is also applicable to all actions expressing emotion, because when a person performs such actions he performs an action of desire if he seeks respect (Fol. 173v] or the like. The action is similar to that of desire if the person seeks solemnity through it, or if he thinks that the action is perfect. The first (true) group of actions, do not have a proper name, but it is known by the generic name "virtuous actions and actions in the pursuit of virtue". Those persons who perform these actions are rewarded by God, and they are referred to in the (following) sound

Hadīth:

Who immigrates for God's sake, immigrates for God;
and who immigrates because of certain worldly interests
which he wants to obtain or because of a woman whom he
wants to marry, immigrates for what he immigrates for 73

In general recompense is in accordance with what is in the (following)
sound Hadīth:

Actions are judged according to the agent's intention
and every person is recompensed by what he intended 74

- The third are the actions by which man obtains the perfection of
the forms of the recollective faculty. These actions are preferred
in themselves by most people to the extent that many of them think
that these actions are happiness itself, especially when these actions
are associated with previous actions and correct. More than any other
nation, the Arabs hold remembrance in high regard; hence one of their
poets said:

Oh Māwiya, wealth comes and goes;
what remains of it is stories and memory 75

They believe that the remembrance of a person is his immortality.

Therefore the poet said:

The memory left after a man is his second life. 76

And that is why the daughter of Haram b. Sinān said to the daughter
of Zuhayr, the poet:

We have given you something temporal and you
have given us something eternal. 77

Proverbs and poems concerning this remembrance are many and well
known. These actions are hidden in some ways of life while they are

obvious in others.

The perfection of the form of remembrance is obtained most frequently and perfectly by way of the actions which we enumerated in reference to the imaginative faculty. The perfection cannot be obtained, or is rarely obtained, by way of the actions of the Sensus Communis. Disrepute is obtained through all corporeal actions, but not through these actions per se, because through these actions the forms of the imaginative faculty are obtained. The forms of the recollective faculty are obtained through these actions only in association with something else; association occurs either when the community practices the memorizing of poetry as when a poet describes something and the people make frequent use of it, as al-Muhalabī has⁷⁸ done with the poet al-'A'shā, or when an action is unusual and fascinating, and people recall it frequently because of that. In general whenever the mentioning of an action stirs the emotions, people like to make it their own. That is how their posterity inherit it. Similarly are all perfect actions such as the construction and⁷⁹ the establishment of 'Iwān al-Madā'im and the statues of al-Khalidiyyāt.⁸⁰ Most books, poems and speeches are among these. The intention of the poet, has nothing to do with (the performance of) a virtuous action, rather it is related to his desire, etc. As for the unusual and fascinating action - because of rarity, immensity and oddity - it may be performed by virtuous people not in order to be remembered, but rather for the sake of the perfection of the action. Since this is

very common and frequent among the high-spirited people and among those who are capable of the Tadbīr of the city, the Tadbīr should be fulfilled by these people. Hence acting for the sake of fame is denounced along with other defects like hypocrisy and corporeal actions.⁸¹ This explains what was declared in the "Ḥadīth" and the "Zabur" concerning the person who seeks fame (in Zabur): "He who seeks fame, God shall order that the fame which he seeks shall become an adder of fire"⁸² and in the Ḥadīths: "God creates scorpions which sting each other and then emit their poison to be mixed with a curse and given as drink to the person who seeks fame".⁸³

Just as there is a particular activity in the recollective faculty of a virtuous person, there is also a particular emotion appropriate to this person; therefore the spiritual form in his recollective faculty continues to exist longer and is recalled more frequently. This is not a voluntary human action, it is simply the possession of the [Fol. 174 v] truth. Truth exists in other than the possessor of remembrance (recollective), as Aristotle has clarified in II. De Sengu. It exists by agreement of the three previous⁸⁴ faculties; that is how a person is able to witness truth, because it is impossible that the three faculties agree and not tell the truth. This agreement is not perceived and one hardly feels it. For this reason truth comes so frequently from the tongues of men and continues to exist among them, while falsity, which is related to the recollective faculty, destroys itself; its destruction is very fast, and it

comes rarely from the tongues of men. We shall explain this later on.

3 - The third category is made up of actions which are related to the universal spirituality. These are the most perfect of all spiritual actions, for it is as though they were the boundaries between actions which are mixed with corporeality - if we may call that mixing - and absolutely pure spirituality. These actions are many and include teaching, deduction and the like. We leave this now until we come to the end of the book.

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CHAPTER:

Some people are overcome by corporeality; these are the lowest. Others possess a very refined spirituality (universal spirituality. And still others have both (corporeality and universal spirituality), which vary in their proportions.

The first two types are very rare. The first of them is more frequent (than the other). The second, which is the most perfect spirituality, is less frequent: 'Uways al-Qurani and Ibrahim b. Adham belong to this type. Hermes belongs to the corporeal extremes of this type (third type), as Aristotle says in the book Nicomachean Ethics. The individuals of this type vary in their proportions by having elements of the other types or by acting in keeping with part or all of the other types. Hence this type has two opposite

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extremes; the expression Khissah (vileness) is used for one of them, not absolutely, but rather in a particular sense. The expression Sharaf (nobility) is used in an absolute sense for the other extreme, without any qualification (or restraint). The vile individual performs actions related to the spiritual form, but only when nothing separates them from corporeal actions. He is vile in this way, and noble because the spiritual form resides in him. The individual of the extreme is one who performs corporeal actions only if they are not separated from the spiritual ones, because if they are separated, then the spiritual action is very little while the corporeal action is very great. This kind of nature is usually praised; that is why the poet says:

They refused to run away, although the spears
were at their chests, they were facing death

and then adds:

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If they had run away, they would have lived in respect

This type of person does not pay attention to corporeal actions, but rather they burden his body with patience towards poverty, hunger and the burden of difficult tasks, in order to achieve the action by which his spiritual form is beautified. Some people are known to be of this type. Learning and teaching and perseverance in sciences are contained in it. The mystics, in reality, are of this type, but according to the intention which they propose, they are included in the type of the universal spirituality which is the entelechia of the rational faculty. We shall explain that when we reach it -

if God wills.

CHAPTER:

We have previously explained that all spiritual actions are either actions of desire or actions similar to these in pattern. For the other goals which are associated with the essential goal of these actions are accidental goals (only) but the essential goal is either a goal of desire or a goal of similar pattern. Such is the case with the person who seeks perfection of the spiritual form of the imaginative or the recollective faculties, for the sake of nobleness and fame, to become great or obtain other rewards of external benefits. Another person performs that type of action simply because it is virtuous and beautiful. Hence he performs it whether he knows that it is beneficial or not, and he performs it more worthily when he does not know that it is beneficial. This type of person is characterized by if he is given credit for his action [Fol. 174 v] or being praised on account of it. This type does not seek gratitude. If obliged to mention his acts, he would not do so out of pride. Hence the prophet - may God bless him and grant him peace - said: "I am the master of mankind" ⁹¹. Yet he says this without pride, rather he was speaking about one of his attributes, much as he would speak about attributes that have no suggestion of pride, as when one says: "I am in good health today."

As for the person of desire, he usually seeks gratitude and

he likes to receive credit for his good deeds, because his goal is external benefit. And if he does not obtain it, then his action would be in vain. As for the righteous person, he obtains a goal which he does not aim for, and of which most people do not know, not to mention aiming for it. Only the philosophers of natural science and of ethics know of this goal. The philosophers obtain what the person of desire aimed for and proposed, and in a way that is of benefit extraneous to the essential goal, as discussed previously. All such benefits are divine gifts and the actions of the righteous person are similar, for example, to the getting of nourishment with agreeable food, as is the usual practice of people of sound health. They do not realize that the food is suitable for health, and yet good health occurs through it without their intention.

Similar to the health which occurs to the person of righteous desire - whether he intends it or not - is this noble and pure spirituality which occurs to the person of righteous character - whether he intends it or not. And similar to desire, which is righteous if it aims for actions which give health essentially, is the person of righteous character who gains spirituality by performing the actions which give this spirituality. Essentially both righteous desire and character are divine gifts which God - the Most High - gives to whom he will of His creatures. A man has no power concerning this, and God may send him wealth through another person. So this second man would have a share in the giving. That is when a man may sometimes

be described as a wealth-giver. This applies also to all gifts which are not divine. As for divine gifts, man cannot share in giving them. What we have been concerned with here is one of these divine gifts - not the highest one nor the lowest, but rather closer to the highest. We shall speak about the ranking of these gifts with respect to nobility and vileness when we speak about the rational faculty.

CHAPTER:

As for the natural actions:

- Some of them are accidental and they follow the pattern of the necessary action in which there is no choice for the possessor of spiritual form such as the nobility of ancestors.

- Others are essential (and of two kinds): either common (for animals and human beings) or human (only). An example of the actions is the parents' love of their children, because parents love the spiritual forms of children. When the offspring is absent from his parents - whether they are irrational animals or human beings - in a way they cannot perceive its form, they would forget about it. And if they confuse him with another in a way that they perceive its form in the other, they would love this other offspring. If they were to love his corporeal form it would be impossible for them to love other than their own. This is clear with camels and their inclination towards al-Baw,⁹² which the Arabs use in order that the milk of the

mother-camel flows. This is the form which contains the entelechy of
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 the offspring of the perfect animal. and similar animals such as
 animals which suckle their offspring and (fowl) which hatch their eggs.
 These conditions of the spiritual forms apply to offspring as far as
 they are not able to feed themselves. After that stage, such condit-
 ions are human only, except that some people relate that a horse would
 never mate its mother. As for all other relations of parents and
 children, they are human only and most of them are governed by social
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 customs and the religious laws. A sufficient account of this is to
 be found in Plato's V Politics.

CHAPTER:

Insofar that particular spiritual forms have the universal
 relation, we say about their conditions what we have already said
 about human actions. Thus, the particular spiritual forms, in having
 the universal relation, are either perceptions or imagination, through
 which the animal performs its particular actions. This has been ex-
 plained on many different occasions. Hence every being which has
 spontaneous movement is sensible and every sensible (being) has spon-
 taneous movement. As for the spheres, they do not move spontaneously
 except in a relative way, because they cannot stop their movements,
 and every being which has spontaneous movement has spontaneous rest
 also. These spheres have in common (the fact) that all of them are
 composed of motives and objects of motion, yet they differ in other

things.

Our only concern here is the affairs which are related to man. The stages of a man are brought into existence by his different faculties, some stages by one faculty, other by another. These stages are made final by the stars of life.

a. -The first of man's stages exists during his infancy, namely, from the first moment of his birth until he becomes able to move his whole body towards what he desires. As long as he remains in this stage of his life, he acts solely in accordance with the nutritive soul. As for the development and change which occur in him these are not specific to one stage only, and our concern here does not include them.

b. -As for his stage from the time he moves toward what he desires until the time in which he gains reflection, it has no commonly used name in the language of the Arabs, except perhaps by those who know the rarely used Arabic expressions. Let us transfer to it the name of the next age, childhood. It is clear that in this stage of life he is animal only, because he acts in accordance with the animal soul only.

c. -The stage which starts when reflection starts is a stage in which he is entirely a human being who controls himself, and

who is not in need of another person to be responsible for him. The spiritual forms of the first stage exist naturally for all animals which care for their young. And some of the spiritual forms of the second stage exist for certain of these animals, such as chicken and partridge. The highest state of life is for man only, because the stages of irrational animals do not include deliberation; rather the stages of these animals are distinguished by other conditions. An account of this is to be found in ten articles of The History of
⁹⁵
Animals. The states of the third age (stage) are artificial in the sense that they are man-made, since taking responsibility for children was not necessarily included in this stage by some societies. The condition with which the spiritual forms of children exist (for their parents) is different and unnatural, a kind of love which is more correctly thought of as artificial (not natural); but human nature is also involved with it. This relation (between parents and their children) varies with different ways of life. [Fol. 175 v] For ex-
⁹⁶
 ample in the democratic way of life we find children more loved than in any other way of life, because of the cooperation among people to protect their homes. That is evident among the Arabs and the Berbers, where social breakdown occurs so often.

In other stages of middle age, advanced age, and the age of the very elderly, the spiritual forms vary with each of them, knowing this is easy for he who has time to consider the matter. Hence when a person is a certain age and does not perform actions appropriate

to that age, he would be still in the previous stage, not having progressed beyond it. This is due to a defect in his faculties; then this would be a defect in his nature, as is the case with mentally ill persons. And if he has the faculties and does not act appropriately, then he is also mentally ill, though to a lesser degree than in the first case. Or he may act according to this age but towards what he used to aim towards in the previous age, making use of the newly acquired faculties in order to improve (do well) the actions of the old faculties. In this he is then an animal, and there is no difference between him and the animal, except that he performs the action of that animal in better and improved way through deliberation.

It is clear that the condition of every age is a preliminary step and servant to the next age. When a man acts in the way which we have described, he makes the preliminary step an end and the end a preliminary step, and the master a servant and the servant a master. Hence Aristotle says in I. Nicomachean : "The defects lie not in the age, but rather in the character and customs".⁹⁷ It is considered improper for the man in advanced age to act as a youth because of the distance between the two ages, with middle age between them. It is preferable for person choosing playing as arbitrator to choose playing with swords for it has place for seriousness;⁹⁸ and it is approved of the youth to rejoice and joke, because these are the first actions of deliberation lying between playing and seriousness. Middle-aged people properly show charity and amity, because these are the serious

part of rejoicing and joking. Persons of advanced age properly show soundness of opinion, soundness of advice, wisdom and intellect, and in general all the rational virtues. When they have these virtues, they are not usually considered particularly intelligent or intellectual, because it is their natural state, and to be considered intelligent and intellectual at this age requires yet additional growth of the emotional faculty.

Then, rejoicing and joking are for youth, sound opinions for the middle aged, and sound deliberation for the person of advanced age, and the very elderly person should have in actuality all the human potentialities.

The state of the very elderly is similar to that of the first age, because a person in the first age is not a human being in the absolute sense, but rather a growing human being. In the last age, he is a decaying human being. Hence the person in this last age should have wisdom only, for wisdom alone is suitable for him. That is why Socrates considers the possessor of this age, if he is wise, to be in a state of rejoicing and happiness. As to what we mean by this "happiness", an account is to be found in the Art of Politics.

Similarly, when we find some of the states of a latter age present in a person at an early age, particularly at a very early age, as when respectfulness, charity, amity, and more than all these,

advice, appear in the youth that would be either because of a defect in his nature, as has been witnessed, such that when he gets old his fire would extinguish faster than the fire of Heraclites, ⁹⁹ or because of what we find in our time among children of these who live in luxury and children of those of noble ancestral claims. It is clear that they affect what they do not possess. If this is to be found in the city and thought to be virtuous, [Fol. 176 v] it would be the gravest and most powerful reason of corruption in it, whichever of the four cities it is. It is the Imām-city in which this is in no way possible. Mostly it happens in the timocracy, then the democracy, then in the ¹⁰⁰ tyranny.

ARTICLE V

CHAPTER:

The ends which are intended by the (actions of the)
"Solitary" are three kinds, because they belong either to his corporeal form, his particular spiritual form, or his universal spiritual form. The ends of the "Solitary", when he is part of the Imam-city, have been spoken of in Political Science. Some of the actions of these other cities - when he is part of them - are suitable to the ends of the "Solitary". An account of all affairs of the city is to be found in Political Science.¹⁰¹

Deliberation, searching, deduction and, in general, rationalization are used in order to obtain each one of these ends because if rationalization is not used, then obtaining that end would be an animal action which has no share of humanity in any respect, except that the acting agent has features similar to those of man. If a person's ends are animal ones, his actions fall in the same pattern with the actions of animals, whether his ends are obtained through human thought or not. There is no difference between a real animal and a man whose features are human but who conceals animality within. It is clear that the type of person whose ends are obtained by animal actions cannot estab-

lish a city nor be a part of a city at all. This is possible for the "Solitary" only, whose ends have been already described.

The ends of the animal (person) belong to the first of the three (above-mentioned categories of ends), and this (first type) does not belong to the universal spiritual form, because the universal spiritual form belongs to the intellect through reasoning. It is clear then that the animal ends belong to the two other categories, namely: corporeality and particular spirituality. The animals may have actions by which they obtain particular spirituality, such as
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 the shyness of a lion, the pride of a peacock, the hypocrisy of a dog, the generosity of a cock and the deception of a fox. When these qualities exist for animals, they exist naturally for the whole species, and not for one individual only, and when an animal perceives through the particular spiritual forms, the nature of the species gives the animal that quality of perception. When an animal possesses a noble quality, the quality belongs to the species, and only in mankind may qualities belong to the individual. Animal species which have noble qualities are the noblest among the species but these qualities are not virtues, because animals practice them at all times, whether they should be practiced or not. Hence they are not virtues except in an equivocal way. An account of the nature of this matter is to be found elsewhere. Thus, a person of corporeal ends is on an equality with animals.

Perfections, in general, are either moral or intellectual. Some moral perfections can be shared by animals, and the qualities which exist for the spiritual forms and which are moral virtues can be shared by animals. But they exist for the species only, as in the case of the succour and the shyness of the lion. They do not exist for one lion alone, but for every lion. If a certain lion were to have a special quality belonging to his particular spiritual forms - exceeding the nature of the species, for example - that would be accidental. The spiritual forms of the animals are expressed in perfections which represent the whole species, and if any animal has some perfection different from the perfections representative of the species, this perfection is accidental. But when any perfection exists in [Fol. 176 v] the human spiritual forms, it belongs to an individual in a particular way, and does not constitute an alternative for the species in an accidental way.

The intellectual perfections constitute particular conditions for the human spiritual forms and are not shared by any other type of forms. Examples are soundness of view, excellence of advice, correctness of opinion, and many other arts and faculties by which man is characterized, such as speech-making, leading armies, medical treatment, managing the home and the like. Philosophical wisdom is the most perfect of the human spiritual qualities, except in relation to those who do not know it, because for them it falls in the same pattern as other qualities. An example is the rank of the scholar

(man of science) in the view of the common people. His kind of perfection, according to them, exists for knowledge accidentally, as secondary matter, while the perfection of (philosophical) wisdom is (for the possessor of wisdom) an essential and primary matter. It is not a quality of something else but rather an absolute perfection.

As for what is acquired by eating, drinking, dressing, dwelling, travelling and the like, if they are sought for themselves and considered as ends they are qualities of corporeal forms. What is acquired by these qualities and by the actions of moral virtues - such as soundness of view and perfection of advice when they are sought for themselves and considered as ends - are qualities of the spiritual forms. The same is true for all arbitrary and demonstrative arts in relation to the person who does not seek them as essential ends. Rational actions and the sciences are absolute perfections and are used with no restraint. They are man's characteristics which are not shared by others. They either give man immortality (eternity) or connect him with it.

The particular spiritual forms lead to rational existence, while the corporeal forms lead to corporeal existence which is the shortest existence. The existence which deserves more than any other to be annihilated is the corporeal, while that which deserves more than any other to continue to exist is the rational existence. Spiritual existences continue for long periods because of their connection

with the rational one, and they rightly deserve that. They are composed of two opposites, namely, the spiritual and the rational existences. They gained their lengthy existence from the rational existence and the limitation of living from the corporeal one. Everything which has a limited time to exist, has length and shortness which are equal¹⁰⁵ in relation to eternity, because nothing can be compared with it. The length and shortness of the limited existence of a being are equal. Since man loves to add an additional year to his life; then even more does he desire to add not only tens but also hundreds and thousands of years. We find in the minds of men the memories of the possessors of different arts enduring some additional years, philosophers and kings¹⁰⁶ like Alexander¹⁰⁷ thousands, and Hippocrates and similar men many thousands of years.

CHAPTER:

Some people, as we have already mentioned, concern themselves with the corporeal form only. These are vile people. Some other concern themselves with the spiritual form only. These are noble and eminent people. The lowest type of corporeal people is that which does not respect the spiritual form nor pay attention to it when occupied with the corporeal one. Similarly the most noble type is the person who is not occupied by his corporeal form nor does he pay attention to it. Yet the person who does not pay attention to the corporeal form shortens his life. This type of person is similar to the vile

type in being extraordinary, [Fol. 177] both types do not exist. We may find a type of person who damages the corporeal forms by obeying the spiritual ones. Thus Ta'abbata Sharran says:

Our lot is captivity or obligation or death;
but free man prefers death.

He considered death better for him than bearing the favour of others concerning his freedom. Among this type is the person who prefers to kill himself during war (instead of being captured). The examples are: what al-Marawānī did in the war of 'Ubad al-Allāh b. al-'Abbās who said:

Humiliation of life and aversion of death, both -
I consider - are mischievous and evil.
If there must be choice between them,
Then let's march joyfully to death.

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and what al-Zibā did with 'Amr when she said:

With my own hand not yours, oh 'Amr

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and the story of the Queen of Egypt with Augustus which is mentioned in historical accounts, or other people such as those mentioned by Aristotle who burned themselves and their cities when they became

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certain that their enemies would overcome them. All this seems to be immoderation except on certain occasions, when corporeality is

destroyed without spirituality because of haughtiness of the heart and great endeavour as Fāṭima 'Um al-Rabī' and all Banū Ziyād (the clan of Ziyād have done when she threw herself from her camel which

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she was riding and died because Qays b. Zuhayr had pursued her.

These are special instances of situations in which death is better

than life. Preferring death to life is a correct human action. We shall give an account of this afterwards.

Among noble, great-spirited people there is a type less immoderate than the previous one, and more numerous than the first. This type of person does not pay attention to the corporeal form compared with the spiritual one, but he does not destroy his corporeality (completely), either because the spiritual form does not force him to do so, or because - although it does - he prefers to keep his corporeal form. An example of this is what Ḥātim al-Ṭā'ī¹¹⁴ did when he slaughtered his horse (for his guests) and did not eat nor feed his family with it, although his children were suffering extreme hunger. Another example is found in the way of life of thieves. Their purpose is to train their bodies, and in doing this they sacrifice their bodies for their bodies. They prefer one corporeal state over another. There is no reason to refrain from admitting that actions such as the actions of al-ṭā'ī and the like are honourable and noble, and that such a nature is sublime, brilliant and spiritual, and that it is the most brilliant, ranking below wisdom only. The philosophically natured person must necessarily have this quality, for if it does not have it, he would be a corporealist and a false philosopher. If the philosophically natured person is determined to reach his ultimate perfection, he acts like the great-spirited person. Thus every person who prefers his corporeality over any part of his spirituality cannot reach the ultimate goal. Therefore not a single corporealist is

happy, and every happy person is a pure spiritualist.

The spiritualist must perform some corporeal actions, but not essentially, while he performs spiritual actions essentially. Similarly, the philosopher must perform many spiritual actions, but not essentially, while he performs all intellectual actions essentially. 115 Through corporeality the philosopher is an existing being, through rationality divine and superior. The possessor of wisdom (the philosopher) [Fol. 177v], then, is necessarily a divine and superior man. He chooses from every kind of action that which is the best, and he shares with every class (of men) the best of their particular qualities; he is distinguished from all others by the most glorious and superior actions. When he reaches the ultimate goal and communicates with the simple substantial intellects which are mentioned in Metaphisica, De Anima and De Sensu et Sensibili, he becomes one of these intellects and properly deserves the title "divine" only. The other two qualities, corrupted corporeality and high spirituality, are eliminated. He merits the title: "A simple (pure) divine". The Mutawahhid (solitary) may have all these qualities without being a 116 citizen of the perfect city. He cannot be a citizen of the perfect city by means of the first two classes (of qualities), nor can he be the city's aim, its agent, or its protector. As for the third class of quality, it does not make him belong to the perfect city, but rather he is its proposed aim, for he cannot be its protector or agent while he is Mutawahhid (solitary). Thus it is evident that

spirituality ranks above corporeality. We shall explain later the different levels of spirituality in relation to one another.

Let us now speak about spirituality as having the universal relation of the spiritual forms. The universal relation is either essentially universal, like species and genera, or accidentally universal, like the particular spiritual forms as they exist for many individuals, not as attributes of the agent in which they exist, but rather as having a universal relation with that agent. An example of the accidental universal relation is the perceived form of the sun or the imaginary form of the mountain of Uhud in relation to the persons who have seen it. Accordingly, these forms are called "imagination", and the perceiving faculty is called "imaginative".

The faculties by which the perceptions are accomplished are of three types:

- The first type is the faculty by which the corporeal forms are perceived. It is the perceptive faculty and its divisions appear as physical embodiments which are organs of an organic (natural) body; the organs constitute five senses and the perceptions occurring in them are spiritual forms, which are of the first level of spirituality.
- The second type is the faculty which conceives spiritual forms which are called "imagination", and which are reflected in the Sensus Communis, as was explained elsewhere. The faculty which conceives

these "imaginations" is called "imaginative", and the reflections which occur in the imaginative faculty are not conceived by divisions within the faculty, but rather the conceived object sets the faculty in motion. Thus colour sets the sense of sight in motion, and the spiritual form occurring in sight sets the imaginative faculty in motion. The grammatical form of the names of these faculties are confused, because the grammatical form which is used for the faculty (al-Mudrik) is similar to the form of the object which sets the faculty in motion (Muharrik). The grammatical form for the object of perception, al-Mudrak, according to the language of the Arabs, is a form which indicates the condition of being acted upon which is contrary to our use. Hence all these spiritual forms are particular and not universal. The animal (the living being) does not have another faculty which is set in motion by the forms occurring in the Sensus Communis, after which the ability of motion ceases and loses all benefit (in the animal). [Fol. 178 v] If such a faculty exists in an animal, it exists in vain. At the first level, we seek what is agreeable to us and run away from the harmful bodies by means of forms which occur in the senses. Similarly we seek the hidden bodies which appear in the imagination and set it in motion, and we run away from them when they are harmful by means of the spiritual forms which occur in the imaginative faculty, namely, the imaginations. These bodies are either present or hidden in relation to us, as is common for all living beings.

The first is common to all animals, but it is thought to exist only in some animals, such as flies and worms. We have explained that in our discourse concerning the soul. ¹¹⁷ As for the second, it is clear that it cannot be separated from the first, for it exists through it. The third exists in animals having motion in actuality, because this faculty is the actualization of corporeal affairs. The animals having the third faculty do not have a name in the language of the Arabs, so let us call this type of animal the perfect actualized animal. This is the animal which takes care of its offspring, and in general loves and hates - emotions which seem almost necessary because they are the lowest kind of agitation. This animal may possess another category of qualities which is more perfect than the previous one and which is also common to both man and irrational animals which possess some skill or the like, such as bees, ants, spiders. This category of quality and other categories which include actions similar to the human being's skill of milking occur either naturally or not naturally which could be either through habit or reasoning. Habit is common to man and some irrational animals such as the starlings, if we do not call two different existents i.e. habit and skill "habit by way of equivocality". Reasoning belongs to man alone, and does not exist in others. Reasoning in turn occurs through man's intellect as happens frequently - this is particularized by the term "deduction" - or it occurs suddenly in which case it is called "inspiration" and similar names. It is clear that this kind of manifestation of the imaginative faculty does not require the external senses as an agent for it, but

external senses are required for the existence of the bodies which receive this type of spiritual forms. There is no need to discuss this here or to enumerate its different types. (Because the existence of bodies requires the external senses) the manifestation of the imaginative faculty cannot exist without the sense of perception. It may be thought that this manifestation requires forms of the Sensus Communis because the forms of the imaginative faculty are composed of forms which have passed through the Sensus Communis and had previously passed through the external senses. An account explaining the nature of this is to be found elsewhere. If this were true, the forms of the imaginative faculty would not have only one aspect. In any case, the external senses are necessary, because if a form of the imaginative faculty were to be void of them it would be a useless addition and it would have a false existence. For its existence is usually actualized in bodies and this is impossible without the external senses. Thus we must examine the possibility of having an invented spiritual form the species of the immediate matter of which has not passed through the Sensus Communis. It is impossible for the remote genus not to pass through the Sensus Communis, because, if it were possible, then the invented spiritual form would not necessarily be in need of the external senses in order to come into existence. Rather, it would be in need of the external senses for its corporeal existence only, for it cannot exist in a body except through an external sense. We must examine [Fol. 178 v] this thoroughly.

These are, according to general inquiry, the different types of the imagined spiritual forms. Through these forms the animal, whether man or irrational animal, moves, because when any of these forms are present in actuality, they are present as imagined. Then the forms connect with the appetitive faculty. They are suited to the appetitive faculty; the latter move and set the organs in motion as long as the suitability is there. When the suitability ceases to exist, neither the appetitive faculty nor the organs are in motion, and the forms continue to exist but give no benefit to the animal either for a certain time or for a particular type of animal. Through this suitability, the appetitive soul is set potentially in motion, and through this suitability the appetitive soul changes, and the lowest degree of its change is the decay of suitability which is called ennui, boredom and similar names. The movement from non-suitability to suitability which is the development of suitability, has no name in the language of the Arabs. Rather the Arabs have terms for the decay of suitability (only).

The spiritual forms do not change because they are not divided, while the appetitive forms have no obstacle to be divided essentially either primarily or secondarily. Hence the appetitive form is thought to be the form of a body, and that body is the Hār
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Gharīzī (instinctive heat) which is in correspondence with the external appearance. Examples are found in the warmth and redness of the body of an angry man, and the coldness and paleness of a frightened

man and the speedy and vigorous movement of a lustful person. The state which leads to these opposing pairs (of conditions) is called "activity" in Arabic, while the slow movement of a weak person and his weakness are called laziness. Activity is necessarily followed by pleasure during action and pain during rest. Laziness, in opposition to activity, gives pleasure during rest and pain during action.

If what we have already explained concerning pleasure and pain is true, then the appetitive soul is in an unnatural state during activity. That state gives the appetitive soul the spiritual forms like hunger and thirst. That same soul would be in a natural state during laziness. Hence the spiritual forms are given either by the latter state, in which case they do not set the soul in motion, or by another state, in which case it is an unnatural state and alienates the soul from it, as with food and a satisfied person. Hence when the appetitive faculty is set in motion by a spiritual form, in an equal way to what that faculty requires in order to be moved, then the form would occur continuously. If that measure were less than equal then the form would not occur continuously, but rather in a certain time only. Thus the form needs several discrete times in order to exist, but this may be severed and not completed. Witnessing that is attainable through the least amount of consideration. Let us suppose that a form sets in motion the appetitive faculty of a healthy body which has a substratum for that form, and let us suppose that that form sets the faculty in motion where there is suitability equal to the required time

in which the form exists in that substratum in a way that they disappear together. If the spiritual form is to continue after the ceasing of the substratum, it would have no function nor would it be a soul in actuality. This case has no term in Arabic, so let us transfer it to the term of the closest thing to it, such as estimation, imagination and similar terms, expressions and compound names. [Fol. 179 v] This is in similar way to that of the Arabs when they say "that which does not call people's concern" and the like

Similarly, if that form sets the appetitive soul in motion towards the natural state which we have called "Suitability", it either finds no substratum, or it does find one, but that substratum requires a longer time in order to receive the form. Thus the form does not occur in the substratum, or only a part of it occurs. In this case, the spiritual form is a soul. In the previous case it was similar to the spiritual form which belongs to "demonstration" or in general to "syllogism" because syllogism does not function at all times, but rather in a certain man at a certain time and not in all men at all times. This is similar to what occurs in demonstration and deductive arguments. It exists primarily in syllogisms composed of generally accepted premises.

ARTICLE VI

CHAPTER:

The particular spiritual forms and their universal relation, as we have already explained, either have passed firstly through the Sensus Communis or they emanated without passing through the external senses. Let us now first speak about them in the way of descriptive definition which defines them in a general way. Thus they are of four types:

1. The best known are those which reside in the senses. This is self-evident.

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2. The second are in nature because a thirsty person finds in himself a spiritual form of water and the hungry person finds a form of food, and so on in the same pattern as nature, such as a lover with his beloved and in general the subject and object of
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desire.

3. The third are the spiritual forms, the outcome of ideas, or those which are the result of reflection and deliberation.

4. The fourth type contains the forms which are born in the Intellectus in Actu without the help of reflection and deliberation. This last

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category contains inspiration and true revelation.

Bringing back accidentally the spiritual form called remembering is related by us to the senses. We shall explain this later on, but now we shall explain what we have just said.

CHAPTER:

The forms which are related to the external senses are either essential or accidental. An example of the essential forms is that of the objects of external senses; of the accidental, what occurs in dreams or during the state called remembering and recalling. Thus when a man sees another riding a horse and later sees the horse (alone), that (horse) reminds him of the man. This type (of form) is of many classes. Poetry is composed of these classes of forms. An example is the saying of MĀlik b. Asmā's:

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With each breeze of rose or jasmin in every garden
I hold the hope of finding you at my next glimpse or turn.

Weeping over one's old home, and having sorrow because of the remnants (also) belong to this type. The great majority of the poems of the Arabs are of this type as are most tales and pleasant talks. This is particularly true for old persons because of the multitude of their experiences. This is obvious for one who considers it. This is not the remembrance, mentioned by Aristotle in the second part of De Sensu, because it does not come after forgetfulness and is recalled from

within instead of from without. The spiritual forms which occur essentially in the senses are clear in themselves.

Those forms occurring naturally are also either accidental or essential. The essential are not particular forms of bodies, as has already been stated because a thirsty person has no desire of specific water; rather, he desires all that belongs to the species of the desired object. Hence Galen thought that animals can conceive the species.¹²³ These objects produce particular spiritual forms only by accident. An example of the accidental forms in a thirsty man who recalls in his mind what he had enjoyed in a certain glass, or a hungry man [Fol. 179 v] who recalls the form of food and remembers a certain food which he had eaten. Nature does not produce essentially except proper and true spiritual forms. Thus when a feverish person desires to cool his stomach, he desires coldness which is necessarily useful for him; but coldness does not reach him necessarily with cold objects because they contain other elements. That is why a cold object, although it is cold and moist, may be tough for the feverish person and mixed with earthly elements such as (special) conditions of water. Therefore Plato says that nature does not make mistakes concerning what it lays down in the soul. Nature gives the soul the (suitable) form, as when nature requires cooling the stomach of a feverish person whose soul recalls water. Water is not cooling nor does the soul recall the water, but rather water is a cold object with other elements which are not recalled by nature and which may harm the

feverish person.

This spiritual form which is the result of nature is not similar to that produced by the senses. Perhaps it resembles forms produced by the intellect and reason. This form is in the nature of the animal, like matter which is constituted naturally to receive the species, but not to receive the species as such, but rather in a different aspect. We have explained that on many occasions. The sustenance of the nature of the animal is through this spiritual form, and this form is the controller of the animal. Since the nature of the animal is compounded, it needs many forms. The explanation of this will be discussed on another suitable occasion.

CHAPTER:

The spiritual forms which are the result neither of the external senses nor of nature, are the result of reasoning or the active intellect. These are only for man, while the first two types exist in the Muhassal animal. The forms which result from reasoning only are either true or false. These forms are more frequently false than true in some Siyar (ways of life). Hopes are included in the false type as in the following saying of a poet:

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Hopes, if they be true, they would be the best hope,
Or at least, we live by them a pleasant time.

Thus man may hope for the impossible, knowing it to be so, like his wish to speak with dead persons. There is no harm in knowing that these hopes are false, for the virtue of such forms is that man recognizes their falsity, because if he does not know that, he would be misled or mistaken and the like. The truth of these forms varies with different ways of life with regard to quantity.

All forms which are the result of the Intellectus in Actu are true essentially, not accidentally. The same is true of all these which result from true reasoning. These latter forms are not of specific bodies in order to be particular, nor are they (completely) free from matter in order to be universal intelligibles. They have no particular relation nor the states of universal intelligibles. Rather they are intermediaries between the particular forms and the intelligibles. This is their most proper position because they have elements of each of the two extremes. They share with the particular forms the faculty by which they are particular, and they are universal because this faculty receives the forms from the intellect by which they gain universality. This faculty is intermediary between the materialistic and the intelligible existents. It receives the forms from and resembles, the two extremes. These are, as we have already said, the forms which are the results of nature. They are for the sake of one's safety and are common to all animals; even plants may have a share in them in one way or another. The forms which are the results of nature for the sake of perfection [Fol. 180 v] exist in some Muhassal animals

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such as bees and ants. Every noble animal is a Muhassal animal, and every Muhassal animal has the spiritual forms of perception, and every noble animal has these forms of perception and the intermediary forms which we have already described. It is evident that the forms of perception do not lead essentially to deduction nor to any spiritual conception such as reasoning and its alternatives. When we perceive a body, and the particular spiritual form of that body occurs to us and we want to recall later a similar form, we transfer it to this status and free it from its particularity concerning its subject, for we cannot recreate that subject since it has already existed. Rather we recall through the intermediary spiritual form the subject which does not exist actually, but only potentially. That is evident to one who considers it briefly.

Therefore, the actions are few of a person who receives only the amount of spirituality which results from perception, consideration, and imagination, while the actions of a person who receives the (complete) spiritual forms are a kind of spiritual excess. That is why a person whose forms of perception are limited by the spirituality resulting from the external senses (only) is a foolish person, because the image of the particular spiritual form which is caused by external senses is the perfect (Muhassala) local movement only. All other movements belong to forms resulting from man's nature. We have already said that these are similar (of the same genus) to the intermediary forms. Such a person who has this nature, namely, the one

whose forms of perception are limited by the particular amount of spirituality, is lazy. He has few actions and does not have many performances. This is similar case to that of some irrational animals such as sheep, cows and swine. If these animals have either natural organs like strong hands or defensive organs and they do not use these organs, they are foolish, such as bears, swine.

Foolish people are easily known. Noble and intelligent animals are those whose particular spiritual forms are more or less similar to the intermediary ones. This type contains all Muhassal
126 animals such as the fox, the bear and all cunning animals. Among men, this type contains those who have many movements. Thus noble men have moving eyes with moist pupils as if they were liquid, while lazy and foolish men have hard eyes which rarely move because the imaginary forms are transferred to the faculties with the same states that are given to them by sight. That is why every man who is in his natural condition and who recalls in his mind a certain spiritual form does so in the very state which he perceives when he stares at it. The pupils of a noble person have frequent movements without repetition. This is so because of the multiplicity of the spiritual states of his forms of perception which are the result of the frequency of the eyes' movements and their glances, just as if he were looking at each state separately, because these glances are recalled, as notions of the spiritual states. A lazy person is calm while an energetic person has pupils with frequent movements, with quick repetitions. For this

reason experts of physiognomy consider the fast movement of the eye as a sign of an unsteady person. These two targets, I mean, the speedy movement of the eye and its frequency on one hand, and the quick, unsteadiness on the other, belong to one category, namely, the spiritual form has abundance of spirituality by which the similarity occurs, whether the form belongs to perception or to any other faculty; and, hence, the movements of the eye become more frequent. This is true because similarity [Fol. 180 v] is not seen in order to give every state of the form that which it deserves. For this reason we hasten the transfers of the sight in order to see all the similarities which exist in it, especially in the obscure ones. An account of the similarities is to be found in II De Sensus. The multiplicity of the spiritual forms is repeated in the senses simultaneously. For this reason the movement of the eye increases. A person who has excellent sight, receives a surfeit of spirituality concerning the perceived form and hence his glances are frequent and consequently repeated. Since he considers what he sees, he spends a long time with the form. Therefore, his glances vary in time. The finer his glances, the faster the movement of his eye; the more excellent his sight, the greater the variation. The man who has a natural disposition for demonstrative reasoning has frequent eye movements with variation in the movements of his pupils. When thinking, he recalls in his mind what he has already demonstrated, so he does not need to reflect on it. That is why the variation here is less than on other occasions where the idea is not clear. There he deliberates and his pupils become calm, and the

variation increases and becomes longer, and the difference and repetition are not regulated. The experts of physiognomy have done well when they took from the eye the signs which indicate the psychic actions, especially those actions related to the faculties by which conceiving occurs.

ARTICLE VII

CHAPTER:

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The particular and the intermediary spiritual forms should not be considered as final causes (goals), because they are forms, most of which occur naturally; and, in general, they are not the result of man's free will. The best among them and those which appear to be good are the result of free will and are contained in the following three categories:

1. They are either contained in corporeal forms and lead to benefits such as farming and other similar arts; or
2. They are contained in the particular spiritual forms which are the objects of other different arts; or
3. They are contained in the intelligible forms which are the
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objects of mathematics, poetry, etc.

These do not constitute the final causes (goals), but rather through them the final causes take place, and they are the causes of the final causes. Let us suppose now that there is a completely virtuous man,
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like al-Mahdi and another completely vile man, like the poet Abu
130
Dulāma. Each of them possess the particular form of the other, and

each spiritual form causes the motion of the body in which it resides.

The form of Abū Dulāma causes pleasure and laughter in al-Mahdī, while
 131 132

the form of al-Mahdī causes frowning and integrity in Abū Dulāma.

It is evident that frowning and integrity are better than pleasure and laughter. Through the form of the superior man the inferior becomes higher than before, and through the form of the inferior man the superior man becomes lower. Therefore, the inferior man claims and attaches himself to the name of the superior one, while the superior man hides the effect of the inferior and does not reveal it except in isolation. In a similar way, each man causes others to move towards his own state, and the poet Zayd Ibn 'Adī al-'Abbadī¹³³ had reason to say:

Do not ask about a person himself,
 but rather about his companions,
 because every man is led by his companions.

It is evident that the Mutawahhid, ought not to associate with merely corporeal beings nor with any whose end is a spirituality mixed with corporeality.¹³⁴

Rather should he seek the company of the adepts in the sciences.¹³⁵

These men of science are now more numerous, now less and even non-existent in some ways of life wherefore the Mutawahhid is obliged in some ways of life to return altogether from the society of men as much as this is possible for him. He should not mix with them except in necessary matters [Fol. 181 v] and in necessary measure.¹³⁶

Or, he should emigrate to ways of life in which the sciences are (practiced) - if such way of life does exist -. This is not contrary

to what is said in the political science nor to what is made clear in science of nature. For it is made clear in the science of nature that man is by nature political; and it had been demonstrated in the political science that isolation is wholly evil. ¹³⁷ But this is only so in essence; it is good by accident, as it may happen in some natural phenomenas. ¹³⁸ The example of this is that bread and meat are healthy nutriment by nature, while opium and colocynth are deadly poison; but the body may be in unnatural states where these latter two can be useful and must be used, and natural diets harmful and must be avoided. These conditions are necessarily unnatural sicknesses; for opium and colocynth are rarely useful and by accident, while nutriments are usually useful and by essence. The relation of these different conditions to bodies is similar to the relation of the different ways of life to the soul. Similar to health - which is supposed to be the only natural state of the body and opposite to ¹³⁹ these different conditions which are unnatural is the Imām-city which is the natural condition for the soul. It is one and opposes all other ways of life which are numerous, and these numerous ways of life are not natural for the soul.

CHAPTER:

The intermediary forms are not (final) goals (for the Mutawahhid) nor does any Mutawahhid act in accordance with them. If he were to do so, he would do so for the sake of one of the three

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 above mentioned categories of benefits. Most the arts which are capacities and professions are limited by these categories. Professions and capacities produce these three (categories of benefits). These forms which are not the result of free will among the intermediary forms are not acquired. How could they be considered as final goals while knowing them does not give the Mutawahhid the knowledge of what he should aim for? Rather it gives him only knowledge of the causes which lead him towards his goal.

Furthermore, since it is the way of life of the Mutawahhid to explain how the knowledge of the spiritual forms should be, and since this (knowledge) is part of his way of life, it is necessary to be concerned about this knowledge if one wants to establish a practical discourse concerning the science of this way of life. In addition to all that, it would clearly appear that this knowledge is one of those sciences which essentially deserves to be known. Since the real Mutawahhid is the one who is directed towards the theoretical sciences, this theoretical knowledge (meaning, knowledge of the spiritual forms) becomes of great value. Then, being concerned about this science, in addition to what we have already said, produces accidentally part of the Mutawahhid's final goal.

ARTICLE VIII

CHAPTER:

The human actions which are related to the Mutawahhid and which he may perform are of three types, as we have already enumerated. Some of these actions are related to the corporeal forms, others to the particular spiritual forms as having the particular relations; ¹⁴¹ and some are related to the universal forms which are the intelligible ones. The particular spiritual (forms), from the point of view of having particular relations, and the intermediary (forms) are not final goals, rather through them the final goals are conceived as we have already explained.

We still have to consider the intelligible spiritual (forms) which are the other aspect of the particular forms, for the subjects of these (spiritual) forms on which the forms depend and by which they exist as true forms are the same. The subject in which the form resides is multiple, and the subject to which it belongs is multiple (too). The form is, by relation to its subject a goal, except in the case of intelligibles which have one individual (only). In the latter case it is the particular spiritual form of the subject. That is true if it is particular in the same way as that of tangible bodies, that

is, to perceive the subject itself (directly), although the subjects of perception are the lowest subjects, because such subjects do not have particular spiritual forms except through (direct) relations, for if they are not conceived by the senses they will not [Fol. 181 v] be conceived by the imaginative faculty. In general, none of these particular forms belongs to the science of (the final goals). Our aim here, is to be concerned with what belongs to man only. If we speak about what does not belong only to man that is a secondary consideration in relation to our subject.

The intelligible forms contain all kinds of substance. Man is one of these kinds. The intelligible forms of man is his universal form i.e. the form of man's species which is the most excellent of all spiritual forms, as we shall explain later on. It does not have direct relation to the individual man as in the case of the particular spiritual form nor does it resemble the celestial bodies ¹⁴² in any of their states. Let us suppose that the form of Zayd has been in a state of vileness in 'Amr's soul, and it is now in virtuous and noble state (in the soul of the same person, 'Amr): one state has occurred and another has been dismissed. In this sense (the intelligible form) resembles the celestial bodies, although it is not one of them. The above mentioned change in Zayd's form is different from the change in Zayd's form when 'Amr' thinks that Zayd is vile and then changes his mind and thinks that Zayd is noble. In the latter case Zayd has changed in 'Amr's opinion (only), while in the first case he had actually changed from one state to another, and this was reflected in

the particular form which 'Amr has had of Zayd. We should distinguish between the two spiritual existents because they are completely different. In the first case of change which reflects the real change, the spiritual (form) acquires from the corporeal existence a state of vileness or a state of nobility. Thus, through the corporeal existence, the spiritual (form) acquires different states. The opposite is true of the intelligible (forms). They do not acquire nobility nor vileness from the corporeal existences. That is clear with the least amount of consideration, because if Zayd is noble and 'Amr is vile, the intelligibles form (concept) of them is described as being both noble and vile. This is impossible (in relation to each one alone). If one is noble and one is vile, and nobility belongs to other than Zayd and vileness to other than 'Amr, that is possible only because the nature of the species accepts the two opposites together.

The species accepts the two opposites either in (two) different times or in (two) different subjects, because the predicates of the propositions which have universal subject, are either: necessary¹⁴³ and in this case they (necessarily) belong to each of their individuals, or they are partial¹⁴⁴, and in this case they belong to some individuals which belong to the universal subject. Therefore, the (universal) subject includes what belongs to it either in a necessary universal way or a partial way. The things which are impossible to exist in the individuals which are subject of that universal (form) are limited and numbered. This was explained on many occasions.

Then, no single subject of the subjects of the universal (form) gives that universal (form) any state. The universal form does not resemble the celestial bodies, rather these bodies have a different kind of existence. If the species of a universal form has a virtuous state then the subject should have a virtuous state (also), because the species has that state. If the specie does not have that state then the subject does not have it either. Now if the subject is noble the individual of that subject would be virtuous also and vice versa, because the species gives the existing individual the state of nobility or vileness and the individual gives the species affirmation. [Fol. 182 v] and permanency. The subject is the cause of variation and impermanency (of the species). Therefore, man cannot change his universal form, while he can change his particular form, as we have already seen when we were considering some of his actions.

Let us now examine the relation of man's form and the subject (substratum) which exists in man at his faculty. It is clear that the intelligible (form) does not exist except for man alone, and it is clear that man is the subject of a species in a way that he is described by that species as having existence and (rational) faculty. This is in contrary to the particular form because when 'Amr has the particular form of Zayd, he has that form as (representing the) thing which exists (externally) in Zayd, and not only as (pure) description of Zayd (as in the case of the intelligible form). If the particular form of Zayd is a description (impression) in 'Amr it would be a

(faculty of the) soul as we have already said. If the form of man sets its substratum in motion, then its subject which the form qualifies is the (same) subject which the form describes (as impression) or resembles an impression.

The universal (form) of man according to the previous explanation) is all the intelligibles, because the subject of the intelligibles is the universal (form). For example, when you say "the universal (form) of the elephant", the subject of this (universal) form of elephant is a certain elephant which was influenced by its genus. Similarly, the subject of man by which he is described is a certain individual of the various individuals of man which are the subjects of the universal (form) of man.

Thus, similar to the fact that man is different from all other substances, in his form which is different from all other forms of other corrupted beings. It rather resembles the forms of the celestial bodies, because the celestial bodies comprehend themselves and the substratum which they qualify and which is their substratum in another sense (which he is going to describe below). If we may use the term substratum for this other aspect. We employ the expression "substratum" in the two following senses, either for the thing which relatively receives the impression, or, for the corporeal substratum in relation to its intelligible form. The celestial bodies are the substrata for the intelligibles by which they are celestial

bodies, and they are not (simple) substrata for the existence of the forms in them, because the celestial bodies do not receive these forms in a way that they are matter (hyla) for these forms, in order that these forms gain their existence through the celestial bodies. In fact, these received forms exist by themselves, and the cause of the cause of their existence exists before them in the same way which the (two) parts of definition precede the defined object.

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They are different from the species of the corrupted bodies, because these latter bodies are substrata in a way that the universal
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(forms) are forms for them. This is similar to the case of man who comprehends the intelligible (forms) in a way that he receives these
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intelligible (forms) which exist in him. In this way (man resembles the hyla (matter) and) the intelligible forms resemble the impression in the matter (hyla). As for man's specie, by which the substratum is
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qualified, it is man's substratum in the second sense.

In fact, man has a nature which gives rise to growing confusion, because this nature - as it seems - is like intermedium be-
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tween the eternal celestial bodies and the corrupted bodies. It is, however, the natural state of man to be an intermedium, for in nature the difference between one genus and another is always through an intermedium. We (usually) observe that in all general of existing being, but sometimes we cannot precisely determine whether a certain intermedium between mineral and plant belongs to the first (genus)

or the second. Similarly, between plant and animal is an inter-medium which has a share of each. This has been explained on many occasions, and we have explained it previously. Therefore it is necessary that man has a share with the eternal celestial bodies and another share with the corrupted bodies; by the first he is eternal and by the second he is a corrupted body.

What is the nature of these two shares? [Fol. 182 v] This is what must be examined: Furthermore, if we examine man from another point of view, we find that man belongs to his specie. Now when the (individual) man receives the specie of man, then, the substratum receives the form of man in two different ways ¹⁵⁰ in the same time which is a dreadful contradiction. Moreover, if the individual man - as being a man - can receive the man (as specie), we would say that man (as specie) belongs to the definition of man, and the (two) parts of the definition precede the defined man. That means that man has existed before he has become a man, and that he has existed before he has existed. This is impossible and dreadful contradiction.

It is necessary then, to examine this analogical expression (man) and to give each of its two parts its share of explanation. In fact, it seems that man is one of the wonders of nature. We say that man contains in himself many facts, and he is a man by all of them. He has (first) the nutritive faculty which does not receive his (real) form; then he has the perceptive, the imaginative and the recollect-

ive faculties. All these do not receive his real essences. Finally,
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he has the rational faculty which belongs to him only...

This is the end of what was found of this discourse,
praise be to God just as He merits and deserves.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. S. Munk, mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe, (New edition; Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Urin, 1955), pp. 383-410. The first edition of this book was published in 1857. Through this French translation of the Tadbīr based on the Hebrew extracts, Ibn Bājja started calling the attention of some scholars. The Hebrew extracts were made by a philosopher of the XIVth century called "Mūsā al-Narbonī" who added this text to his Hebrew commentary on Hay b. Yaqdhān of Ibn Tufayl.
2. 'U. Farrukh, Tarīkh al-Fikr al-'Arabī, (Beirut: Almakal al-Tijari, 1962), p. 499.
3. D. M. Dunlop, "Ibn Bājja's Tadbīru'l - Mutawāḥḥid (the rule of the Solitary)", Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, April (1945), pp. 61-81.
4. M. Asin Palacios, "Avempace Botánico", Al-Andalus, Vol. V (1940), pp. 255-299. And "tratado de Avempace Sobre la Union del Intelecto con el Hombre", Al-Andalus, Vol. VII (1942) pp. 1-47. And "La Carta de Adios de Avempace", Al-Andalus, Vol. VIII (1943) pp. 1-87. In addition to, El Régimen del Solitario, (Madrid-Granada: Escuela de Estudios Arabes, 1946).
5. Al-Taymuriya Library, Dār al-Kutub al-Maṣriyya, Cairo. Ethics 290 pp. 332-346.
6. Ibn Bājja, 'Ilm al-Nafs, Ed. M. S. Ḥasan al-Ma'sūmī (Damascus: Al-Majma' al-'Ilmi, 1960). An English translation of this book was made by the same editor (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1961).
7. Ibid., p. 10.
8. cf. Fr. Rosenthal, The technique and Approach of Muslim Scholarship, (Roma: Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, 1947) pp. 21-22.
9. Ibn Bājja, 'Ilm al-Nafs, p. 3.

NOTES

INTRODUCTORY STUDY OF THE TADBIR

1. cf. M. Mahdi, Ibn Khaldūn's Philosophy of History, (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 125-132.
2. cf. infra translation, p. 62.
3. For further details see: Lane's, Arabic-English lexicon.
4. cf. notes on the translation of the text, nn. 6, 100
5. cf. infra translation, p. 61.
6. Al-Ghuraba, is a title used for the mystics who isolate themselves in an uncongenial world where they live as "strangers - Ghurabū". Al-Mutawahhid also is a "stranger" who gives up political activity and civic duty, and represents an individualistic mystical attitude. This idea was taken from Ibn Bājja and adopted by Ibn Tufayl in his Hay B. Yaqdhān. Ibn Tufayl developed the theory of al-Mutawahhid, but he did not question the soundness of the revealed law in any of its aspects. Thus he took a mystical stand and not a purely rational stand as Ibn Bājja has done.
7. Ibn Bājja attacks al-Ghazālī and the mystics in both the Tadbīr and Risālat al-wada' for they believe that the ultimate end or goal of man is to be attained by spiritual contemplation during the mystical isolation (khalwa).
8. Infra translation, p. 60.
9. This term was used by al-Fārābī before Ibn Bājja, he used it in al-Madina al-Fādila see: Al-Fārābī's, Der Musterstaat, Ed. Fr. Dieterici (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1895), p. 18, P. 61. But al-Fārābī's Nawābit have different implication. It is Ibn Bājja who identifies the philosopher with the Nawābit.

10. M. Mahdi, Ibn Khaldun, p. 128.
11. cf. infra translation, p. 83.
12. We are going to use this term "régime" with an accent on the letter "é" as an alternative for Tadbīr. The reason is that this term in the French language is closer in meaning and practice to Tadbīr than the English "regime".
13. Infra, p. 135.
14. M. Mahdi, Ibn Khaldūn, p. 129
15. Al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, Ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut: Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, série Arabe, 1927).
16. Al-Ghazālī died in 505 H. and Ibn Bājja died in 533 H.
17. Ikhwān al-Ṣafā', Rosā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā wa Khillān al-Wafā', Ed. Khayr al-Din al-Zarkālī (Cairo, 1928), Vol. I, 62-63.
18. It is said that Bishr al-Hāfi who was in al-Basra, has left the city and went barefooted to the desert and did not come back, for detail about Bishr see J. Despois, The Encyclopaedia of Islam (New edition; Leiden: E. J. Brill 1960).
19. Infra, p. 52.
20. Lane's, Arabic English Lexicon.
21. Infra, p. 54.
22. Infra, p. 63.
23. Infra, p. 64.
24. cf. Risālat al-Wadā', pp. 37.- 38.
25. cf. Ibn Rushd, Kitāb al-Nafs, Ed. A. F. al-Ahwānī (Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍa 1950), p. 90.
26. Ibn Bājja refers to the Mutawahhid and the philosophers as happy people cf. infra, p. 60. And also A. F. al-Ahwānī's introduction Kitāb al Nafs of Ibn Rushd, p. 52.
27. Infra, p. 117.

28. Ibn Rushd, K. al Nafs, p. 62.
29. Sh. Pines, in his introduction to The Guide of the Perplexed of Moses Maimonides, tran. Sh. Pines (second impression; The University Chicago Press 1964), p. CV.
30. cf. Ibn Bājja, 'Ilm al-Nafs', trans. M. S. H. Ma'Šūmī, p. 115.
31. Ibid., p. 116.
32. Ibid., p. 117.
33. Ibid., p. 118.
34. Infra, p. 54.
35. Infra, p. 58.
36. cf. Alfarabi, Compendium Legum Platonis, Ed. Raymundus Klibansky and Fr. Gabrieli (In Aedibus Institute Warburgiani Londinii Mcmlii []). For instance the words Tadbīr, Mudabbir and Tadabbur are used in pp. 4, 5, 7, 9, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 31, 33, 39. Al-Fārābī discusses the different stages of the person's life in similar way to that of Ibn Bājja, he speaks the same language. Here some terms which are repeatedly used by Abū Bakr as they are used in the Laws:
Asmān (stages of life) pp. 3 ff., 14, 16, 19, 22, 41
Sīra (way of life) pp. 10, 11, 18, 23, 27
Tartīb (arrangement) pp. 3,4,5,8,9,16,20. These are only few examples.
37. Ibn Bājja defends 'Ali b. Ṭālib against Mu'āwiya, infra, p. 82, and he exalts Ibn Abbās in his war against Marawān II the last 'Umayyā Khalif, p. 115.
38. M. Asin Palacios reads Iqāmiyya instead of Imāmiyya. M. Mahdi in his book Ibn Khaldūn has noticed that this unusual term in Islamic politics and philosophy, but he adopted the term, he said: "Sīra iqāmiyya this is a rather unusual term for the perfect regime. M. Asin Palacios translates it as 'estable' adding the following note: "Traduzco as ila voz "iqāmiyya" ateniéndome sólo a la etimologia; pero ignoro el sentido técnico que tonga en la mente de Avempace, impossible de adivinar por falta de contexto que lo explique." By saying that this regime is one and that it is the natural regime,..., Ibn Bājja sufficiently defines the technical meaning of the term in the surviving text." M. Mahdi, B. Khald., p. 130 n. 3.

M. Asin Palacios justifies his translation as we see on an ethymological ground as "stable" but says that he does not its technical sense since neither the context nor al-Fārābī offer any help. This term did not occur in al-Fārābī's books dealing with political philosophy.

39. Ervin I. J. Rosethanl notes in his article, "The Place of Politics in the Philosophy of Ibn Bājja", Islamic Culture Vol. XXV, p. 208, n. 72 that Imāmiyya is better and more correct term, he says: "The Hebrew translator renders Imam by Kohen (priest), whilst we are not aware of the term Imāmiyya occurring in any treatise on politics we have seen, it is in itself a legitimate formation. What confirms us strongly in our conjecture is, however, the fact that Narbonī uses the term Kohanat in the first passage where the four imperfect states are mentioned. Unfortunately, our present passage does not occur in Narboni's commentary. But the term Kohanot is a literal translation of imāmiyya on the basis of (Imam equals Kohen)" In addition to the previous discussion al-Fārābī in his K. Tahsīl al-So'āda (Hyderabad 1345) p. 43 uses the term Imām on equal ground with the philosopher, lawgiver and king. Furthermore, Ibn Rushd following al-Fārābī and probably following Ibn Bājja uses the same term in many occasions.

40. E. I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam, (Cambridge: The University Press, 1962), p. 166. We should note here that the problem is not settled completely because Ibn Bājja identifies this city with the perfect one, he contrasts it to all other "régimes" and calls them unnatural. He says also that this city (Imāmiya) can never degenerate and that there are no causes of corruption in it. These descriptions and qualities made M. Mahdī accept M. Asin Palacios' justification, and these same qualities make us question the soundness of E.I.J. Rosenthal's stand.

41. Al-Naqarri, Nafh al-Tīb, Ed. M. M. 'Abdelhamīd (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Tijāriyya, 1949), Vol. II, 294. cf. D. M. Dunlop, "Philosophical Predecessors and Contemporaries of Ibn Bājja", Islamic Quarterly, Vol. II n.2. p. 103.

42. Al-Naqarri, Nafh al-Tīb, Vol. II, p. 350. cf. M.S.H. al-Ma'ṣūmī, "Ibn al-Imām, the Disciple of Ibn Bājjah" Islamic Quarterly, Vol. IV n. 4. p. 108.

43. Al-Fath b. Khāqān, Qalā'id al-'Iqyan, (Egypt; Būlaq, 1283 H.) p. 300. The same is quoted by Ibn Khalakān, Wafīyyat al-'A'yān, tran. Mac Guckin de Slane (Paris: oriental translation fund, []). Vol. III, p. 131.

44. G. Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science, reprinted (Baltimore: the Williams and Wilkins Comp. 1950), Vol. II, Part I, p. 183.
45. cf. MacGuckin De Slane's notes on Ibn Khallikan's Biographical Dictionary, p. 133 n. 10. cf. also Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, Tabaqāt al-Aṭibbā', French trans. H. Juhier and A. Nouredine (Alger: Librairie Ferraris, 1958) Vol. XIII p. 26 n.85.
46. For the biography of Ibn Bājja cf. T. J. De Boer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, trans. E. R. Jones (London: Luzac and Co. Ltd., 1961) pp. 175-180. cf. also Maḡarrī, Naḥḥ: Vol. IX pp. 230-240. And Ibn Khallikān's Biographical Dict. Vol. III pp. 130-133.
47. MS. Pococke 206, Fol. 3, cf. D. M. Dunlop. "Phi pred. comt". p. 100.
48. Infra, p. 79, and Risālat al Wadā', p. 21.
49. Sh. Pines, The Guide of the Perplexed, p. CIV
50. Risālat al-Wadā', p. 14.
51. Ibid, p. 17.
52. Al-Fārābī, Der Musterstaat, p. 43 and p. 59.
53. Risālat al-Wadā', p. 17.
54. Infra, p. 75.
55. Sh. Pines, The Guide, pp. CIV, CV.
56. E. I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought , p. 163.
57. Ibn Ṭufayl, Ḥay b. Yaqdhān , Ed. A. Maḡmud (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglo, [n.d.]) pp. 74 ff.
58. Ibid, p. 68.
59. Sh. Pines, The Guide, P.C.V 11
60. cf. E. I. J. Rosenthal, "Some Aspects of Islamic Political Thought", Islamic Culture, Vol. XXII n. 7, p. 13.
61. Risālat al-ittisāl, p. 22.
62. Ibid, p. 22-23.
63. Ibn Ṭufayl, Ḥay, pp. 67-69

NOTES

TRANSLATION

1. Nahwa is read behaq in [AS], contrary to [MT] and Munk.
2. Al-Tartīb (arrangement or organization) is used here to mean Tadbīr.
3. It means the capacities of high practical arts such as medicine and the like, in opposition to manual arts.
4. Most probably he means his book, Fuṣūl...fi al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya..., which is mentioned by Ibn Abī 'Uṣaybi'a in Talaqāt al-Aṭibbā, p. 87.
5. D. M. Dunlop in his "Ibn Bājja's Tabīr", J.R.A.S., p. 74, changes the first Political Science and translates Republic. He notes that this "correction seems necessary, but the passage remains obscure, he translates the second Political Science by Politics, then he explains that he "Aristotle's Politics (I, 3 Seg.), here apparently ascribed to Plato. There seems to have been no Arabic version of the Politics however." This last remark seems correct, and Ibn Rushd's statement that he commented upon Plato's Republic because he had not yet seen Aristotle's Politics hold good for the Falāsifa to date.

[AS] always makes reference to Aristotle's Politics. E.I.J. Rosenthal in his article "The Place of Politics in the philosophy of Ibn Bājja" I.C. p. 199., notes that "Asin whenever al-'Ilm al-Madani or al-Sinā'a al-Madaniya which are used by Ibn Bājja synonymously, occur makes a reference to Aristotle's Politics: This is very misleading and we have failed to locate even one of the numerous references so given, also in other places.

There is, moreover, no need to go outside Plato quite apart from the difficulty to ignore the text which clearly means Plato..."

6. The four imperfect cities as enumerated by Plato are: Monarchy, Aristocracy, Oligarchy and Democracy. This is what Ibn Bājja means when he speaks about "The four cities". But this is not all, because Plato has a more complicated classification, he speaks about arbitrary cities such as: tyranny, extreme democracy and

so on. All these appear in al-Fārābī's Der Musterstaat or al-Madina al-Fadila p. 62, where they have Arabic names. Ibn Bājjā who read the Republic in Arabic either as independent work or through al-Fārābī (we are inclined to believe, that he read both Plato and al-Fārābī) uses in the Tadbīr al-Farabi's terminology as we shall see later.

Ibn Bājjā always refers to Plato's Republic and to Aristotle's works, with the supposition that the reader is well acquainted with the Greek works which were translated into Arabic either completely or partially.

7. Well known stories translated into Arabic from their Persian source by Abdullah b. al-Muqaffa' a Persian who adopted Islam, and died in 757 A.D.
8. It was not possible to identify this book. [AS] suggests that it could be an indication to all stories of wise men among the Arabs.
9. The term basīta (simple) should be understood as opposite to composed cities, that is to say the simple imperfect cities and not their compositions: otherwise the term is very strange.
10. Arist., Eth. Nicom., I. III, c.1. thus in [AS], but E. Rosenthal doubts all references of [AS] supra n. 5. We are not going to identify Ibn Bājjā's references to Greek philosophers not only because it is impossible to do so sometimes but also because we do not have the Arabic versions of these books which Ibn Bājjā has used. They are certainly different, sometimes they contain more chapters as the case with Nicomachean Ethics, sometimes they are related to different authors as the case with some Neoplatonic books which were related to Aristotle.
11. This is a reference to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.
12. Muhammad, Ahmad and al-Hasan the sons of Musā the son of Shakir, they are known as Banū Musā and sometimes Banū Shākīr. cf. Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, (Cairo, 1348 H.) p. 378. They were experts in al-Hiyal and in arithmetic. In [AS] we find that Banū Shākīr are one person called Dhu Shākīr or Dū Sākīr according to M.A. Palacios' reading. Palacios added saying: "Faltá on Brockelmann, Geschichte, el título y el autor de este libro". It is true that Brockelmann did not mention the book, simply because Banū Musā b. b. Shākīr did not write a collected book, but they were known to be masters in this science, or in this subject of physics.
13. Supra, Introductory Study, n. 9.
14. Al-Fārābī.

15. The four imperfect cities and the perfect one.
16. The expression "Solitary" here is not a translation of the Mutawahhid rather it is a translation of the Arabic expression Mufarrad or Mufrad which means to be singled out or isolated.
17. Supra, Introductory Study, n. 6.
18. "Sick" is translation of the Arabic expression Mufarrad, for Ibn Bājja means by it the man who is in unnatural state of physical health.
19. Ibn Bājja wrote several books in medicine; we do not know which one he means, cf. Ibn Abī 'Usaybi'a, Tabaqat al-Atibbā', pp. 85, 86.
20. Dunlop notes (p. 78 n.1.) "a slip for 'four' probably". But E. Rosenthal notes In the Place of Politics n.64 that "no change is necessary in view of al-Fārābī's K. al-Siyasāt, 57.11 where three states are opposed to the Ideal State". We agree with Rosenthal that the whole passage is very interesting "for Ibn Bājja's contention that medicine and judicature are no sciences since they do not exist in the Ideal State, and for his attack on Galen".
21. It means that the rational faculty comprises all what distinguishes man from irrational animals, and mentioning the rational faculty includes all what distinguishes man from other.
22. He does not mean that every action of man is an act of choice but he means that all particular human actions which are not shared by animals are acts of choice.
23. The expression "soul" here means the higher faculty of the soul, namely, the intellect or the rational faculty as will be shown clearly later.
24. Ibn Bājja being a physician knows the relation between bodily part and psychic part of man, as clear above.
25. The portrait of the philosopher here is very close to that of the Stoics' "Sage" .
26. This saying of Galen's was very common and well known in the medieval writings Ibn Gebirol the Jewish philosopher of the XII century repeats the same saying, see Munk p. 263.
27. This book of Ibn Bājja's is included among the list of Ibn Bājja's works which is mentioned by Ibn Abī 'Usaybi'a, Tabaqāt, pp. 85, 86.

28. The expression "purpose" here means intellectual or rational purpose only.
29. cf. Munk, p. 394 who adds the quality "séparées" to the "immobile substances" and notes that Ibn Bājja means to speak about the "intelligences des sphères, appelées intelligences séparées".
30. By the expression "spiritual form" it should be understood the pure forms without any matter and the abstract concepts of all the faculties of the soul. The forms can exist by themselves without matter, while the matter cannot exist without form. cf. De Boer, History of Philo. p. 178.
31. Different from Munk the Arabic text does not speak about the second type before the third, cf. Munk p. 394. In Munk there is also additional material in relation to the third type which reads as follows: "Ce sont en quelque sorte des formes (qui restent) dans la faculté rationnelle (de l'âme), lorsque le rapport particulier qu'il y avait entre elle et la chose individuelle a cessé d'exister; car, tant que ce rapport particulier existe, elle (la faculté rationnelle) est toujours affectée d'une certaine corporéité qui fait que le rapport est corporel; mais lorsque la corporéité cesse et que la faculté devient purement spirituelle, elle ne conserve que le rapport universel, c'est-à-dire, le rapport à tous les individus.
32. It is a mountain in Arabia north to Medīna.
33. It is strange that Asin Palacios makes reference here to Aristotle's De Sensu, instead of making reference to the Tadbīr itself. cf. infra pp. 118, 119.
34. Here again we find in [AS] reference to Aristotle's De Anima instead of to the writings of Ibn Bājja.
35. Imaginary legend which is repeatedly mentioned in Islamic books of theology. It is an equivalent to Gog and Magog in the Bible.
36. Supra, n. 7.
37. The second Muslim Khalif.
38. A legend about a person who was able to see from a very long distance. cf. Yāqūt, Irshād al-Arib ilā Ma'rifat al-Adab (Cairo, 1910). Vol. IV, p. 1032.
39. Is the famous poet Thābit b. Jāber, about whom the Arabs relate some imaginary stories, see Jamharat Ansāb al-Arab, Ed. E. Lévi-provençal (Cairo: Ma'ārif, 1948) p. 232. See also Ibn Qutayba,

al-Shi'r wal - Shu'arā' (Beirut, Dār al - Thaqāfa, 1964)
pp. 562-564.

40. Al - Jam' (unity) according the mystics is: " the removal of disorder and separation between eternity and creation. When the sight of the soul becomes attracted to see the beauty of (the truth of) God; then the light of the intellect, which separates things, would be covered by God's light, and the separation between what is eternal and what is created vanishes. Because falsity vanishes when truth comes". Al-Tahān ancy, A Dictionary of the technical terms used in the Sciences of the Muslims, Ed. M. W. Abd al - Haqq and G. Kadir (Kalkuta : W. N. Lee's Press, 1862) Part I, p. 234.
41. Al - Gazālī, al - Munqidh minal - Dalāl, Ed. with French trans. Farīd Jābr (Beirut: al-Lajna al-Dawā'iyya lil-Tarjama, 1959) p.40.
42. Dhikr al-Maṭlūb this clause is read in [AS] Dhikr al-Maḥlūm which makes no sense as far as we know, while al-Maṭlūb is God, for it means "the one whom we seek" or "the one who is sought after - the sought one".
43. This example may be an addition from the scribe who was living in Egypt.
44. This is another example which supports our claim in the previous note.
45. If lying is to bring happiness, it does so for the inhabitants of the imperfect cities only and not directly. It is clear that happiness in the perfect is not through symbols but rather through direct unity with truth.
46. Here again [AS] refers to Aristotle with no reason.
47. It means VI. Nicom. Eth. as suggested by [AS].
48. Supra, Introductory Study n. 38.
49. Supra, n. 11.
50. This means the propositions which lead to certain agitation in the soul.
51. Proposition of beautiful style which affect the soul.
52. Ibn Bājja has two kinds of classification of the forms. They are

either three types of forms as mentioned in the beginning of this passage or two types only: universal and particular, but the particular are either spiritual or corporeal.

53. He means the recollective faculty, the imaginative faculty and the *Sensus Communis*.
54. The faculties which belong to the nutritive are the digestive and the like.
55. He means the four elements.
56. There is a clear repetition, we do not know whether it is due to the scribe or to Ibn Bājja himself.
57. It is said that al-Mutanabbī said this poem when he received the news concerning the death of Sayf al-Dawla's sister. cf. Dīwan al-Mutanabbī, (Beirut: Dār Šādir, 1958) p. 433.
58. It means from one to four of the classification of the previous paragraph.
59. [MT] read the "health" instead of the "result".
60. It means the goals have nothing to do with being Mudabbir. See Risālat al-Ittisāl, p. 38.
61. [AS] refers to Aristotle.
62. He means by "states" particular concept or agitation which the forms leave in the soul.
63. The common and usual things.
64. [AS] reads Zīna instead of rutba, and he translates it ornaments (ornament) which makes no sense at all.
65. This paragraph is continuation of last chapter according to the MS. but it is the beginning of a new article according to Munk.
66. It was impossible to identify the poet who said this line but I found that 'Ubayd b. al-'Abrās has said something very close to this. Hence this line of poetry may have been composed by Ibn Bājja himself who could not remember the exact words of the poet.
67. Sura XII, verse 174.
68. Sura XII, verse 175.

69. Between 1085 and 1138 A.D.
70. Between 1009 and 1085.A.D.
71. Those who beautify themselves, and al-Ta'jammul is "beautification". It is also a title for a group of poets who were very famous with regard to poems of love.
72. Supra, n. 47.
73. Related by al-Bukhārī, Muslim and Abū Dāwūd, cf. Wensinck, corcordance de la tradition Musulman, (Leiden, 1962)
74. Related by al-Bukhārī, Muslim and Abū Dāwūd, cf. ibid.
75. Hatim al-Ta'i speaking to Māwiya the daughter of 'Avnzar. cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, pp. 167, 168.
76. It is said that when Abū Shujā' known as al-Majnūn went to Cairo and got in touch with al-Mutanabbī, the latter said this poem in praising him. cf. Dūwān p. 490.
77. cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, p. 82 where the story is different, it says that 'Umar the second calif asked one of Haram b. Zinan's children to recite some of what Zuhayr has composed concerning Haram. After, 'Umar heard the poetry, he said: "it is good poetry" b. Haram said: "we used to be generous with him (Zuhayr)", and 'Umar answered: "You have given him something temporal and he has given you something eternal".
78. cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, p. 178 ff.
79. cf. Encyclopedia of Islam, al-Madā'in.
80. cf. Encyclopedia of Islam, al-Khālidiyyāt.
81. Al-Zabur is the Book of Psalms.
82. [AS] claims that this verse refers to V. 5 of Solomon LVII, which means that [AS] refers to the Bible while it is clear from the text that the verse refers to the Book of Psalms. Of course there is still a place for similarity between the Bible and the Book of Psalms.
83. I could not identify this Hadith.
84. cf. supra, p. 78.
85. Ibn Bājja always makes such remarks without keeping his promises, cf. supra, p. 49.

86. He is a mystic from Yemen; a contemporary of the Prophet who adopted Islam. cf. M. m. Ḥilmī, al-Hayāt al-Rouhiyya fi al-Islām, (Cairo, 1933) p. 10.
87. He is Ibrāhīm b. Adham b. Mansur b. Yazīd b. Jabir Abū Ishāq from Balakj, died between 160-166 H./ 776-783 A.D. cf. Enculopedia of Islām, Ibrahim b. Adham.
88. A Greek god (hero) who serves as herald and messenger of other gods, presides over roads, commerce, invention, eloquence, cunning and theft, and conducts the dead to Hades.
89. This is a verse related to a poet from the tribe of 'Abd al-Qays, see al-Buḥturī, al-Ḥamāsa, ed. Cheikho (Beirut, 1910) p. 37.
90. cf. supra, Introductory Study, n. 7.
91. Related by Abū Dāwūd, Ibn Mājjā and Ah mad b. Ḥanbal, cf. Wensinck, Corcordance.
92. A skin of a young unweaned camel stuffed with straw (or with panic grass or with dry herbage), to which a she-camel is made to incline when her young one has died: it is brought near to the mother of the young camel (that has died), in order that she may incline to it, and yield her milk over it. Lane's "Arabic - English Lexicon", al-Baw.
93. He means the higher kinds of animal. Of course this is unusual term to be used for animals. Ibn Bājjā has another term for such animals, namely, al-Muḥassal.
94. Translation of the term al-Wad'
95. Ibn Abī 'Uṣaybi'a mentions that Ibn Bājjā has commented on Aristotles De Animalibus. cf. Tabaqat, p. 85 and cf. also Munk, p. 386.
96. cf. al-Fārābī, K. al-Siyasa al-Nadaniyya, ed. F. M. Najjār (Beirut: al-Matba'a al-Kāthūlikiyya, 1964) pp. 88, 99, 100, 101. Al-Fārābī explains the nature of this city, and Ibn Bājjā supposes that his reader is acquainted with al-Fārābī's writings.
97. This is how Ibn Bājjā quotes Aristotle, but the quotation is not very clear.
98. He wants to say that if the middle aged person is to play, he has to play with ~~swo~~ swords, because playing with ~~swo~~ swords implies seriousness.

99. The MS. has Appocritis , but from the context we know that the person who is meant is Heraclites or Hercules who was a hero of classical mythology noted for great strength and especially for achieving twelve labors imposed on him by Hera.
100. Here Ibn Bājja mentions the names of the cities for the first time, cf. supra, n. 6.
101. cf. supra, p. 31.
102. al-Fārābī, K. al-Siyāsa , p. 87. cf. al-Fārābī takes a similar stand, but different from Ibn Bājja he considers al-Nawābit as harmful and useless like "thorns among plants and poisoned herbs among grass".
103. It is strange to hear about the shyness of a lion.
104. In Arabic al-Ṣanā'ī' al Dhunūniyya wal-Burhāniyya.
105. The limited is not compared with the unlimited and the definite is not compared with the indefinite; similarly the temporal is not compared with the eternal.
106. Alexander the Great.
107. This shows who Ibn Bājja used to think about, Hippocrites. The whole passage is interesting; it explains Ibn Bājja's view concerning eternity, cf. supra, p. 41, and because he gives Greek names only.
108. cf. supra, n. 39.
109. Ibn Bājja refers here to the war between the 'Umayyades and the Abbasides, when Ibn Abbas who was leading the armies of the Abbasides defeated Marwān II.
110. cf. al-Mufaḍḍal al-Ḍabbī, Amthāl al-'Arab, (Qusṭanṭīna: Maṭba' at al-Jawā'id, 1300 H.) p. 66, where the story is given in detail that al-Zibā' poisoned herself saying to 'Amr who overcame her "with my hands not yours". In Tadbīr we find "my hand" and in Amthāl al-'Arab "my two hands".
111. The Roman emperor.
112. Ibn Bājja was very fond of the Greeks as well as the Arabic literatures as is clear.
113. cf. al-Ḍabbī, Amthāl, p. 31, where the story is different for we learn from al-Ḍabbī that Faṭima'um al-Rabī' did not die, rather she faced Zuhayr etc.

114. cf. supra, n. 75.
115. There is an addition in Munk, p. 398, which reads as follows:
Il ne prendra du corporel que ce qui doit servir d'instrument pour prolonger son existence, mais il ne le bannira pas complètement du spirituel; il ne prendra également du spirituel même le plus élevé que ce qui est nécessaire pour l'intelligible et il s'en tiendra finalement à finalement à l'intelligible absolu.
116. Different from the Arabic MS. Munk reads as follows: Toutes lesdites qualités sont celles du solitaire, citoyen de la république parfaite.
117. cf. supra, Introduction, n. 6.
118. cf. Risālat al-Ittisāl, p. 11, 12 and K. al-Nafs . (The Arabi version) p. 27.
119. The difference between this type and the first is that the forms this second type do not exist without the help of the imaginative faculty.
120. There is an addition in Munk which reads as follows: Cette forme qui vient de la nature ne correspond point à un corps particulier; car celui qui a soif ne désire pas telle eau en particulier, mais une eau quelconque de l'espèce qu'il désire. C'est pourquoi Galien a prétendu que les animaux perçoivent les especes (ou les universaux.)
121. cf. Munk, p. 95, n. 1.
122. cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, p. 666.
123. This is not the first time when Ibn Bājjā attacks Galen. cf. supra, n. 20.
124. It was not possible to identify the poet.
125. Munk reads, differently, as follows: "Les animaux qui n'ont pas de sang comme les abeilles et les fourmis". Certainly the Arabic MS does not mention anything about animals without blood.
126. Ibn Bājjā mentions the bear both here and in the previous passage as two opposite types of animal.
127. By "intermediary" Abū Bakr means the third and fourth types of particular spiritual forms as we have seen in the previous article.

128. It is al-ta'lim in Arabic which means mathematics, cf. al-Fārābī, Ḥisā' al-'Ulūm, ed. 'Uthmān Amin (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1931) p. 34 ff.
129. Munk makes a mistake in referring to the twelfth Shi'ite Imām instead of the Abbaside Khalif, the father of Hārūn al-Rashīd. For the story of al-Mahdi and Abū Dulāma, cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, p. 662.
130. Ibid, p. 660.
131. Munk translates "modesty" and suggests that the Arabic word is al-Ḥayā' which makes more sense than "frowning", but the Arabic MS. does not allow such reading.
132. There is an addition in Munk, p. 401, which reads as follows:
parce que celui-ci s'humiliera par la conception de la nature élevée du Mahdi et de sa noble forme.
133. cf. Ibn Qutayba, al-Shi'r, p. 153.
134. There is an addition in Munk, p. 402, which reads as follows: ni même avec celui qui n'a pour but que le spirituel absolu.
135. By "people of science" we should understand "the philosopher" or those who have the intelligible forms.
136. Munk has a long addition which reads: Il doit les écarter de lui, car ils ne sont pas de son espèce; il ne se mêlera pas à eux, ni n'entendra leur bavardage, afin qu'il n'ait pas besoin de démentir leurs mensonges, de poursuivre de sa haine les ennemis de Dieu et de porter son jugement contre eux. Convien-drait-il au solitaire isolé de se faire le juge de ceux au milieu desquels il séjourne? Certes, il vaut mieux qu'il se livre à son culte divin et qu'il rejette loin de lui ce lourd fardeau, en se perfectionnant lui-même et en brillant pour les autres comme une lumière. C'est en secret qu'il doit se livrer au culte du Créateur, comme si c'était là une chose honteuse, et c'est ainsi qu'il se perfectionnera autant dans sa science que dans sa religion et qu'il plaira à Dieu.....; où bien, il ira dans les endroits - s'il s'en trouve - où fleurissent les sciences, et il se liera avec les hommes d'un âge mûr, qui excellent par leur jugement, leur science et leur intelligence et, en général, par les vertus intellectuelles, avec des hommes accomplis, et non pas avec des jeunes gens inexpérimentés....
137. cf. supra, pp. 17, 18.
138. Munk reads "vin" (wine) instead of "meat".

139. cf. supra, pp. 30, 31.
140. cf. supra, p. 134.
141. It means the relation of the particular form to its object in opposition to its relation with the different individuals who have the form. This second relation is called the universal relation of the particular form in opposition to the particular relation.
142. The Arabic MS says "al-Ajsām al-Mutaharrika" which means moving bodies, but from the context we should understand "the celestial bodies".
143. Darūriya in Arabic.
144. Juz'iyya in Arabic.
145. It means temporal in opposition to eternal.
146. It means the generic forms which are universal, are their forms.
147. It means; he receives them as their substratum.
148. Munk has an addition which explains the last clause, it says:
et dans ce qui est homme on trouve l'espèce de l'homme, quoi-
que ce qui la reçoit reçoive la forme de l'homme de deux
manières à la fois, je veux dire, une fois en tant que forme et
une autre fois comme perception; et cela n'est pas inadmissible,
car c'est à deux points de vue différents.
149. Man on one hand is temporal and corrupted body, but on the other
hand he may attain eternity through the rational faculty.
150. Ibn Bājjā wants to raise a logical problem concerning the contra-
diction between the universality of Man's form, and the tempor-
ality of the individual man.
151. Munk has additional materials which cover the following pages.
The reason we are quoting all these pages instead of making
reference to them only, is to give a kind of result which throws
light on some ambiguous paragraphs of the text as it stands in
the MS. Munk reads (p. 405 ff.):

qui perçoit sa propre essence comme elle perçoit les autres essences, avec cette différence qu'elle perçoit sa propre essence dans toute sa réalité, tandis qu'elle ne perçoit les autres essences qu'en ce qu'elles sont distinctes de la sienne, et elle les abstrait et en fait des choses intelligibles. Il est clair que ces choses intelligibles sont en rapport avec la hylé; car elles ne sont pas abstraites en elles-mêmes, puisqu'elles n'existent tout d'abord que comme ce qu'il y a d'intelligible dans les choses matérielles. En effet, c'est après leur abstraction des individus que reste le rapport universel, qui est le rapport (de l'espèce) à tous les individus, bien que le rapport particulier, c'est-à-dire le rapport avec chaque individu en particulier, soit détruit; car, la matière étant la cause de la corruption (), le rapport (de la forme) avec elle ne reste pas, de sorte que nous disons que l'intelligible d'Aristote n'est point l'intelligible de Platon à l'égard des formes de l'imagination, qui diffèrent dans eux selon la différence des individus dont elles ont été abstraites, et qui sont devenues intelligibles par le rayonnement de l'intellect actif.

Ainsi donc, le but vers lequel doit tendre le solitaire qui désire l'immortalité n'est point en relation avec la matière; c'est pourquoi il conduit à la véritable fin, où disparaît même ce rapport universel dont nous avons parlé. Là, en effet, la forme est complètement dépouillée de corporeité et n'est plus un seul instant forme hylique; car il (le solitaire) perçoit les formes isolément et en elles-mêmes, sans qu'elles aient été abstraites des matières. Et, en effet, leur véritable existence, c'est leur existence en elles-mêmes, bien qu'elles soient abstraites. C'est là la conception intelligible, je veux dire l'intellect dans son existence réelle ou l'intellect en acte; c'est l'existence de l'intellect émané, qui, plus que toute autre chose, ressemble à l'intellect actif. Cette forme émanée n'a plus aucun rapport avec la matière, si ce n'est à un certain point de vue, c'est-à-dire, comme l'entéchie des intelligibles hyliques; car c'est en quelque sorte l'intellect en acte qui est le substratum de l'intellect acquis ou émané. En effet, quand les formes sont devenues intelligibles en acte, elles sont le terme des êtres de ce monde; et par cela même qu'elles sont intelligibles en acte, elles comptent au nombre des êtres. Or, comme il est de la nature de tous les êtres pensés et de devenir des formes pour la substance (qui pense), il n'est pas inadmissible, comme le dit Abou-Naqr, que les choses pensées en tant qu'elles sont intelligibles en acte, c'est-à-dire intellect en acte, pensent à leur tour. Or, ce qu'elles pensent ne saurait être autre chose si ce n'est ce qui est en réalité intellect; mais ce qui est en réalité intellect, parce qu'il a l'intelligible pour forme, est intellect en acte seulement par rapport à cette forme ou à ces formes (qu'il pense), tandis que pour tout autre objet intelligible il est (intellect) en puissance. Lorsque l'intellect est en acte par rapport à toutes les choses intelligibles, et qu'il est le ... — — — —>

terme de tous les êtres, étant devenu lui-même les choses intelligibles en acte, alors, pensant l'être qui est intellect en acte, il ne pense d'autre être que lui-même; mais il se pense lui-même sans abstraction; car son être en lui-même, avant de penser, est intellect ou intelligible en acte. Et en cela il diffère des autres objets intelligibles; car, ceux-ci sont pensés tout d'abord par cela qu'ils sont abstraits de leurs matières dans lesquelles ils existent. Or, si après avoir été intelligibles en puissance, ils sont pensés une seconde fois, leur être n'est plus l'être précédent, mais est séparé de leur matière; car ce sont des formes qui ne sont plus dans leur matière et des choses intelligibles en acte. Ainsi donc, lorsque l'intellect en acte pense les choses intelligibles, qui sont ses formes en tant qu'elles sont intelligibles en acte, ce même intellect, que nous avons appelé d'abord intellect en acte, est désormais l'intellect acquis.

Or, comme il y a des êtres qui sont de (pures) formes sans matière, des formes qui n'ont jamais été dans la matière, ces êtres, quand on les pense, existent comme des choses (purement) intelligibles, tels qu'ils existaient avant d'avoir été pensés. Car si, comme nous l'avons dit penser une chose de prime abord, c'est abstraire les formes hyliques de leur matière, elles (les formes) acquièrent par là une existence autre que leur première existence. Mais, comme il s'agit ici de choses qui sont de (pures) formes sans matière, la substance n'a pas besoin d'être abstraite de sa matière; au contraire, l'intellect, étant en acte, les trouve abstraites et les pense telles qu'elles existent en elles-mêmes (c'est à dire) comme choses intelligibles et immatérielles. Et quant il les pense, son propre être, comme chose intelligible, devient un intellect second, dont l'être (pourtant), avant de penser, était ce même intellect; ce qu'il faut entendre dans ce sens que, comme il s'agit de formes immatérielles, celles-ci, quand elles sont pensées, existent absolument telles qu'elles existaient en elles-mêmes, étant intelligibles dans toute la force du terme. Car, de même que nous disons de l'intellect qui est en nous, qu'il est en nous en acte, de même absolument on doit le dire de ces intellects qui sont dans le monde (en dehors de nous). Ces formes peuvent être pensées dans toute leur perfection, quand tous les objets de notre intelligence, ou du moins la plupart, sont devenus intelligibles en acte; l'intellect alors devient intellect acquis, et lesdites formes intelligibles deviennent des formes pour l'intellect en tant qu'intellect acquis. L'intellect acquis est en quelque sorte le substratum de ces formes, tandis qu'il est lui-même une forme pour l'intellect en acte, lequel, à son tour, est comme un substratum et une matière pour l'intellect acquis; (d'autre part) l'intellect en acte est une forme pour la substance (dans laquelle il réside), et cette substance est comme une matière.

Puis donc que l'intellect actif est indivisible, je veux dire, puisque toutes les formes spécifiques ensemble ne sont dans lui qu'une seule, ou du moins, puisque leurs essences sont des choses indivisibles [je veux dire, puisque chacune des formes spécifiques existe comme unité dans lui], la science de cet intellect séparé, en raison de son élévation, est une, bien que les objets de cette soient multiples, selon la multiplicité des espèces. Si les formes qui viennent de lui sont multiples, ce n'est que parce qu'elles se produisent dans des matières (différentes). En effet, les formes qui se trouvent aujourd'hui dans certaines matières sont, dans l'intellect actif, une (seule) forme abstraite; mais non pas dans ce sens qu'elles aient été abstraites, après avoir existé dans les matières, comme cela a lieu pour l'intellect en acte. Rien n'empêche l'intellect en acte de faire des efforts pour rapprocher de lui peu à peu ces formes séparées, jusqu'à ce qu'arrive la conception (purement) intelligible, c'est-à-dire l'intellect acquis; c'est pourquoi l'essence de l'homme, ou l'homme par ce qui forme son essence, est ce qu'il y a de plus rapproché de l'intellect actif. Rien non plus n'empêche cet intellect (acquis) de donner à la fois ce que les autres intellects ont donné d'abord, c'est-à-dire, le mouvement pour se penser soi-même; et alors arrive la véritable conception intelligible, c'est-à-dire la perception de l'être qui, par son essence même, est intellect en acte, sans avoir en besoin, ni maintenant, ni auparavant, de quelque chose qui le fit sortir de l'état de puissance. C'est là la conception de l'intellect séparé, je veux dire de l'intellect actif, tel qu'il se conçoit lui-même, et c'est là la fin de tous les mouvements.

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2. Other selected sources.

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PART THREE

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جوهه، الجوهر ٢٤-٣٩-١٢٢

جوالاشر
١٢٨-١٢٦-٢٤

جولہ ۱۹۷۱ء

مار خرناسی ۱۰۱ - ۱۰۲

۷۸-۷۷-۷۶-۷۵-۷۴-۷۳-۷۲-۷۱-۷۰-۶۹-۶۸-۶۷-۶۶-۶۵-۶۴-۶۳-۶۲-۶۱-۶۰-۵۹-۵۸-۵۷-۵۶-۵۵-۵۴-۵۳-۵۲-۵۱-۵۰-۴۹-۴۸-۴۷-۴۶-۴۵-۴۴-۴۳-۴۲-۴۱-۴۰-۳۹-۳۸-۳۷-۳۶-۳۵-۳۴-۳۳-۳۲-۳۱-۳۰-۲۹-۲۸-۲۷-۲۶-۲۵-۲۴-۲۳-۲۲-۲۱-۲۰-۱۹-۱۸-۱۷-۱۶-۱۵-۱۴-۱۳-۱۲-۱۱-۱۰-۹-۸-۷-۶-۵-۴-۳-۲-۱

1,7-1,0-1,1-1,2-99-97-98-80-59

100 - 110 - 115 - 1.9 - 1.1 - 1.0

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يوجد في (١) نوع الانسان ، فانه كانه يقبله ، فقد صار الموضوع
 يقبل صورة الانسان ، بوجهيه من القول ، في وقت واحد ،
 وهذا شنيع ، وايضاً ، فانه كانه شخص انسان - بما هو انسان -
 يقبل الانسان ، فالانسان في هذا الانسان ، واجزاء الحد متقدمة
 للمحدود ، فالانسان موجود قبل أنه يكون انساناً ؛ فالانسان
 حد وجد قبل أنه يوجد وهذا محال وشنيع .

فالواجب أنه نفخ عن هذا القول المحلل ، فنقطي
 كل واحد من طرفيه قطعه . ويشبه أنه نقف منه على انه
 الانسان من مجايب (٢) الطبيعة التي اوجدت (٣) ، فنقول أنه
 الانسان منه امور كثيرة . وانما هو انسان بجموعها ، ففيه القوة
 الفاذية ، وليس هذه يقبل (٤) صورته ؛ وفيه القوة الحاسة والخيالية والذاكرة
 وهذه كلها لا يقبل زواتها ، ولا يلحقها ؛ وفيه القوة الناطقة وهذه الخاصة به .
 انتهى ما وجد في هذا القول الحمد له كما هو اهله ومستحقه .

(١) [فيه] في الأصل .

(٢) [المجايب] في قراءة [أس] .

(٣) [اوجد برها] في قراءة [أس] .

(٤) [تقبل] في قراءة [أس] .

يكبر^(١) خوبصاً شديداً ، وذلك انه طبيعة الانسان هي فيما يظهر
 لها لو اُسطة بين تلك السردية ، وهذه الاليفة الفاسدة . والامر
 في الانسان في هذه الحال على الجري الطبيعي ، فانه الطبيعة لم
 تنتقل من جنس الى جنس إلا بمب^(٢) ، كما نجد ذلك في كل
 اجناس الجواهر الموجودة^(٣) ؛ فانه في الموجدات موجداً وسطاً
 بين المجدات والنبات لا يقدر الانسان انه يحكم عليه هل
 هو نبات او مجراد ، وكذلك بين جنس الحيوان و جنس النبات
 شيء هو وسط ، يأخذ من كل بقط ، وقد قيل في ذلك في
 مواضع كثيرة ، وقلناه نحن فيما تقدم .

واذا كان ذلك فقد يجب ضرورة أنه يكون في الانسان مفر
 هو في تلك السردية ، فيكون به سردياً ، ويكون فيه معنى^(٤)
 يسه الاليفة الفاسدة ، فيكون به كائناً فاسداً ، فهاهنا المقيان نقد
 ينبغي ان يفحصاً راضياً ، فانا اذا نظرنا من جهة اخرى كما هو الانسان

(١) [بير] في قراءة [أ س] .

(٢) [بتوسط] في [مت] .

(٣) [الموجدات] في الأصل وهي [الموجدات] في مت .

(٤) [بعض] في الأصل [معن] في [مت] .

المصنف برأ وهو^(١) موضوعها بالوجه الآخر أنه قيل لها بزيادة النسبة
 الأخرى موضوع ، فإنه إنما يقال موضوع بوجهين : أما القابل للأثر
 بالاضافة ، وأما الموجود الجسماني بالاضافة الى عقوله ، والأجسام
 المستديرة هي موضوعات للمعقولات التي برأ هي ماهي ، وليست
 موضوعات لوجود تلك الصور فيها ، إذ لم تقبل على جهة انزاع
 هيولائها ، فيكون برأ وجودها بل ما عكست منه صورها
من صورها هو موجود بنفسه ، وسبب وجودها ، يتقدم
 لها في الوجود على ما تقدم اجزاء الحد المحدود .

فأما أنواع الأجسام الكلية ، فإنه الأجسام موضوعات ،
 على انه الكليات صور لتلك الأجسام والأشياء التي يفعلونه^(٣)
 بتلك المعقولات على انهم قابلون لها ، وبهم توجد تلك المعقولات ،
 وتنبه على جهة ما الأثر في المواد . فأما نوع الانسان ،
 فإنه موضوعه المصنف به ، هو موضوعه الذي له على الجهة الثانية .
 وقد ينشأ موضوع تعجب واعتبار

(١) [الواو] زيادته مقترنه

(٢) هكذا في الأصل والارجح انزاع مكرره

(٣) [يفعلونه] في الأصل .

كانه في الصورة الخاصة، فانه صورة زيد الخاصة، هي عند عمرو،
وهي عند عمرو على انما امر وجود فيه لا على انه يتصف بتلك
الصورة، فانه كانه ذلك أنصافاً، فهي في عمرو نفس - كما قلناه
فيما تقدم - فصورة الانسان انه كانه لرجل تحريك لما هي فيه،
فموضوعها المتصف^(١) بها، هو موضوعها الذي هو له هيئته،
او كالهيئة - وبعبارة فانه كلّي الانسان سائر العقوليات، فانه
موضوع تلك المتصف بذلك الكلّي، كأنه قلت كلّي الفيل، فموضوعه
فيل أثر به الجنس، وموضوعه الذي يتصف به هو شخصه الخاص
الانسان الذي هو موضوع كلّي الانسان.

فلما باين الانسان سائر الجواهر الموجودة، فكذلك

باينة صورته سائر الصور التي للكانيات الفاسدات، واشهرت^(٣)

بالصور التي للأجسام المستديرة، فانه تلك تصقل انفسها، وموضوعها^(٤)

(١) [المتصف] في قرارة [أُس]

(٢) [هي] في الأصل .

(٣) [واشهرت] في الأصل .

(٤) [موضوعها] في الأصل .

عدد [و] ^(١) حَسَنَاهِيه . وهذا كله قد تبينه في مواضع كثيرة .
 فأذنه ولا موضوع واحد من موضوعات الكل ينفيد الكل
 حالاً . ولا يشبه به ^(٢) الكل للأمر المتحرك بل الأمر فيها
 على الوجود المقابل . وذلك أنه نوعه أنه كان يقبل الأمر
 الأفضل لموضوعه يقبل الأمر الأفضل ، لأجل قبوله وإعطائه ، وهو
 وأنه كان لا يقبل لم يقبل موضوعه . وأنه كان الموضوع شريفاً
 كان الشخص الموضوع شريفاً وبالعكس . فالنوع ينفيد الشخص
 الموجود حال الشرف والخسة وهو أيضاً ينفيد الشبابة [Fol. 182]
 والدوام . والموضوع هو سبب التقيد والزوال . فليس أذنه في
 شيء الأنا شيء هو لصورة العامة كما ظهر في جملة من
 أفعاله أنما لصورة الخاصة .

فلننظر الآن في النسبة التي لصورة الأنا في الموضوع
 الذي يوجد له ، كالمملكة فيه ؛ فظاهر أنه المفقول لا يوجد إلا
 للأنا خاصة ، فيبين أنه موضوع نوع ، على أنه يوصف به ،
 هو موضوعه ، على أنه ذو وجود وذو ملكة . وهذا مقابل ما

(١) [الو] أضافه من عندنا .

(٢) الأرجح أنما زائدة .

الصادرة تستفيد الروحانية من الجسمية التي هي (١) موضوعها لال
 حنة أو رفعة ، فبالوجود الجسماني إذا تستفيد هذه الروحانية
 اهوائاً . فاما (٢) المستولاة فهي على لال مقابلة ، وهي أيضاً لا
 تستفيد من الوجود الجسماني لارفعة ولا حنة ، وذلك بين
 بأدنى تأمل . وذلك أنه زيدا أنه كانه كريماً ، وكانه محمداً
 فالمستول منهما يوصف بأنه كريم وليثم معاً . هذا مالا يمكنه - فانه
 كانه بعض كريماً وبعض ليثماً - والكريم سيكونه لفي زيدا واللؤم قد
 يكونه أيضاً لفي عمرو ، فذلك كانه لأنه طبيعة هذا النوع قبلت
 الصنعية معاً . وقبول الصنعية إما في أوقات مختلفة ، أو في
 موضوعاتنا امور كلية اما ضرورية ، فهي لكل ما هو شخص لذلك
 الكلي الموضوع ، واما جزئية ، فهي أيضاً في بعض الأشخاص إلى
 هي موضوعة الكلي الموضوع في القضية ، فذلك في وجود ذلك
 الموضوع في كل ما يلزمه اما لزوماً ضرورياً كلياً ، أو غير ذلك
 من اللزوم . والأشياء التي هي متمسكة أنه توجد في الأشخاص
 التي هي موضوعه لذلك الكلي هي أيضاً محدودة ، وزوايا

(١) [هي] في قراءة [أسماء] .

(٢) [واما] في قراءة [أسماء] .

الروحانيات روحانية على ما ينبغي بعد هذا. لكنه ليس لها إلى
 إنسان إنسان نسبة تخص، كما^(١) عرض ذلك بالصورة الروحانية
 الخاصة، وهي أيضاً في حال من الأحوال تشبه المتحرك^(٢)،
 كما عرض في تلك، فانه صورة زيد كانت في نفس عمرو بحال
 فيه، ثم صارت الآن بحال فضيلة^(٣) ورفعة، فقد هدشت لها
 حال، وزالت عنها حال، وبهذا الوجود تشبه المتحركة - وانه لم
 تكن متحركة - وليس ذلك كما يلزم في صورة زيد، اذا ظن فيه
 عمرو الخ، ثم انتقل، وظن به الرفعة، فانه زيداً في تلك
 تحرك منه ظن إلى ظن. وفي الحال الأولى يكون زيد كانه قد
 فتحيداً بصورته الجسمانية، فحصلت صورته الروحانية الخاصة،
 عند عمرو بهذه الحال، ثم انتقل زيد فصار كرمياً، فصارت
 صورته الروحانية الخاصة عند عمرو بهذه الحال الأخرى،
 وزالت عنه الحال الأولى، فيجب انه تفرقه بين الوجودية الروحانية
 فانها تتغير به بناء التفسير، فبهذا الوجه، وبهذا النحو

(١) [كلاماً] في الأصل.

(٢) يعني الأجسام المستديرة والكواكب السيارة.

(٣) هكذا في الأصل وهي [فضله] في قراءة [أسي].

هي^(١) هيئته ، كغيره . فهي ينسبها الى موضوعاتها غاية ، اللهم
 الا في المصطلحات التي لها شخص واحد ، فتلك نسبة روحانية
 الخاصة انه كانت لتلك خاصية على هذه الجبهة التي هي للأجسام^(٢)
 الظاهرة ، وذلك يكونه بانها نفسا أنفردا ، وأنه كان المحسوس
 شرفا ، فليس لتلك روحانية خاصة الا بالنسبة . وذلك
 أنه المحسوس اذا لم يدرك لم يمكنه [فهل. / ٨١٧] الخيال أنه يدركها .
 وبالجملة ، فاي هذه كانه ، فلا مدخل له في هذا العلم ، لأننا
 انما غرضنا فيما يخص الإنسان ، فانه^(٣) تكلمنا فيما لا يخصه ،
 فكلها^(٤) في ذلك في هذا العلم بالقصد الثاني .
 والمصطلحات^(٥) هي جميع^(٦) انواع الجوهر . والانساء هو نوع
 من انواعها . فمقول الانساء هو صورته العامة ، وهو اخص

(١) اضافته في الرابعة .

(٢) [الأجسام] في قراءة [أُس]

(٣) [وانه] في قراءة [أُس]

(٤) [فكلها] في قراءة [أُس] بخلاف الأصل ولكننا ارجع

(٥) [وبالمصطلحات] في الأصل .

(٦) [لجميع] في الأصل .

الباب الثامن

فصل ٤

الأفعال الانسانية التي تضاف الى الموجد، ويمكنه أن يفعلها فتوجد ثلثه اصناف -
 كما عددنا قبل - مزايا ما هو نحو ^(١) الصورة الجسدية له ^(٢)، ومزايا ما هو نحو ^(١) الصورة
 الروحانية الخاصة، منه هيئة لراية خاصة - ومزايا ما هو نحو ^(١) الصورة العامة،
 وهي الصور المصغولة، فاما الروحانية الخاصة - منه هيئة لراية خاصة - والروحانية
 المتوسطة، فبما نذكر في الغايات، وليست غايات كما قلنا في هذه كلها .
 وقد سبق ^(٣) علينا ان نقول في الروحانية المصغولة . وهذه الصورة هي فيما
 احدها في الصور الخاصة على وجود مقابل، فانه تلك الصورة موضوعها الذي
 تستند اليه، وهي به موجودة صادقة، واحد، وموضوعها، الذي هي هيئة فيه
 كثير، وهذه موضوعها، الذي هي به هي موجوده، كثير، وموضوعها، الذي هي له

(١) [بخو] في قرادة [أس] .

(٢) لقطه في [أس] لأشرا زائدة في الأصل .

(٣) [يبقى] في قرادة [أس] .

منزلاً باراده^(١) فليت حكتبه ، وكيف تنصب غاية والموقوف
على هذه ليس يعطى المتوحد علم ما ينبغي أنه يقصد^(٢) نحوه بل
انما يعطيه علم الأسباب بالموصله .

وأيضاً فانه سيره المتوحد ، لما كانه احد ما يجب أنه يبينه
كيف ينبغي أنه يكونه علم الصور الرومانية ، وكانه هذا أيضاً أحد
اقسامها . فقد ينبغي انه يقول فيه ما اراد أنه يضع في هذا
العلم قولاً صناعياً . ومع ذلك كله فانما يظهر أثناء القول بطر
من العلوم التي تستحقه أنه تؤثر لذواتها ، ولأنه المتوحد على
المقصود انما هو من فنانو العلوم النظرية ، فانه هذا النحو من
انحاء العلوم النظرية دليل القدر ، فيكونه القول فيطرح مع ما
ذكرنا قد افاد بالصرح بهذا من غايته المقصوده .

(١) [ند] زائدة في الرأى وغير واردة في الأصل .

(٢) [يقصده] في الأصل .

ولكن هذه الأحوال هي ضرورة أمراض، وهي خارجة عن الطبع، نزيه نافعة في الأقل، وبالمرض والأغذية نافعة في الأكثر، بالذات. ونسبة تلك الأحوال إلى الأبدان، كنسبة السير^(١) إلى النفس. وكما أنه الصمة يظن برازها واحدة تضاد هذه الكثرة والصحة وجمدها أمر طبيعي للجمد، وهذه الكثرة خارجة عن الطبع، كذلك السيرة الأمامية^(٢) هي الأمر الطبيعي للنفس، وهي واحدة، تضاد سائر السير وهي كثيرة، والكثيرة غير طبيعية للنفس.

فصل:

الصور المتوسطة ليست غايات ولا يوجد متوحد يعمل غرضا، بل إنما توجد عنه^(٣) المتوحد لأجل إحدى تلك الثلاث؛ فانه أكثر الصناعات، وهي القوى والمهنة، هي مقصورة على هذا الصنف، والمهنة والقوى إنما توجد للثلاث. وهذه المتوسطات، ما كان

(١) [سير] في قراءة [أس].

(٢) [الأمامية] في قراءة [أس].

(٣) [يوجد غير غير] في قراءة [أس].

عنه الأثرى ، ولا يذكره إلا في الخلوة . وكذلك كل واحد يحرك صاحبه الى نحو الحال التي هي فيه وقد أثنى زيد بن عدي الصباري^(١) في قوله : [طويل]

عنه المرء لئلا نال ، وصل عنه قرينه فانه القرينه بالطهارة معتد .

فالمتوحد ، الظاهر منه امره انه يجب عليه أنه لا يحب الحسافي ، ولا منه غايته الرومانية المتوجة بجسمه^(٢) ، بل انما يجب عليه انه يحب اهل العلوم ، ولأنه اهل العلوم معتد به في بعض السير ، ويكثرون في بعض ، حتى يبلغ في بعضا أنه يدعو ، ولذلك يكون المتوحد واجبا عليه في بعض السير ، أنه يعزل عنه الناس جملة ما يمكنه ، ولا يلبسهم الا في الأمور الضرورية [١٨١هـ] أو بقدر الضرورة ، أو يهاجر الى السير التي يشرح العلوم ، انه كانت موجودة . وليس هذا قضا لما قيل في العلم المدني ، ولما تبينه في العلم الطبيعي ، فانه تبينه هناك أنه الانسان مدني بالطبع وتبينه في العلم المدني أنه الأعزال شر كله ، لكنه هذا انما هو بالذات . ولما بالعرض فخذ كما يوضح ذلك في كتيب مما في الطبع . فقال ذلك أنه الحبز واللحم غذاء بالطبع ونافع ، وأنه الأرضيون والحنظل سموم قائله ، لكنه قد يكونه للجد اهل ال غيرة طبيعية ينفع فيرا هذا ، ويجب انه يستعد ، وتعد فيرا الاغذية الطبيعية . فيجب أنه تجتنب .

(١) هو ابنه الشاعر المشهور عدي بن زيد الصباري . انظر كتاب الشعر

والشعر لأبيه قتيبة - طبعة بيروت [١٩٦٤] ص ١٥٣ .

(٢) [المتوجة بجسمه] في الأصل وهي [المتوجة بالجسمية] في قراءة [أس] .

الباب السابع

فصل :

والروحانية الخاصة والمتوسطة لا تجعل غاياتها، لأشياء ^(١) أموراً حاصلة أكثرها
 بالطبيعة، وبالجملة ضيف الإرادة. وما يصل منه محمودات، وما يظن به أنه محمود،
 بالإرادة، فهي داخلية في هذه [الثلاثة] الثلاثة؛ أما في الجسمانية، أو فيما ينتفع فيها،
 كالغذاء، وما يجري مجراها، أو في الصور الروحانية الخاصة، فكأنها ضيف ضائع آخر.
 وأما في المعنويات كالأصناف العقيم والشر، وما جازاه، فليست هذه غاياتها، بل عند
 هذه تحصل تلك الآخر، وهذه اسبابها. ولذلك من كانه أناته أفضل، فليكنه ضائعاً
 المهدي وآخر أدنى، فليكنه أبداً دلاء السائر، فخذ كل واحد منهما الصورة الخاصة بالآخر
 وكل صورة روحانية، فقد تحرك الجسم الذي هو فيه، فصورة أبي دلاء السائر تحرك المهدي
 إلى الراحة والفعل، وصورة المهدي تحرك أبداً دلاء السائر إلى الصبر والقوام. وظاهره
 الصبر والقوام أفضل من اللهو والفعل، فصوره الأسن يصير الأدنى أسنى، وصوره
 الأدنى، يصير الأسنى أدنى، ولذلك تظاهر وتعلقه ^(٢) بكم الأسنى، ويخفى الأسنى تحركه

(١) [أموراً] في قراءة [أس]، ولعل خطأ طباعاً.

(٢) [وتعلق] في قراءة [أس].

بِهِ هِرَاطٌ هِرَقَةٌ ، لِأَنَّهُ إِذَا فُكِرَ خُطَرُ بِيَالِهِ عَاقِدَاتُهُ ، فَلَمْ
تَكُنْ لَهُ فِيهِ رُوبَةٌ ، فَفَلَّ التَّفَاوُتُ . وَفِي بَعْضِ غَيْرِ بَيْتَةٍ ^(١) ، فَهُوَ
يَسْقِلُ الرُّوبَةَ وَتَكُنْ هِرَقَةٌ ، وَيَكْثُرُ التَّفَاوُتُ ، وَيَطُولُ ، وَلَا يَنْتَقِلُ
عِنْدَ التَّفَاوُتِ ، وَلَا التَّوَاتُرِ . وَمَا أَهْنُ مَا خَفِلَهُ أَهْلُ الْفَرَاغِ
مِنْهُ اتَّخَذُوا مِنْهُ الصِّبْغَ الْعَلَامَاتِ الدَّالَّةَ عَلَى الْأَفْعَالِ النَّفَائِيَةِ ،
لِأَسْمَا عَلَى الْأَفْعَالِ الَّتِي نُسِبَتْ إِلَى الْقَوَى ، الَّتِي بَرَأَ يَكُونُهُ الْإِزْدَارُ .

(١) [بَيْتَةٌ] فِي قِرَاءَةِ [أُسَى] .

اعنى سرعة حركة الصية وكثرتها ، وسرعة القلب تابعا له شيء واحد ، وهو أنه الصورة الروحانية سواء كانت محسوسة أو كيف كانت ، كثرت روحايتها ، وهي التي يربطها بكونه الشيء ، فتكثر الحركات ،

لأنه هذا [Fol. 180v] يدري ، فتحكم على كل صورة بما يجب لها ،
لذلك نرى^(١) التنقل لرؤية جميع الطائعات التي فيزيها ولا سيما

الغائصة . وقد نفس القول في هذه الطائعات في السابعة منه

الحس ، فتكثر الصور الروحانية في الآلة متتالية في الحس ،

فتسرع حركات الصية ، والجيد الرؤية روحانية تكثر عنه الصورة

المحسوسة ، فتكثر تحقيقاته ، فتقارنها^(٢) حركات حركته ، ولأنه

يرى^(٣) ، فهو يلبث مع الصورة زفناً حساً ، ولذلك تتفاوت

التحقيقات . وكلما كان أظف إهدافاً كان أسرع حركة . وكلما كان

أجود رؤية كان التفاوت أكثر ، ولذلك يوجب الإنسان^(٤) المطبوع

على الفكرة البرهانية كثير حركة الصية كثير اصناف التفاوت

(١) [يسع] في قراءه [أسم] .

(٢) هكذا في الأصل .

(٣) [نزدوى] في قراءة [أسم] .

(٤) [للإنسان] في الأصل .

والأرضين^(١) حيوانهم كأنهم جامدة قليلة الحركات، فانه الصور المتغيرة
 إنما تصير في القوى بالأنهوال التي يلحقها بها البصر، فلهذا
 كل من كان على الجرى الطبيعي، وأظن بباله صورة ما روحانية،
 فهو يظنها بالحال المرئية^(٢)، وهو^(٣) يحده نحوها. وكثرة الأنهوال
 الروحانية الموهودة للصورة الحسية في النبيل، لكثرة^(٤) حركات
 الصية وتحديقاً^(٥)، كأنه ينظر الى واحد واحد منها، ولذا
 التحديقان تعاد إظهارات. هذه الأنهوال الروحانية. ولذلك النبيل
 كثير تحرك الحدة، غير متواترها، والبليد ساكن، والعقول كثير
 حركة الحدة، متواترها سريعاً. ولذلك وضع أهل الفلاسفة
 سرعة حركة الصية علامة القليل البسات^(٦). وإنما هذا الفرضان^(٧)

(١) [الأرضين] في قراءة [أُس]

(٢) [المرئية] في قراءة [أُس]

(٣) [فهو] في الأصل

(٤) [بكثرة] في الأصل

(٥) [تحديقاً] في الأصل

(٦) [البسات] في قراءة [أُس]

(٧) [الفرضان] في [أُس]

تفصيلها طبيعة ذلك الإنسان ، وقد قلنا اننا نجانب المتوسطه .
وهذا الإنسان الذي له هذه الطبيعة - وهو الذي تقتصر فيه
الصورة الحسية على القدر الذي يحضر فيه الروحانية -

هو بليد ، وهو قليل التصرفات ، ولا توجد له أحوال كثيرة .
وكذلك بعض الحيوان غير الناطق مثل الشاة والبقر والخنازير
فانه كما له مع ذلك آليات ، اما طبيعية ، مثل قوة الأيدي او
سلح ، ثم لم يستعمله ، كما ارعن^(١) مثل الدب والحفريز ،
والأرعن^(٢) من الناس معروف .

واما البليل والذكي فهو الذي تكونه هذه الروحانية
الخاصة بجال المتوسطه ، اما قليلاً واما كثيراً^(٣) ، فمن الحيوان
المحصل مثل الثعلب والدب ، والحيوان المختال^(٤) كله ، وفي
الإنسان ، فالكثير التصرف ، ولذلك توجد في الإنسان البليل
الصيونة المتحركة الرطبة الحفريات ، لأننا ما يسه ، ويوجد البليل

(١) [الأرعب] في قراءة [أس] .

(٢) [الأرعب] في قراءة [أس] .

(٣) [كثراً] في قراءة [أس] .

(٤) [المختال] في قراءة [أس] .

فإنما نصيرها في هذه الرتبة^(١)، ونخلع عن كل عضو من الموضوعات،
فإنه موضوع لا يمكننا إيجاده لأنه قد حصل موجوداً، وإنما
نوم^(٢) بالصورة الروحانية المتوسطة ما هو غير موجود بل بما
هو موجود بالصورة، وغير موجود بالفعل، وذلك بيته لمن تأمله
أبصر تأمل.

ولذلك تقل أعماله يحصل له من الروحانية القدر
الذي يصير له الحس والتأمل والتحصيل عند تلك الصورة، وتكونه^(٣)
أعماله من يستفيد الصورة الروحانية عنده زيادة روحانية.
ولذلك من اختصرت الصورة المحسوسة عنده على روحانية،
التي يستفيدها من الحس، كما ارعن^(٤) فإنه الصورة الروحانية
الخاصة - وهي التي سببها الحس - فإنه^(٥) هنا الحركة المحسوسة
في المظاهر فقط، وأما سائر الحركات، فإنما هي للصورة التي

(١) [الرتبة] في قراءة [أ.س].

(٢) [نوم] في قراءة [أ.س].

(٣) هكذا في الأصل إلا أنه [أ.س] يحورها إلى [تكثر].

(٤) [الرعب] في قراءة [أ.س].

(٥) [فأنه] مكررة وهي زائدة.

لأنه هذه القوة قبلية عن العقل ، واستفادته منه العموم . وهذه
 القوة وسط^(١) بين الموجودات الروحانية والموجودات العقلية ،
 فهي تقبل عن الطرفين ، وتلك^(٢) وهذه الصور - كما قلنا -
 تفيدنا الطبيعة ، فما لا من تفيد الطبيعة لأهل السلامة ،
 فهي مشتركة^(٣) للحيوان كله ، بل يشارك^(٣) في ذلك
 النبات ، بوجه ما . فاما ما تفيد الطبيعة ، لأهل الأخف
 [Fol. 180] فهو في بعض الحيوان المحصل ، كالخيل والتمل وكل
 حيوان ينيل فهو محصل ، وكل محصل فله الصورة الرومانية
 المحسوسة . وكل ينيل فله الصورة المحسوسة . والصورة
 المتوسطة هي التي رسمناها قبل ، والصورة المحسوسة ظاهر
 من أمرها أنه لا يكون عننا بذاتها استنباط ، ولا تصور
 روحاني ، كالفكر وما قام مقامه ، فأننا متى احسنا جسمًا ،
 وحصلت عننا صورته الرومانية الخاصة ، وادنا انه نفع مثلها^(٤) ،

(١) [وسطًا] في الأصل .

(٢) [تلك] في الأصل .

(٣) [تشارك] في قراءة [أس] .

(٤) [مثلها] في الأصل .

ولذلك قد يتمكن الإنسان ما يعلم أنه لا يمكنه ، مثل أنه يتمكن
 مخاطبة صوتي ، وليس يضر^(١) هذه أنه يعلم الإنسان أنظر طازية ،
 بل فضيلة أمثال هذه الصور الطازية أنه يعلم الإنسان أنظر
 طازية ، فإنه أنه لم يعلم بكذب كما أنه مخدوعاً أو غالطاً^(٣) ، أو ما
 شاكل ذلك ، والصورة في هذه يقف في السير ويكذب .

وأما التي توجد عن العقل الفاعل فكلها صادقة ، بالذات
 لا بالعرض ، وكذلك ما يوجد عن الفكر الصادقة . وهذه الصور
 ليست صور الأجسام بصيرها ، فتكون خاصة ، ولا هي أيضاً
 مجردة عن الهيولي ، فتكون مقولات عامة ، وليس توجد لرجل
 النسبة الخاصة ، ولا توجد لرجل حالات المقولات العامة ، بل
 توجد بين الصور الخاصة والمقولات . ومجده كانه ذلك ، لأنه
 فيرجح أنه كل واحد من الطرفين شيئاً ، فربما تشارك الخاصة
 بأمر في القوة التي بصير فيرجح الخاصة ؛ وتبصر عامة

(١) [نضر] في قرارة [أُس] .

(٢) شاقطه في [أُس] .

بصينه، بل على وجه آخر، وقد قلنا ذلك في مواضع كثيرة. وقوام
طبيعة الحيوان إنما هو برهنة الصورة الرومانسية. وهذه الصورة
الرومانسية هي مدبرة الحيوان، ولأنه طبيعة الحيوان مركبة لذلك
اجتازت إلى صور كثيرة، وتلخيص^(١) هذا في موضع آخر لا يعب به

مخلص:

والصور الرومانسية التي لا يفيدها الحس ولا الطبيعة، فأنما يفيدها الفكر
أو العقل الفاعل، وهذه فقط تختص بها الأنسان. فأما الصنفان الأولان
فهما موجودان للحيوان المحصل، فأما الصورة التي يفيدها الفكر، فقد تكون
صارفة وكاذبة - والكذب^(٢) غير أكثر وجوداً منه الصدق في بعض السير
- وفي هذه تدخل الألفاظ ومزاج قول الشاعر^(٣) [طويل]:
من - أنه تكلم حقاً - تكلم أحمق المن

^(٤) وإن فقد عنا برأ رضا رغداً

(١) [تلخيص] في قراءة [أ.س].

(٢) [وكذب] في قراءة [أ.س].

(٣) لم أتمكن من تحديد الشاعر الذي قال هذا البيت

(٤) [غداً] في قراءة [أ.س].

تبريد المعدة ، فاشتهى البارد ، وهو ضرورة نافع ، لكنه البارد
 إنما يصل اليه ضرورة مع البارد ، وفي البارد أشياء غير ذلك
 مثل أنه يكون البارد ، فيكون مع أنه بارد رطب يكونه ^(١) غليظا
 له ، ويكونه ^(٢) مختلطاً به قوى أرضيه مثل أهوال المياه ؟ فذلك يقول
 فلاطن : « الطبيعة لا تفلط فيما تمتازه به النفس » فتطير النفس
 الصورة ، مثل أنه تستدعي الطبيعة في الحيّ تبريد المعدة ، فيضربها
 الماء ، وليس الماء هو البارد ولا الماء استدعت ، بل الماء هو
 البارد وفي الماء أشياء أفهم ^(٣) تستدعي ^(٤) الطبيعة ، فربما
 أضررت اللحم ، وليس ^(٥) هذه الصورة الروحانية التي يفيدها
 الحس ^(٥) مجانبة للصورة التي يفيدها الحس . وقد تجانس الصورة
 التي يفيدها الفكر والعقل ، وهذه الصورة هي في فطرة الحيوان ،
 كاللهيولي فطورية على قبول النوع ، لكنه ليس به حيث هو نوع

(١) [فيكونه] في قراءة [أُس] والأصح جبراً جملة .

(٢) [او] بدلاً من [له] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٣) [تستدعيه] في الأصل .

(٤) [وليس] في الأصل .

(٥) خطأ من الناسخ والأصح [الطبيعة] .

مُعظم الحقايق والسمره هذا ، وأكثر ما يوجد ذلك عند من أُسِنَ
لكثرة ما شاهدوه ، وذلك بينه عند من تأمله .

فليس هذا التذكر هو الذي يذكره ارسطو في الثانية من
الحس ؛ فانه لهذا لا يكونه عنه نسيانه ، ويكونه المتذكر له تذكره
من قبل نفسه ، لانه قبل غيره . فاما الصور الروحانية

الحاصلة عن الحس بذاته ، فاعرفها بغير نفسه ، واما الحاصلة عن
الطبيعة ، فهي أيضاً بالعرض ، وبالذات ، فاما بالذات فليست

صورة خاصة لجسم ، وقد قلنا في ذلك ، لانه الطمانه لا
يشتري ماءً بصينه ، بل انما يشتري الى ما كانه من ذلك النوع

الطهرى - ولذلك ظن جالينوس انه البرائم تدرك الأنواع - بل

انه احدثت صورة روحانية خاصة بها العرض . اما بالعرض ، مثل

انه يطش الانسان ، فيمر بخاطره ما كانه أجبه في عذق ماء او

يجوع ، فيمر بخاطره^(١) [Fol. 149v] صورة الفداء ، فيستذكر طعمها ما

قد كانه أغذاه^(٢) ، فالطبيعة اذنه بذاتها لا تفيد الا صورة

روحانية صادقة ، وعلامية لها ؛ وذلك انه المحموم انما يشتري

(١) [خاطره] في الأصل -

(٢) [اغذاه] في الأصل .

الباب السادس

فصل :

الصور الرومانسية الخاصة مع نسبتها العامة هي - كما قلنا - إما أن تكون مرتبة بالحس^(١) المترك أو لا، أو تكون إستفادتها لدمه الحس. فلتنقل أو لا على طريق الرسم المميز لها والمميز للصور الرومانسية الخاصة الأربعة العامة، أربعة أصناف، أشهرها كلربا الحواس، وذلك بيه بنفسه، والثاني الطبيعة فانه العاطفي يجذب في نفسه صورة رومانسية للماء، والجائع للطعام، ولذلك سائرهما، وما يجري مجرى الطبيعة، كالعاشق للمثوبة، وبالجملة، فاطشوف للمثوبة والثالث الفكر كالصورة الرومانسية المستنبطة بفكر ورؤية^(٢)، والرابع العقل الفاعل، وهي كالصورة المستنبطة، لا بفكر ولا رؤية^(٣)، وفي هذا الصنف تدخل الأرقام والروايات الصادقة. فاما أقطار الصورة الرومانسية بالعرض، ويسمى ذلك بالذكر فنسب^(٤) ذلك للحس، وسنقول فيما بعد، فلتنقل في هذه

(١) [الحس] في الأصل بدوه البناء

(٢) [رؤية] في قراءة [أبس].

(٣) [يدخل] في قراءة [أبس].

(٤) [نسب] في قراءة [أبس].

أو يحصل^(١) منزع جزء [فقط، و]^(٢) في هذه الحال تكون الصورة
 الروحانية نفساً. في هذه الحال^(٣)، وفي التي قبلها تنبئ الصورة
 الروحانية الخاصة بالبرهانه^(٤)، وبالجملة بالقياس^(٥)، فانه
 القياس لا يفعل ابداً، بل انما يفعل في اناسه ما وقتاً ما، وفي اناسه
 اكثر لا يفعل شيئاً اصلاً، كما يعرف ذلك في البرهانه، وفي سائر
 الرقييه. واكثر ما يوجد ذلك في القياسات المؤلفه عن المقبولات.

(١) [تحصل] في قراءة [أُس].

(٢) [فقط، و] اضافة فقره صه عندنا .

(٣) هكذا في الاصل والأولم انزع زائدة .

(٤) [لبرهانه] في قراءة [أُس].

(٥) [للقياس] في قراءة [أُس].

وجودها الى ازمة منفصلة وربما انجزم ذلك ، فلا يكمل ، وإلهاء
 ذلك سرى بأدنى تأمل . فلنترك صورة تحرك قوة نزوعية في
 جد صحيح ومادة تقبل تلك الصورة ، فلنترك تحركها في
 زمان وجودها في تلك الحال الملايكة فاونياً للزمان الذي
 فيه يتم وجود تلك الصورة في تلك المادة ، هل يكون
 انفقارهما معاً ، فنحن ذلك تبقى تلك الصورة الرومانية
 لا عمل لها ، ولا هي نفس بالفعل ، ولا اكم لها عند العرب ، فلننقل^(١)
 اليها اكم اقرب الأشياء اليها ، وذلك مثال^(٢) الوهم والخيال ،
 وما جاز ذلك من الألفاظ والأقوال والأسماء المركبة [١٧٩١]
 كقولهم : « لا يبالى به » . واستجابه في الدلالة .

وكذلك انه حركة النفس النزوعية الى الحال الطبيعية -
 وهي التي سميناها بالملايكة - ، فاقاً انه لا تجد مادة ،
 او تجد مادة غير انه قبول المادة للصورة يحتاج الى زمان اطول
 من زمان ذلك النشاط ، فتكون الصورة اما ان لا تفصل
 في المادة ، — — — — — ←

(١) [غلينقل] في قرارة [أوس] .

(٢) مثل .

والحال التي تعرض عنزها هاتان تسمى عند العرب نشاطاً ، وبطء
 حركة الضعيف وضعفه يسمى كلاً . والنشاط يتبعه ضرورة
 لذة عند العمل ، واذى عند الكونه . والكل على ضد ذل ،
 فانه في كونه لذة ، وفي عمله اذى . فاذا لانه الامر على حائتين ،
 في اللذة والاذى ، فانه النفس الزوعية تكون في النشاط على
 حال خارجة عنه طبعاً وتغذيها تلك الحال الصور الرومانية
 كالجموع والظما ، والكل تكون الزوعية فيه بالحال الطبيعية ،
 فتكون الصور الرومانية اما ان تغذيها تلك الحال ، فلا يمكنه^(١)
 ان يحركها اصلاً ، أو تغذيها حال^(٢) اخرى ، فتكون عند ذل
 خارجة عنه الطبع ، فينفر عنزها كحال المختلئ سبباً عند الطعام ،
 فلذل من حركته صورة رومانية قوة زوعية فاعز ان كان
 تحريكها لرا صورياً^(٣) لما يحتاج في وجودها ، حصلت تلك الصورة
 في الجسم في زمانه متصل . وانه كان اقل ، لم تحصل في زمانه
 متصل ، بل انما يحصل في زمانه متصل هزء صرياً ، واحتاج

(١) [ولا تمكنه] في قراءة [أس] .

(٢) [وتغذيها حالاً] في الأصل والتصحیح ضروري لفهم النص .

(٣) [ولاً] في الأصل .

الصورة لا جدوى^(١) لها في ذلك الحيوان ، أما في وقت من الزمان ،
 وأما في غير ذلك الحيوان . وبرهذه الملازمة يصير النفس الزوعية
 متحركة بالقدرة ، وفي هذه الملازمة تنفيذ ، ويسمى آخرها صفات تفيد
 وهو فساد الملازمة - ملازمة^(٢) ، وما جازى ذلك من الاسماء
 وأما حركتها من لا ملازمة الى ملازمة ، وهي تكون الملازمة ، فلا
 اكمل لها في لسان العرب . بل انما توجد الاسماء عندهم بلسان
 العرب لفاد الملازمة . وأما الصور الروحانية ، فليست متفيدة
 اذ ليست حنسية . وأما الزوعية ، فليس مانع يمنع من اعتبارها
 اما بذاتها أو لا ، وأما ثانياً . ولذلك يظن ان صورة الجسم ،
 وذلك الجسم هو الحار الفريزي وذلك موافقه لما يظهره
 من استمرار جسد الفاضل وحمته ، وبرد جسد الخائف
 وصفرته وصرعة حركة الطاهر^(٣) للشهوة الشديدة^(٤) ، وقوتها^(٥)

(١) جدوى

(٢) [سامة] في الأصل .

(٣) [الشاهي] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٤) [الشديدة] في الأصل .

(٥) [وقوتته] في الأصل .

باطلاً ، فإنه ^(١) وجودها إنما هو لتحصل في اجسام ، ولا يمكن ذلك دون
الحس ، ولذلك يجب انه نفخض هل يمكن أنه توجد صورة روحانية
مختصة فادترأ القريبة لم يمر نوعها بذلك الحس المشترك .
وأما مبشر البصير ^(٢) فغير ممكنه ، فانه كان ذلك فالصورة
الروحانية المخدعة لا تحتاج الى الحس في وجودها ضرورة ، بل
إنما تقتصر الى الحس في وجودها الجسماني ؛ إذ لا يمكنه ان
توجد في الجسم إلا بحس ، فيجب أنه نفخض [١٧٨٤/١٧٨٤] عنه ذلك
النفخض المستقل .

فرزده على الاستقصاء المجلد أصفاف الصور الروحانية
المتخيلة ، ففرزده الصور يتحرك الحيوان - إنساناً كانه او بهيمة -
فانه كل واحد هذه الصور اذا ظهرت ، وصورها بالفعل أنه
تحصل متخيلة ، فنحن ذلك تنقل بالزوعية ، فانه لا يتحرك
تحركة الزوعية ومركبة الأعضاء ^(٣) فادامت الملازمة ، فاذا
انقضت تلك الملازمة لم يتحرك ، ولا تحرك تلك الأعضاء ، وبقيت

(١) [باطلاً فإنه] ساقطه في [أُس] .

(٢) [البصير] في قراءة [أُس] والاربعون انرا خطأ مطبعي .

(٣) ساقطه في [أُس] .

يوجد بالطبع ، وهذه اما باحتياد ، وذلك ايضاً مشترك للناس .
 وبعض الحيوان غير الناطق ، كالزرنور أنه لم يقل على نحو الوجود
 واحتياد باشتراك الأسماء ، ومنه ما يحصل باحتياط ، وهذه تخص
 الإنسان فقط ، ولا توجد لغيره . وهذه اما انه تكونه بفكرة^(١) كما
 يصرح ذلك كثيراً ، ويخص باسم الاحتياط ومنه ما يوجد دفعة
 ويسمى الأرقام ، وما شاكل ذلك من الأسماء ، فظاهر أنه
 هذا النوع من وجود الصورة الخيالية ليس يحتاج الى الحس -
 على انه فاعل لها - بل يحتاج الى الحس في وجود الالهام القابلة
 لهذه الصورة الرومانية . وتلخيص ذلك وتعديه اضافة لا
 يحتاج اليه فيما نحن بسبيله ، ولذا لا يمكنه انه توجد خلواً من
 حس . وقد نرى انما يحتاج الى صور الحس المشترك ، لأنه هذه
 الصور انما تكونه ابدأ مؤلفة من صور من الحس المشترك
 ومنه قبل من الحواس ، وتلخيص كيف الأمر في ذلك في غير
 هذا الموضع ، لكنه انه كان ذلك فليس على جهة واحدة ، وكيف
 كان ذلك ، فلا يمكنه انه يوجد خلواً من الحس ، لأننا لو كانت
 خلواً لكانت فضلاً لا يحتاج اليه ، وكان وجودها

(١) [فكره] في قراءة [أس] وذلك بخلاف الأصل .

توجد مفردة^(١) في بعض الحيوان ، كالذباب ، والدود وقد قلنا كيف
 ذلك مما كتبناه في النفس . وأما الثانية فبنته من امرها الزا
 لا يمكنه ان يتفرد عنه هذه ، الا اذا انما توجد برزده . والثالثة
 هي للحيوان الذي توجد له حركة محصلة ، فانه التحصيل في الأمور
 الجسمانية انما يكون هذه ، ولا اسم لهذا الجنس في لسان^(٢) العرب .
 فلتدع الحيوان المحصل الطامل ، وهو الذي يرى اولاده ، وبالجملة
 كل حيوان يجب ، او^(٣) يبغض ، فانه هذا الانفعال كما لا ريب وهو
 أدنى منازل^(٤) لها وقد يوجد لها عقوله اخرى اكل منه هذه وهي
 ايضا مشتركة للأنسان والحيوان غير الناطق الذي له صنعة ،
 او ما يجري مجراها ، كالنحل والنمل والصنكبة والآنسان . فريده
 الحاله اما أنه تحصل للحيوان بالطبع ، وذلك كالحيوان^(٥) غير الناطق
 كالنحل وما يجري مجرى الفريضة ، وهي الرضاع للأنسان وما لا

(١) [يوجد مفرداً] في الأصل .

(٢) [كلام] في الأصل وقد صححت في هامش الأصل .

(٣) [أو] هكذا في الأصل والأصح [و] .

(٤) [منازل لنا] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٥) هكذا في الأصل وهي [للحيوان] في قراءة [أُس] .

تترك هذه القوة .

وهذه القوى تفلط^(١) أشكال الفاظها . وانه لكل لفظ المدرك
 لكل اللفظ الذي يدل على المحرك ، والمدرك كله في لانه العرب .
 لكل يدل على المنفصل ، والأمر بالعكس ، ولذلك كانت هذه كلها
 استخاصاً ، فلم تكن كليات وليس في الحيوان قوة أخرى تحركها
 الصور الحاصلة في الحس المشترك ، فانه قوة التحريك تنقطع
 عندها ، ولا لها أيضاً انه وجهته جدوى^(٢) [Fol. 148] ، فانزها لو
 وجهته لكانت باطلة ، فانه الصور التي تحصل في الحواس بها نطلب
 ما طام موافقاً لنا ، ونزرب عنه الأجسام الطرفة لنا ،
 وبالصورة الروحانية الحاصلة في القوة التخيلية ، وهي الخيارات
 بها نطلب الأجسام الغائبة عنا ، وهي التي لا تحركها ، ونزرب
 أيضاً عنها اذا كانت غير نافعة لنا . والأجسام هي اما حاضرة
 لنا واما غائبة عنا .

وهي مشتركة للحيوان ، اما الأولى فهي مشتركة للجميع

غير اننا قد يظن بها اننا قد — — — — — ←

(١) [يفلظ] في قرارة [أُس] .

(٢) [جدي] في الأصل .

صنفه لما هي فيه ، فهي عامة بنسبتها^(١) الى ما هي فيه ، كصورة
أليس^(٢) المحسوسة ، وكصورة جبل أهد المتخيلة عند من ابصره .
وهذه من هذه الجبهة تعرف بالخيالات . ويقال للقوة المدركة
الرا متخيلة ، فانه القوى التي بها تدرك المدركات ثلثة اصناف :
الصنف الاول القوة التي بها تُدرك الصور الجسمانية ، وهو الحس ،
واجزاؤه صور الأضباع ، وهذه الأضباع التي لها من هذه القوى
هي اعضاء جسم طبيعي ، وهي الحواس الخمس . والأدراكات الحاصلة
منها هي صور روحانية ، وهي في اول مراتب الروحانية .
والصنف الثاني القوة التي تدرك هذه الصور الروحانية التي
تسمى الخيالات ، وهي المرتبطة في الحس المترك على عابثته
في غير هذا الموضع . ويقال للقوة المدركة لها متخيلة ، وهذه
الأدراكات الحاصلة في القوة المتخيلة ليس لها قوى بدركه لها
على هذه الجبهة ؛ فانه هذه الجبهة المترك منها مترك^(٣)
فانه اللون يحرك البصر والصورة الروحانية الحاصلة في البصر

(١) [بنسبتها] في قرادة [أليس] .

(٢) [أليس] في قرادة [أليس] .

(٣) [المترك] في قرادة [أليس] .

وصدوره عليه انه الاله [الهي] فخلا ، وارتفعت عنه اوصاف
الحسية ^(١) الفانية ، ووصاف الرومانية الرفيعة ، ولاوه به
وصف الهي بسيط .

وهذه كلها قد تكونه للموحد ، دونه المدينة الطاملة .
ولا يكونه بالربانية الاوليه لجزء هذه المدينة ولا غايتها ،
ولا فاعلها ، ولا حافظها . وهذه الثالثة ^(٢) قد لا يكونه بها
جزء هذه المدينة ، بل يكونه غايتها المقصودة ؛ اذ لا يمكنه ان
يكونه حافظها ، ولا فاعلها ، وهو موحد . فقد تبين بنا
القول مرتبة الرومانية من الجسمانية ، وانزلنا أشرف
وسببها فيما بعد مراتب اوصاف الرومانية بعضها عند
بعض . ولنقل انك في الرومانية ، منه حيث لرب السببة
العامة للصورة الرومانية . والعامة اما ان تكون عامة
بذاتها ، كالأنواع والأجناس واما عامة بالعرض ، كالصور ^(٣)
الرومانية الخاصة ، اذا كانت موجودة لكثير ، لا على انفراد

(١) [الحسية] في قراءة [مت] .

(٢) [الثالثة] في قراءة [أسى] .

(٣) [فبالعرض وكالصور] في الأصل .

أنه يكونه على كماله الأخير، فهو يفعل هذا الفعل، ولذلك
كل ما يؤثر جسمانيته على شيء من روافدها، فليس يمكنه أن
يدرك الغاية المقصود، فإذا خلا^(١) جسماني واحد سعيد، وكل
سعيد فهو روافدي صرف. إلا أنه كما يجب على الروافدي أنه
يفعل الأفعال الرومانية لذاتها، كذلك الفيلسوف يجب أن
يفعل كثيرًا من الأفعال الرومانية، لكنه لا لذاتها، ويفعل
جميع الأفعال العقلية لذاتها، فبالجسمانية^(٢) هو الإنسان
موجود، وبالرومانية هو أشرف، وبالعقلية هو إلهي
[الهي] فاضل. فذو الحكمة [٤٧٠/٤٧١] ضرورة إنسان فاضل
إلهي، وهو يأخذ من كل فعل أفضل، ويشارك كل طبقة في
أفضل أحوالهم^(٣) الخاصة بهم، وينفرد عنهم بأفضل الأفعال
وأكرمها، وإذا بلغ الغاية المقصود، وذلك بأنه يفعل العقول
البيضة الجوهرية التي تذكر فيما بعد الطبيعة، وفي كتاب النفس،
وكتاب الحس والمحس، كما أنه عند ذلك واحدًا من تلك العقول،

(١) [ولا] في قراءة [أس].

(٢) [وبالجسمانية] في الأصل.

(٣) [أحواله] في الأصل و[أحوالهم] في [مت].

وذلك عندنا^(١) فعله حاتم الطائي عندما ذبح فرسه ، وقد جاثقاً
 لم يطعم منه شيئاً ، ولا طعم منه اهله وصيته يتضاعفونه^(٢)
 جوعاً ، وصل ما يعفله الصوم لكنه اولى انما مقصدهم
السياسة^(٣) لإقامة الجسم فزهم يبدلونه^(٤) اجسامهم لأجسامهم ،
 ويؤثرون حالاً جسمانية على حال أخرى جسمانية . وهذا
 الصنف لا موضع للتوقف عنه الأعذاف بانه هذا الفصل شرف
 ورفعة ، كفضل الطائي وما جانه .

وانه هذه الطبيعة كريمة سنية روحانية ، وانها أسمى المراتب
 دونه مرتبة الحكمة فقط ، وان الطبع الفلسفي يجب^(٥) ضرورة أنه
 يكونه من اوصافه هذا ، فانه انه لم يكن هذا فيه كانه جسمانياً
 وكانه فيلسوفاً بهرها^(٦) فهذا الطبع الفلسفي اذا كان مرفعاً

(١) [عندنا] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٢) [يتضاعفونه] في قراءة [أُس] و[يتضاعفونه] في الاصل .

(٣) [السياسة] في [مست] .

(٤) [يبدلونه] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٥) [يجب] في قراءة [أُس] ولعلها خطأ طباعي .

(٦) [بهرها] في قراءة [أُس] .

هرقوا^(١) أنفسهم ومنهم^(٢) ، عندما اتقنوا انه عدوهم يظهرهم .
 ويشبه انه يكونه هذا كله اخراطاً إلا في بعض المواطن ؛
 فانه انداف الجسمانية دونه الروحانية عند كبر نفسٍ وعظم
 همةٍ ، وذلك مثل ما فعلته فاطمة ام الربيع وسائر بني زياد^(٣) .
 عندما لمحوا براقيس بن زهير في ترميزها عنه بصيرها التي كانت
 رآبها عليه ، فماتت . وهذه الحال خاصة في بعض الأحوال التي
 الموت فيها افضل منه الحياة . واختيار الموت على الحياة حفل انساني
 صواب ، وسنلخص هذه الحال بعد هذا .
 ومنه شرف الأشراف^(٤) الكبار الأنفس صنف دونه هذا ،
 وهو الأكثر وهو لا يحفل بصورته الجسمانية عند الروحانية
 غير انه لا يتلفها ، اما الأله^(٥) صورته الروحانية لا تظفره الى
 ذلك ، او انه انظفرت الى ذلك فأكبر بقاء صورته الجسمانية

(١) [هرقوا] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٢) [منهم] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٣) انظر امثال العرب للنسفي طبعة قسطنطينة ص ٣١

(٤) غير موجودة في [مت] وهي مفادها لبعض افكاره ولعلها اضافة منه الناسخ .

(٥) [انه] في الأصل وهي [الأله] في [مت] .

فما حفظنا إماماً اسأراً وصنةً^١

طوما دمً ؛ والحرُّ بالقتل أهدرُ

فراى الموت أفضل منه تحمل صنة الصفة ومنه هاولاي منه يقتل
نفسه ، اما في الحرب فكما يفضل المرواني في حرب عبيد الله به علي
به العباس وهو القائل^(١) :

« ذل الحياة وكره المماة ؛ وظراً اراه وفيماً وبسلاً

فانه كانه لابد منه ذاوذا فيراً الى الموت سيراً بهيلاً^(٢) »

وكما فضلة الزباء مع عمرو بهيه قالت ؛ ديديدى لا بيدىك يا عمرو^(٣) .

وعلمكة مصر مع اوغطس المذكور هبها في التواريخ ، ولها أقوام
يذكرهم في كبار الأنفس ارسطوطاليس ،

(١) هو عم الخليفة ابو العباس السفاح وابو جعفر المنصور ، كانه
ناسطاً عند الخليفة الأصوي الأبهيد مردانه الثاني والقائد الذي هزم الأتوريين .

(٢) كتاب الأغاني الجزء الرابع ص ٩٤ وهو يقرأ :

اذل الحياة وكره المماة وكلا أرى لك شراً وبسلاً

فانه لم يكنه عداها فسيراً الى الموت سيراً بهيلاً

(٣) [بيدى لا بيدىك يا عمرو] انظر امثال العرب للمفضل الضبي

مطبوعة الجواب - قطنية [١٣٠٠ هـ] ص ٦٦

فضل :

عنه الناس - كما قلناه قبل - من يراي صورته الجسمية فقط ، وهو الخبيث ، ومنهم من يراعي^(١) صورته الروحية فقط ، وهو الرفيع والشريف . فكما انه أضى الجسماني^(٢) من لا يحفل بصورته الروحية عند صورته الجسمية ، ولا يلتفت اليرح ، كذلك افضل مراتب الشريف^(٣) من لا يحفل بصورته الجسمية ، ولا يلتفت اليرح . لكنه من لم يحفل برا اهلاً قصر^(٤) حده^(٥) وجوده ، وكما أنه ذلك خارج عنه الطبع كذلك هذا^(٦) [٢٩٠/١٧٦] وهذا ايضاً لا يوجد بل انما يوجد من يتلف صورته الجسمية في طاعة صورته الروحية ، ولذلك يقول تأبط شراً^(٧)

(١) [يعاني] في الأصل .

(٢) [مزج] في الأصل .

(٣) الجسمانيه [في] [مته] .

(٤) [الشرف] في [مته] .

(٥) [حد] في الأصل .

(٦) [لهذه] في قراءة [أسي] وهي بخلاف الأصل .

(٧) انظر القراءات لآب قتيبة ص ٢٢٩ - ٥٦٢ - ٥٦٣ - ٥٦٤ . انظر ايضاً لجمهور انساب العرب - طبعة القاهرة ١٩٤٨

البقاء، وكل ما بقاؤه^(١) عساه، فطول كقصه في نسبة
الى الأزلية، از لا نسبة اليها فطول البقاء المتناهي
كقصه، لكنه اذا لانه الإنسان يجب بالطبع بقاء عام زايد
في عمره، خاف من انه يكون محبوباً عنده أكثر، واعظم زياده
عمره، بل زياده في نفسه، بل زياده الوفاء أو أكثر، كما نجد
ذلك في كثير من ذوي المهنة^(٢)، ونجد المثانية^(٣) في كثير من العلماء
والأدباء، مثل الأسكندر مع الملوك، وكثير من الحكماء والأدباء
في مثل ابقرط وما جانه^(٤).

(١) [بقاه] في الأصل .

(٢) [الطبيته] في قرادة [أُس].

(٣) [المثانية] في قرادة [أُس].

(٤) يتحدث ابنه باهجه عنه وسيلتيه في الحصول على البقاء الدائم أو

الخلود، الأولى وهي وسيلة الارتفاع الى مستوى العقل الأعلى
والإتحاد مع العقل الفعال، والوسيلة الثانية هي الخلود عنه طريق البقاء
المستمر في ازهاه الأرضية وذاكراتهم وهنا أيضاً نجد ابنه باهجه
يشير الى انه الأفراد الذين وصلوا الى أعلى درجات سلم الطبقات وهي
درجة العقلانية هم الأكثر خلوداً والأكثر بقاءً في ازهاه الأرضية .

وصاحباني ذلك ، اذا طلبت لذواتها ، ونسبت غاياتها وهوال
 هذه الصور الرومانسية ، وكذلك الصنيع الظنوني كلها ،
 والصنيع البرهانية عند من لا يطلبها للغايات الذاتية لها .
 واما هذه الأفعال الذكرية والعلوم ، فهي كمالايات بالأطعمة ،
 ولا يقال بتقييد ، وهي مخفية بالأنس ، لا يشترك فيها غير
 الأنس وهي اما ان تعطى الوجود الدائم ، أو فصل به ، واما
 الصور الرومانسية الخاصة ، فاما تصيد الوجود الذكرى . واما
 الصور الجسدية ، فانها تصيد الوجود اطار اليه ، وهو
 اعصر الوجودات ^(١) .

واليعه الوجودات بالفناء الوجود الجسدي ، واليعه
 بالديموم فالوجودات ^(٢) العقلية ، واما الرومانسية ، فهي طويلة
 البقاء ، بالإضافة الى العقلية . وجعه كانه ذلك ، فانها مركبة
 من الطرفين الجسدي والمفصول ، فمنه ^(٣) المصقول استفادته
 طول الوجود وديموم البقاء ، ومنه الجسدي استفادته تناهي

(١) [الوجودات] في الأصل .

(٢) [فالوجودات] في الأصل .

(٣) [ومن] في قراءة [أس]

بالصورة^(١) الرومانية الإنسانية ، لا شره لغيرها غيرها ، وذلك
 كصواب الرأي ، وجوده المصورة ، وصفه الظن ، وكثير منه
 المهره والقوى التي الانسان فحقن بها كالمخطابة ، وقود
 الجيوش ، والطب ، وتبديل المنزل ، وغير ذلك . فاما الحكمة^(٢)
 فانها أكل [احوال]^(٣) الرومانية الإنسانية - بالاعتماد لا
 يعلمها - فانها عند ذلك تجرى^(٤) مجرى هذه ، وذلك مثل
 مرتبة العالم عند الجمهور . وهذا الكمال يوجب للعالم بالعرفي ،
 وبالصدق الثاني . واما الذي للحكمة بالذات ، وعلى القصد الأول ،
 فليست احوالاً لشيء^(٥) بل هي كالاتي بالأصله واما الذي
 يستفاد بالأكل والشرب ، والدثار ، والمكس والمركب ، وما
 جاني ذلك ، اذا طلبت لذواتها ، ونسبت غاياتها فاحوال هذه ،
 ومنه افعال الفضائل الكلية ، وجوده الرأي ، وصواب المصورة ،

(١) [بالصورة] في [مت] .

(٢) [واما] في قراءة [أس] .

(٣) غير موجوده في الأصل ومضافه في الرأى . وهو موجوده في [مت] .

(٤) [يجرى] في قراءة [أس] .

(٥) [احوال لشيء] في قراءة [أس] .

بإشتراك الأسم . وقد تلخص كيف ذل في عيد هذا الموضوع ، وأما
 غائية الجسائية^(١) ، فذل والبرهية سواء ، وهذه الكلمات ،
 بالجملة ، أما كمالات شكلية ، أو كمالات فكرية ، والكلمات
 الشكلية يمكنه في بعضها أنه تشارك ميراث البراهيم . والأحوال
 التي توجد للصورة^(٢) الروحانية ، وهي فضائل شكلية ، يمكنه أنه
 تشارك ميراث البراهيم ، لكنه لا توجد إلا لأنواعها ، كالنجدة والحياة
 المعجودية للأسم ، ليس لأسم واحد ، لكنه لكل أسم ، بل أنه وجد
 لشخص أسمه حتى يوجد لصورة الروحانية الخاصة شيء يخصها ،
 من ذل كالأفراط مثلاً ، لكنه ذل لصورة بالعرض . وهو
 البراهيم الروحانية إنما [تكونه]^(٣) بأحوال هي كمالات إذا انهدبت
 عوضاً من النفع ، فإنه وجد شيء من أحوال ، فالعرض وما
 يوجد من هذه الأحوال المشتركة [Feb. 1767] للصورة الروحانية
 الإنسانية ، فكلها يخصها لا لأنها عوض من النفع بالعرض .
 وأما الكلمات الفكرية ، فهي أحوال خاصة

(١) هكذا في الأصل إلا أنه [أُس] يقط [ال] .

(٢) [للصورة] في الأصل .

(٣) استنتاج من عندنا بدلاً من فرائح موجود في الأصل .

يوجد^(١) في كثير من الحيوان أفعال^(٢) ببر^(٣) ، مثل الحياة للأبد
والعجب للطاوس ، والملح للكلب ، والكرم للديك ، والمكر للقطب ،
إلا أنه هذه^(٤) إذا كانت للبراهيم كانت طبيعة للنوع ، ولم يخص
ببر شخص واحد من ذلك النوع ، بل أنه أدرك بصورة روحانية
خاصة ، فخص^(٥) ذلك النوع بعطية هذه الحالة ، فشرفه بالنوع
فأما^(٦) لشخص ما منه ، فلا يوجد ذلك إلا للإنسان خاصة .
وهذه الأنواع التي توجد لها هذه الأخلاق الكريمة هي من أشرف
الحيوان . وإنما لم تكن فضائل لأخرى تستحق^(٧) في كل وقت سواء
كان ذلك ينبغي ، أو لا [ينبغي]^(٨) ، فذلك ليست فضائل إلا

- (١) [توجد] في قراءة [أُس] .
(٢) في [مت] أضافه [انفعالات] بعد [أفعال] .
(٣) هكذا في الأصل وهي [سأل] في قراءة [أُس] .
(٤) في [مت] أضافه [الأخلاق] بعد [هذه] .
(٥) هكذا في الأصل وقد اسقطت الفاء في قراءة [أُس] .
(٦) [وأما] في قراءة [أُس] .
(٧) [وأما ما لم يكن فضائل] في الأصل وهكذا قرأها [أُس] والأصل
[وأما لم تكن فضائل] وهي في [مت] هكذا [وأما لم تكن هذه الأخلاق فضائل
للبراهيم لأخرى] .
(٨) زيادة في [مت] .

ففي نيل كل واحد مننا ؛ فإنه إنه لم تستعمل الفكرة كأنه ذلك
 فضلاً برهيمياً ، ^(١) لأنه شركه للانسانيه فيه من جهة من الجبريات ،
 أكثر من انه الموضوع جسم خلقة خلقة ^(٢) انسانه وأما من كانه
 غرضه غرضاً برهيمياً - سواء نيل ^(٣) بفكرة انسانيه او لم نيل -
 كانه جري انسانيه وجرى ^(٤) البرهيه واحد . ولا فرق بينه أنه يوجد
 حينئذ خلقة خلقة - انسانه ، قد استعمل برهيه ، او يكونه برهيه
 مفردة . وبينه انه ما له هذا بالفعل البرهيه لا يلتزم منه مدنيه ،
 ولا يكونه جزء مدنيه أصلاً ، فهو انما يوجد للمتوحد وغايات
 المتوحد كما قلناه . فإذا غايه البرهيه احدى الثلاث ، وهذه
 لا تكونه للصورة الرومانيه العامة ، فإنه ذلك هو للفعل ، وذلك
 بالنظر فيه انما الاشياء ^(٥) ، وهي الرومانيه الخاصه والجسمانيه
 خاصة الرومانيه الخاصه فقد — — — — — ←

(١) يوجد فراغ قبل [لا] وللهذا [أش] يضيف [و] قبل لا ، وهي في [مت] كما في

قراءتنا

(٢) [مت] يضيف كلمة [جسم] قبل انسانه .

(٣) [نيل] في قراءة [أش] .

(٤) [جرى] في الأصل .

(٥) يصح الأثنان : الأولى والثانية .

الباب الخامس

فصل :

الغايات التي يتفهمها المتوحد فهي ثلث ، اما أنه تكونه
لصورته الجسدية ، أو لصورته الروحية الخاصة ، أو لصورته الروحية
العامّة ، فانه الغايات التي له - وهو^(١) جزء مدينة إقاميه^(٢) -
فقد تلخصت في العلم المدني ، واما التي تنبئها له في مدينة
مدينة - مه حيث هو^(٣) جزء مدينة - فانه مه افعاله في ما
يليه بالمتوحد فيكونه اهدى هذه ، واما انه يكونه في المدينة
الفاضلة ، فقد تلخص امر المدينة همه في العلم المدني .
والروية^(٤) والبعث والاستدلال ، وبالجملة ، فالفكرة تسعمل

(١) [وهي] في قراءة [أس] .

(٢) [إقاميه] في قراءة [أس] .

(٣) [هي] في هامش الأصل

(٤) [الروية] في قراءة [أس] .

ذو الحشرة في البهي، فانه ذلك اما عن نقص في الطبع، مثل ما قد شوهد ذلك، فمتى
تطاول^(١) التي به نقص، ولقد اسرع منه محمود بن ابي قليظ^(٢)، ولعامة مثل ما يوجد في هذا
الوقت من اولاد المترفين^(٣)، واولاد ذوي الاسباب، ربيته انهم يظهر منه ذلك من غير ان يكونوا
اهلاً له، وهذا اذا اتفق انه يكون يظن به الفضيلة^(٤) [F. 1. 176]، ويتقبل في المدينة
لانه اعظم اسباب الفاد فيها قوة - اي مدينة كانت من المدن الأربع - فانه ايرامية^(٥) لا يمكن
ذلك فيها اهلاً واكثر ما يكون في مدينة المال^(٦)، ثم في المدينة الجماعية، ثم التقلب.

(١) [تطاولت] في [مت].

(٢) الأربع أنه هيركول Hercule بطل من أبطال
الميتولوجيا عند الرومان، سماه اليونان هيراكليس، يضرب المثل بقوته
وبطائه، باسمه دعا الافرنج عواميد هيركول، اي مضيق جبل طارق
لاعتبارهم انه المرور منه الى الأطلس لا يقوى عليه الا الجبابرة.

(٣) [المترفين] في قراءة [أُس].

(٤) [الفضيلة] في قراءة [أُس].

(٥) [الأقامية] في قراءة [أُس].

(٦) غرض في الأصل، كلمة ساقطة، وكلمة [المال] اقترع منه عندنا

لأنه المدن الأربع تنقسم مدينة المال حسب تعدد افندطونه

والفارابي.

يوصف [الآب] بالذكاء والذهن؛ فأنزلها إنما يحتاجها لتفصيل
 الأمور النطقية، والشيخ إذا كانه على الحال الطبيعي، فقد
 حصل ذلك، بل ذلك للآب وكذلك جودة الفكر للسهولة،
 ومن الروية^(١) [للشيخ] فإنه الشيخ يجب أنه يكونه عنده
 بالفضل الفانيات مفرغاً منها.

وأما سن الررم في الأوليه، فهو منها مجال نظيره
 للشيخ المتقدم، لأنه في الأوليه ليس أناً بالاطلاق،
 بل أناً ينشأ، وفي هذه السن أناه يبنى، ولذلك
 يجب أنه يوجد له الحكمه فقط، وهذا هو اللابيه.
 ولذلك يجعل سقاط صاحب هذه السن إذا كانه حكماً.
 في جزلة الصدء وأما الذي نفي^(٢) بهذه الجزلة؛ فتأخذه
 في صناعة تدبير المده. وكذلك من وجد^(٣) بعض هذه الأحوال
 في السن المتقدمه قبلها - لا سيما من كانه في السن البصيرة
 منها - مثل أنه يوجد الوخار والبر والتودد. وأبعد من

(١) [الروية] في قرارة [أُس].

(٢) [ينفي] في قرارة [أُس].

(٣) [وقد] في قرارة [أُس].

أَنْ (١) الفقه ليس من قبل السن أو مقابله (٢) من قبل الصادق
والخلفه ؛ ولذلك يستحق على (٣) الشيخ الصابى ، ليعاخذ
عابيه الشيخه ، اذ بينهما من الكهل ، ولذلك يستحق
من المحاكمية للعب (٤) اللعب بالسبع ، لأنه فنان (٥) للجد .
ويستحق من السباب المزعج (٦) والزبل ، لأنه اول افعال
الرديه (٧) اذ ذلك متوسط بين اللعب والجد ، ومنه الهمول
البر والتودد ، اذ ذلك هو الجد الذي في المزعج (٨) والزبل .
ويستحق من الشيخ جهوده الرأي ، وجهوده المشورة والحكمة
والعقل . وبالجملة ، فالفضائل المنطقية . فلهذا لا يبار

(١) [فنان] من الأصل .

(٢) [أوها] في قراءة [أس] .

(٣) [من] في [من] .

(٤) هكذا في الأصل وقد كانت شائعة في عصر ابنه بابه .

(٥) [فنان] في قراءة [أس] .

(٦) [المزعج] في قراءة [أس] .

(٧) [الرديه] في قراءة [أس] .

(٨) [المزعج] في قراءة [أس] .

ينفصل عنهما ، فإنه انه نفقته القوى فذلك نفق في الطبع ،
 مثل المستويين . وأما انه توجد^(١) له القوى ، ولا يفضل عنهما ،
 فذلك ايضا مقصود ، ولكنه دونه ذلك الأول . وأما انه يفضل
 عنهما غير انه يقصد الأمور التي كأنه يقصدها في السن الأولى^(٢) ،
 ويستخدم القوى المستجدة في تجويد أفعال تلك القوى ، فلهذا
 يسمي ، لا فرق بينه وبين البرهية ، غير انه يفضل حفل تلك
 البرهية أكثر أو أجود بالرؤية^(٣) . وبينه انه كل حال في سن ما
 فهي توطية^(٤) لما بعدها ، وفادى^(٥) لها ، فإذا حفل ذلك ،
 فقد صير^(٦) التوطية غاية ، والغاية لا لتوطية ، والرئيس مرسومًا ،
 والمروءس رئيسًا . ولذلك يقول أرسطو في المقالة الأولى
 منه يتقوما ههنا - - - - -

-
- (١) [يوجد] في قراءة [أ.س.] .
 (٢) [الأول] في قراءة [أ.س.] .
 (٣) [الرؤية] في قراءة [أ.س.] .
 (٤) [يصل] التوطية .
 (٥) [فادى] في [م.س.] .
 (٦) [يصل صار] في قراءة [أ.س.] .

الحياة . وأما^(١) السن الثالثة فهي بالوضع ، ولذلك لم يكن من
 بعض الرابع كغالة الأولاد غيرها ، والحال الموجودة معها^(٢) ،
 لصورة الأولاد الرومانية ، فحال أخرى ، ومجبه أخرى غيرها
 تكون بالوضع ، وللطبع الانساني فيها مدخل ما . وهذه تختلف
 بحسب السير [Fol. 175v] ، كسيرة الجماعية ، فانه الأولاد فيها
 أُهْب^(٣) منهم في سائر السير لتساووه على حفظ المنازل ، وذلك
 بيته في الصرب والبربر . وفي هذه السير تقع الصيوبة^(٤) ، ولوجهد^(٥)
 كثيراً . وأما في باقي الأسماء كسن الكهولة ، وسن الشيخ ،
 وسن الرأسم ، فانه الصورة الرومانية تختلف فيها كلها . وتلخيص
 ذلك ستمثل له تفرغ في النظر فيه .

ولذلك من كانه ذو سن ما ، ولا يفضل افعال القوى
 المنسوبة لذلك السن ، فانما هو في السن الأولى ، لم

(١) [خاما] في قراءة [أس] .

(٢) [منزها] في قراءة [أس] وهي قراءة مقبولة أيضاً .

(٣) ساقطه في الأصل الا انزيا مضافه في الرأسم .

(٤) [يقع الصيوبة] في قراءة [أس] .

(٥) [فيوجد] في قراءة [أس] .

الا انه يكونه ذلك عند اهل العلم بفريق اللسان ، فليست اليه
 اكتم اقرب الأسماه اليه وهو اليقظة وبعبه انه في هذا الوقت
 منه الصر حيوانه ففلا ؛ فانه انما يفضل عنه النفس البرهيمية ففلا .
 واما ما لردنا تنشأ ^(١) فيه الرؤية ^(٢) ، ففقد ذلك هو اننا بالارادة
 ومكين بنفسه ليس به ضرورة الى ما يكفله .

واما في السببه المطعده ، فانه السن الأولى ، فالصور
 الروحانية موجودة فيها بمرئيه الحال بالطبع ، لكل ما يتقبل
 ابنة . واما السن الثانية فقد يوجد لبعضها ايضا بعض في
 هذا الزمان ، كالدهاج والقيج واما تمام ^(٣) المدق ، فلهذا
 خاصه ؛ اذ سن الحيوان غير الناطقه لا ينقسم بالرؤية ^(٤) ، بل
 انما ينقسم بالحوال اوفر ، وقد قيل كيف يكونه ذلك في كتاب
 اخبار الحيوان ، وذلك في المقاله ^(٥) الصر منه كتاب

(١) [تنشأ] في قراءة [أ.س.] .

(٢) [الرؤية] في قراءة [أ.س.] .

(٣) [فاما بما من] في قراءة [أ.س.] .

(٤) [الرؤية] في قراءة [أ.س.] .

(٥) [مقاله] بدونه والى السنين " في قراءة [أ.س.] .

توجد^(١) له بسبب أفعال قوى ما ، وأحوال أخر توجد لها
 أفعال قوى أخر ، وتتجدد^(٢) هذه الأحوال بأجزاء العمر . فالأول^(٣)
 منه قد يوجد له في سن الطفولة^(٤) ، وذلك منه وصفه الى انه
 يتحرك بحمله^(٥) جسده الى ما يشتهي ، فانه مادام كذلك فانه
 يفضل عن النفس الفارضية ، وأما ما يوجد له من الحركة والتغير ، فليس
 محسوراً ، ولا القول فيه في هذا النحو الذي يفقد ويتحرك^(٦) .
 وأما حاله ، من وقت يتحرك^(٧) الى ما يشتهي الى وقت توجد^(٨)
 له فيه الروية^(٩) ، فلا اكتم له خصه في لسان العرب : صفاً ، اللهم

-
- (١) [يوجد] في [مت] .
 (٢) [وتتجدد] في قراءة [أُس] .
 (٣) [فالأول] في [مت] .
 (٤) [الطفولة] في [مت] .
 (٥) [بحمله] في قراءة [أُس] .
 (٦) [وهي] في الأصل وهي [يفقد عجز] في قراءة [أُس] .
 (٧) [هركته] في [مت] .
 (٨) [يوجد] في قراءة [أُس] .
 (٩) [الروية] في قراءة [أُس] .

فأما الأهوال التي توجد للصورة الروحانية الخاصة، من حيث
 لها النسب العامة، فإنا نقول غيراً ^(١) قلناً ^(٢) في الأفعال
 الإنسانية. والروحانية الخاصة، من حيث لها النسب العامة،
 هي إما أصالة، وإما حيادية. وبهذه الصور يتحرك الحيوان
 حركة الخاصة به، وقد بينته كيف ذلك في مواضع شتى ولذا
 كل متحرك من تلقائه حس، وكل حس متحرك من تلقائه.
 وأما الأهرام المستديرة فليست متحركة من تلقائها الا على
 طريق النسبة؛ إذ ليس لها انه تقف، فانه كل متحرك من
 تلقائه يسكنه من تلقائه، وإنما تترك تلك الأهرام ^(٣)
 والحيوان في الزاوية مؤلفة من المتحرك والمتحرك، وتفرقه بغير
 ذلك.

وقصدنا فيما نحن به ببلية الأمور التي تنسب الى
 الانسان، والاشياء له أهوال يشتمل عليها،

(١) [إذا] في الأصل .

(٢) [فإننا نقول قلناً] في قراءة [أُس] وهي بخلاف الأصل .

(٣) [الأهرام] في قراءة [أُس] وهي الأهرام في الأصل .

كما طرحت [١٧٥] صه الأولاد وكالبعض عند التحصين .
 فهذه الأحوال التي للصورة الرومانسية هي للأولاد ، ما
 داموا لم يقدروا على الفداء ، وأما إذا قدروا على الفداء ، فما
 بعد ذلك هي انسانية فقط ، اللهم الا ما يحكيه قوم
 عن الفرس ، انه لا ينال^(١) أمه . ولما ساروا للقربة
 فكلوا اناني ، فأكثروا بالوضع والشرعية ، وقد قيل
 في هذه الأحوال المقدار الكافي في الخاتمة منه سياسة
 غداطن^(٢) .

(١) [ينال] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٢) يريد انه يقيم تفرقة اساسية بين الانسان والحيوان . فعلى
 الرغم من انه ابنه باهة يذهب مذهب الفلاس في اعتبار الانسان
 حلقة في سلسلة الصاعدين الحيوانيين من درجة الى درجة ، الا انه
 ينظر الى الانسان الذي يملك العقل على انه مختلف كل الاختلاف .
 ولقد اثار ابنه باهة في مواضع متعددة الى انه ما يميز الانسان
 الا انما هو العقل ، فاذا لانه الانسان فاهراً عنه استخدم
 العقل فهو بحري بحري البرية . وهذا الفرق ينعكس في امتلاك
 الانسان لصور رومانية غير مرقنة وليست نتيجة الفريسة كالحال في طيورته .

فصل:

واما الطبيعية فمنها بالعرفن ، ويجري^(١) مجرى الضرري
الذي لا اختيار لذي الروحانية فيه ، مثل شرف الأبدان .
ومنها ما بالذات ، ومنها المشتركة ، ومنها الانسانية ، فاما^(٢)
المشتركة ، كحب الأبناء والأولاد ، فانهم يحبونه صور الأولاد
الروحانية ، فانه الأم والأب - سواء كانه حيواناً غير
ناطقه او انساناً - اذا غاب عنه ابنه غيبة لا يدرك بها
الصورة التي عنده الطرفة ، وانه تائب عليه غيره حتى
يدرك منه تلك الصورة أهبة . ولو أحب الجسمانية
ما امكنه انه يحب غير ابنه ، وذلك بيته في الأبل وعطفا
على ألبو^(٣) ، الذي يتخذ العرب ، ليدّر عليه . وهذه
الصورة بها تمام اولاد الحيوان الكامل وما يجري مجراه ،

(١) [تجرى] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٢) [واما] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٣) هو الحمل الدمي الذي يصنع العرب منه جلبة او فلافه
ويحس بالقش او ما يشبه ذلك ثم يوضع بجانب الناقة
التي اُجبت حديثاً ليدّر لبنها في حالة فقرانها صفيرها او ما يشبهه .

هذه الروحية ، وكلها موهبة إلهية ، يفيض الله تعالى بها
 من يشاء من خلقه ، وليس للأسانه في ذلك حظ ، فانه المال
 قد يزرعه الله الأسانه على يدي أنسانه أكثر ، فيكونه لذلك
 الأسانه في ذلك الفضل نصيب ، فلهذا يعصف الأسانه
 بأنه مُعْتَمَدٌ بِالطَّالِ وكذلك سائر المواهب التي ليست الإلهية^(١)
 فانما المواهب الإلهية فهي ما لا يمكنه ان يكونه الأسانه
 سبباً لها ، وهذه منزا ، وهي وانه لم تكن اجلاً ، فليست
 بأخيراً بل هي متاعها الجميلة ، ونقول في ترتيب هذه
 المواهب في الشرف والخس في القول في الناطقة^(٢) .

(١) هكذا في الأصل .

(٢) في هذا الفصل تظهر آراء ابنه باجة في انه المواهب الفطرية والقضاء
 والقدر تلعب الدور الأساسي في قدرة الأسانه على الوصول الى درجة
 اعلى من درجة غيره في سلم الطبقات التي تميز فرداً من غيره
 والواقع انه ابنه باجة الذي يعطي دوراً هاماً للعقل الإنساني في
 الحصول على الكمال والسعادة ، يترك أمر الوصول الى التمتع بدرجة
 اعلى الصور العقلية الى قوى غير انسانية . وهذه هي الهدى
 وسيلته في الحصول على السعادة والكمال ، الا اننا اولى الوسائل ارضياً .

فقد^(١) يُعلم ذلك إلا حكماء الطبائعيين، والحكام بحكمة الأغنياء فقط، ويحصل له ما اراده أولئك، واعتمدوا عليه على انه ربح رائد على الغاية الذاتية، الى سائر ما عدد قبل هذا، وهذه كلها مواهب للرهب، وعملهم ذلك كما لأخذاء باطوائفه الذي يفتدي به الأصحاء، وانه لم يعلم ذلك الصحيح انه ذلك يوافقته مخلص^(٢) الصبي، وهو لم يصدقها الى سائر ما يحصل له منه الأبرار^(٣)، وكما انه الصبي انما يخص للفاضل الشروة - اعتمدها ام^(٤) لم يصدقها - كذلك هذه الروحانية المحضه الشريفه انما يخص للفاضل الخلف، سواء اعتمدها ام^(٥) لم يصدقها، وكما انه الشروة انما تكون خاضعة اذا اراد الاطفال التي تصير بالذات الصبي، كذلك الخلف الفاضل انما يصير به روحانيا بأنه يكون عنه الفعل الذي يحصل له عنه بالذات

(١) [ولاد] في قرارة [أوس].

(٢) [مخلص] في قرارة [أوس].

(٣) [الأبرار] في قرارة [أوس].

(٤) [او] في الأصل.

(٥) [او] في الأصل.

فلذلك قال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: «أنا سيّد ولد آدم»^(١)
 ولا فخر وإنما كانه إخبار نفسه بالصفة الموجودة له^(٢)، وإخباره
 بذلك، كإخباره بإير صفاته الموجودة له. التي^(٣) لا
 يَصِفُ فِيهِ^(٤) يَصِفُ نَفْسَهُ بِهَا^(٥) أَنَّهُ يَفْخَرُ، كما يقول الألبان
 «أنا اليوم صحيح» وما جازى ذلك .
 وأما السوفي فهو منّا في الأكل، وَجِبُّ أَنَّهُ تَذَكَّرَ لَهُ
 أفضاله الجميلة، فالسوفي غاية الأمر الخارج، فإنه لم ينله
 ذهب عمله باطلاً. وأما الفاضل فحق له غاية لم يقدرها،
 وأكد الناس لا يعلمونها فضلاً عنه أنه يَعْتَدُ وَهًا^(٦)

- (١) أنا سيّد ولد آدم، فليكني سيّد ولد آدم. إلى سيّد ولد آدم .
 أبه طابه: رعد ١٣، الهدية جيل ٥٦ انظر معجم الالهيات المفردات .
 (٢) الجملة الآتية زائدة في الأصل أو بالأحرى مكررة بعد «الموجودة له»
 وهي: «التي لا يَصِفُ فِيهِ يَصِفُ نَفْسَهُ بِالصفة الموجودة له»
 (٣) الذي في قراءة [أُس] .
 (٤) [عنده] في قراءة [أُس] .
 (٥) [بذلك] في الأصل .
 (٦) [يعتدونها] في قراءة [أُس] .

فصل :

قد تقدّمنا ولفظنا قبل انه جميع الافعال الرومانية هي افعال
 سُوفِيَّة ، او تجري مجرى^(١) السُّوفِيَّة ، وذلك انه يطلب^(٢) بها
 الفاعل التي شأنها ان تقدره بفاعيلها الذاتية ، وتلزمها ، فهي
 غاية بالعرض . وهذه سُوفِيَّة او تجري مجرى السُّوفِيَّة كمن يطلب
 بكمال الصورة الرومانية المتخيلة ، او التي في الذاكرة التامة
 والسمة ، افعال ليكبر ، او لينال بها^(٣) جزاء معه الحيات
الخارجية^(٤) ، وعرفهم من يفضل ذلك الفعل لا شيء^(٥)
 انه هيد وهيل ؛ فلذلك يفضل ، حيث يعلم ، وهي
 يعلم ، ويختص هذا الصنف بالتألم ، انه ذكر له فعله
 [Fol. 174v] ذلك أو مدح به . وهذا الصنف لا يكون متنا
 ولا مخفورا ، بل انه اضطر الى ذكره ، فلا على جبهة الفخر ،

(١) [مجرى] - مقطوع في قراءة [أ.س.] .

(٢) [يطلب] في قراءة [أ.س.] .

(٣) [مضربا] في قراءة [أ.س.] .

(٤) [الخارجية] في الأصل .

(٥) [سوا] في الأصل .

الشاعر^(١)؛

« أبعادهم يفروا والقنا في محوهم »

ثم قال : « ولو اسلمهم فرّوا لعاسوا أحرزة »

وهذا الصنف شأنه الأزدراء بالأفعال الجسائية، وشأنه
الحمل على جسمه بالصبر على العري والجوع، وتكليف الأعمال
الشاقة في ذلك الفعل الذي شأنه أنه يحمل عنه صوره
الرومانية، وقد شوهد منه هذا الصنف بمائة . والقلم
والقلم والمثابرة^(٢) على العلم دافلة في هذا الصنف
والصوفي، أما في الحقيقة، فداخله في هذا الصنف وأما
بحسب مقلودهم الذي يقدونه، فداخله^(٣) في الرومانية
العامّة التي هي كمال الناطقة، وسنقول في ذلك إذا
انترينا إليه أنه شاعر الله .

(١) هذا البيت منسوب إلى شاعر من قبيلة عبد القيس ،

انظر الحماسة « للبحرّي - تحقيقه الأديب شيخو بدوي ١٩١٠ ص ٣٧

(٢) [المثابرة] في قراءة [أس] .

(٣) [داخل] في قراءة [أس] .

بالأقل والأكثر، وذلك بأنه يقدّر به سائر تلك، أو يكون محمله
 أحدها أو سبغها، فلهذا يوجد في هذا الصنف طرفان متقابلان،
 لا يطلع على أحدهما الخ، بل يقال ^(١) بتقييد، ويطلع على
 الآخر الشرف، فيقال منفرداً دونه تقييد، فاما الأخرى فهو
 أنه يفضل الفضل الذي نحو ^(٢) الصورة الروحانية، غير أنه لا
 يفضل ذلك إلا عندما لا يقطع به عنه الأفعال الجسمانية
 تصوير ^(٣)، فيفضل ذلك فهو ليس بمنزلة الاعتبار ^(٤)، شريف
 بما يحصل بصورته الروحانية، والقابل له هو الذي لا يفضل
 منه الأفعال الجسمانية إلا ما لا يقطع به عنه الأفعال الروحانية،
 فانه قطع فيكونه الفضل الروحاني ^(٥) قليلاً جداً. والفضل الجسماني
 عظيم جداً، وهذا الطبع مما يمدح ^(٦) به ولذلك قال — — —

(١) [يقال] في قراءة [أس].

(٢) [تجده] في قراءة [أس].

(٣) [تصفيه] في قراءة [أس].

(٤) [الأيثار] في قراءة [أس].

(٥) [يا روحاني] في قراءة [أس] وقد تكون خطأً وطبعياً.

(٦) [لمدح] في قراءة [أس] = = = =

ذلك ، فإنا نرجي القول فيها ^(١) في أكثر الكتاب .

مض :

من الناس من تغلب عليه الجسمية فقط ، وهؤلاء لا لهم
أقرب الناس ، ومنهم من تغلب عليه الروحانية اللطيفة جداً ،
ومنهم من يوجد فيه واحدة من هذه . وهذه تختلف بالأكثر
والأقل ، فالصنف الأوله قليل الوجود ، إلا أنه الجسماني
أكثر ، وأما الطرف الآخر - وهو الروحاني الأمل - فأقل وجوداً
وفي هذا الصنف يعد أوتيس القرني ^(٢) و إبراهيم بن إدهم ^(٣)
- غاما ^(٤) هرمي ^(٥) ، فإنه الطرف الأقرب من هذا الصنف ، على
ما يقوله أرسطو في كتاب ينقوما جيا . وهذا الصنف يختلف

(١) كذا في الأصل والأصح [إلى] .

(٢) من زهاد الطبقة الأولى ، يمني عامر النبي واحتضنه الإسلام . انظر الحياة الروحية في الإسلام ص ١٩٣

(٣) إبراهيم بن إدهم بن منصور بن يزيد بن جابر أبو كعب التميمي البجلي ، مصنف
مفتوح نوحي فانيه ١٦٠ - ١٦٦ لفرجه أو ٧٧٦ - ٧٨٣ للميلاد - انظر دائرة
المعارف الإسلامية .

(٤) [واما] في ترجمة [أسي] .

(٥) أكم يوناني ملوكو ابنه جوسيتار ، هو إله الضاحكة والتجارة والسرة . كانه
أكثرهم يسخر منه من معاصريهم .

فإنَّ أكثرَ ، وهذا ليس بفضل انساني ، ولا يعتمد فيه صاحبه أكثر [Fol. 174]
 من الصدفة ، وذلك يكونه في غير ذي الذكر . وإنما يكونه ذلك - كما
 بينه أرسطو في الثانية من الحس - باجتماع القوى الثلاث ،
 فيظهر لصاحبه الصدفة ، ولا يمكنه أن يجمع ^(١) كل شيء ، وتكذب ^(٢) ،
 واجتماعها ليس محدوداً ، ولا يطار الإنسان يصرحاً ، ولذلك
 الحجة كثير على الألسن تردده ، طویل بقاؤه ، والذكر الطارب
 يردد ^(٣) بينه ، سريع انحاده ، قليل على الألسن تردده ،
 فاما كيف ذلك فنقول فيه بعد هذا .

ولما ^(٤) الأفعال التي تحصل للرومانية ^(٥) العامة ، وهي اكل
 هذه الرومانيات على الإطلاق ، كأننا التحوم بين هذه المترجمة
 بالجسمية ، إنه قيل لهذا الصنف اقتراح ، وبين الرومانية
 المطلقة ، وهي كثيرة ، كالعقلم ، والاستنباط ، وما جاني

- (١) [يجتمع] في قراءة [أُس] .
 (٢) [تَكْذِب] في قراءة [أُس] .
 (٣) [بِذْنِه] في قراءة [أُس] .
 (٤) [فَإِذَا] في قراءة [أُس] .
 (٥) [الرومانية] في قراءة [أُس] .

عند كبار الدُّنْصِ، وعند المُتَأَهِّلِينَ لِتَدْبِيرِ الْمَدَنَةِ، وَكَانَهُ كَثِيرًا،
 صَارَ بِرَأْيِ الْوَلَدِ فِي^(١) السَّبِيرِ، لَذَلِكَ جَاءَ فِيهِ^(٢) مِنَ الْوَعِيدِ مَثَلُ مَا
 جَاءَ فِي أَفْصَالِ النِّقَاطِصِ، كَالرِّيَاءِ، وَكَالْأَفْصَالِ الْجَسَامِيَّةِ، فَلِذَلِكَ
 مَا جَاءَ فِي الْحَدِيثِ لَهُ فَقَدْ السَّعَةِ وَفِي الزُّبُرِ: «رَدَّ مِنْهُ وَقَدْ السَّعَةِ،
 أَمَّا لَمْ يَلِكِ السَّعَةِ الَّتِي قَصَدَهَا أَنْ تَصِيرَ حَيَّةً مِنْ نَارٍ» .
 وَالْأَحَادِيثُ الَّتِي هَدَّيْتُ عَنْهُ: «رَدَّ يَخْلَعُ^(٣) عَقَابًا يَنْلِغُ كُلَّ وَاحِدٍ
 مِنْهَا صَاحِبَهُ، ثُمَّ تَنْقِيَا^(٤) سَمُورًا، فَتَنْقِي بِاللَّعْنَةِ^(٥)، وَيَقَاهَا
 قَاصِدُ السَّعَةِ^(٦)» .

وَمَا يُوجَدُ فَضْلٌ فِي هَذِهِ الْعُقُودِ يَخْتَصُّ بِفَاضِلِ الذِّكْرِ، كَذَلِكَ
 يُوجَدُ أَيْضًا انْفِصَالٌ يَخْتَصُّ بِهِ الْفَاضِلُ فِي ذَلِكِ، فَتَبْقَى صُورَتُهُ
 الرُّوْحَانِيَّةُ الَّتِي فِي الذِّكْرِ حِدَّةٌ أَطْوَلُ مِنْ تَدَلٍّ، وَيَكُونُ ذِكْرُهُ

(١) كَذَا فِي الْأَصْلِ وَالْإِلْهَامِ اسْتَخْرَاضًا .

(٢) [هَامِيَّة] فِي قَرَارَةِ [أُسَا] .

(٣) [يَخْلَعُ] فِي قَرَارَةِ [أُسَا] .

(٤) [يَنْقِيَا] فِي قَرَارَةِ [أُسَا] .

(٥) [بِاللَّعْنَةِ] فِي قَرَارَةِ [أُسَا] .

(٦) هَذَا الْحَدِيثُ غَيْرُ مَذْكُورٍ فِي كِتَابِ مَجْمُوعَاتِ الْحَدِيثِ السَّتَةِ الْمَشْهُورَةِ .

تكونه ^(١) سيرة ^(٢) الأمة حفظ الأقاويل الموزونة ، فيصف الشاعر ذلك ،
 ويتداوله الناس وذلك مثل ما فعل الخليل بالأعراس الشاعر . وأما
 أنه يكونه الفعل ^(٣) غريباً معجباً ، فيتداوله الناس لأعجابه ، وبالجمل
 بأنه يقدره به انفصال عنه ذكره ، فيستظرف الناس منه ذلك
 الخبز به ، فيستواريه الأعصاب ، ومنه ما يكونه باتقانه أفعال
 المقتدر ، كصانع ^(٤) وكبانه ^(٥) أيوانه المدايه ، واهتمام الخالدياته .
 وفي هذا الصنف يد من أكثر التواليف والأشعار والخطب .
 وأما ما يقصده ^(٦) الشاعر ، فبما مدخل له في العمل الفاضل ،
 وإنما هو شوقي ، أو يجري مجرى السوي ، وأما الأمر الغريب ،
 والعجب نوعه ، أو قدره ، أو مأواه ، فقد يصنفه الأفاضل
 - لا لينالوا به الذكر - بل لأجل كمال العمل . ولما كان شاعراً

(١) [يكونه] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٢) [سير] في الأصل .

(٣) [الفاعل] في الأصل .

(٤) [كصانع] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٥) [كبار] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٦) [يقصده] في الأصل وفي [أسي] .

السَّاحِرُ: « ذكر الفتى محرمه الثاني » .

ولذلك قالت بنت هرم به سنانة لبنت زهير السَّاحِرُ: ^(٢)

« اعطيناكم ما يبلى ، واعطيتمونا ما يبقى » .

والأخبار والأشعار في ذلك كثيرة جداً رابعة وهذه الأفعال هي في بعض
البراهين وفي بعضها أكثر .

« هي سُئِلَ - أكثر ذلك رأتم - بالأفعال التي عدت من القوة ^(٣)

الخيالية ، وأما التي ^(٤) في الحس المشترك ، فاما انه لا ينال بها ، او ينال
قليلاً جداً ^(٥) ، وأما جميع الأفعال الجسمانية ، فكلها ينال بها المذنب ،
ولذلك ليس ينال بجميع تلك الأفعال بذاتها ، اذ تلك الأفعال تنال بها الصورة التي في
القوة الخيالية ، وإنما ينال بها في الذاكرة ، بانه يقترن البراهين ، وذلك اما انه

(١) ذكر الفتى محرمه الثاني وما جبهه ما قاتله وفضل العيش أطفال

المتنبي : قدم أبو شجاع فائق المعروف بالمجنون من الضيغم إلى القاهرة

فوصل أبا الطيب وحمد إليه هدية قيمتها الف دينار فقال القصيدة في مدحه .

ديوان المتنبي ص (٤٩٠) دار صادر - دار بيروت [١٩٠٨]

(٢) في كتابه الشعر والشعراء ، ابن قتيبة يثب هذا القول لعمري

الخطاب بعد ما سأل أجد أولاد الهرم أنه يتلوه هذه شعر زهير في أبيه

راجع ابن قتيبة - الشعر والشعراء ، ص ٨٢

(٣) [القوى] في الأصل .

(٤) [فما بالي] في الأصل .

(٥) [شراً] لذا في قراءة [أُس] .

يظن به الكمال . فها الأول ، فلا أسم له ، لكنه يعرف باسم الجنس ، وهو
 العمل الفاضل ، وعلى طريقة الفضيلة ، وهذا ولا يهم ان فيه اجرهم على الله ، وفي هذه
 الأصناف الحديث الصحيح : «د منه كانت هجرته الى الله ، فخرجته الى الله ، ومنه كانت
 هجرته لدينا يصيرها ، او امرأة ينكحها ، فخرجته لما هاجر اليه»^(١) وبالمجمل ، فالأجد
 على ما جاء في صحيح الحديث : «د انما الأعمال بالنيات ولعل امرى عاتوى»^(٢)
 ومنها الأفعال التي ينال بها كمال الصورة التي في الذكر
 وهذه مؤثره لذاتها ، عند أكثر الناس ، حتى انه أكثرهم يظن ان السعادة ،
 لا سيما من ازدوجت مع تلك ، وكانت هادئة ، والعرب ترى في الذكر لهاصة
 ما لا يراه كثير من الأمم ، ولذلك قال الشاعر^(٣) :

أما ترى ان المال غايه ورائح
 ويرويه انه الذكر هو بقاء المذكور ، ولذلك يقول

(١) منه كانت هجرته لدينا يصيرها --- مسلم ، احارقه ١٥٥ بخاري ، بد الوهي ١
 ابو داود ، طهارة ١١ . انظر صحيح الحديث المفهرس - ونذكره ليد ١٩٦٢

(٢) [انما] الأعمال بالنيات --- البخاري : بد الوهي ١ . مسلم : احارقه ١٥٥

ابو داود : طهارة ١١ . ابنه عاچه : زهد ٢٦ انظر صحيح الحديث المفهرس .

(٣) [سأل] في الأصل .

(٤) هاتم الطائي في مخاطبة حاوية بنت خنجر ، انظر الشعر الثماني لابن قتيبة

الخارجية^(١) ، وقد لا يفقد عننا^(٢) شيء أهدأ ، سوى أنه الإنسان
 يروى أنه يفضل هذه الأفعال ، فيحصل عننا كمال صورته الروحية
 وأما أنه يفقد بها ما عدا الصورة الروحية ، فأنما يفضل
 هذه الأفعال حيث يعلم بها أو يظن أنه يعلم ذلك . وما
 كان العلم به^(٣) أكثر كان غفله له أقوى وأتم ، وحيث^(٤)
 لا يظن أنه يعلم فإنه لا يفقد بها ، فإنه حصل شيئاً عننا
 غيباً أو غفله وما كان منه هذه صارقاً ، فلا أشك
 له وما كان منه هذه بالعرف ، أو كان بأيسر^(٥) الرأى^(٦)
 وبالجملة فأنما يفقد منه صاحبه الانفعال ، ومن يفضل هذه
 لأجل الانفعال غفله شوقي - أنه طلب منه الكرامة [Fol. 143v]
 أو غيرها - أو يجري مجرى الشوقي ، أنه طلب منه الخشوع ، وأنه

(١) [الخارجية] في قراءة [أ.س.] .

(٢) [فينا] في قراءة [أ.س.] .

(٣) [بها] في الأصل .

(٤) [لها] في الأصل .

(٥) [و]

(٦) [نسى] في الأصل .

والبر . والرهزل داخل في هذا الصنف ، وكثير منه الملبس والمساكنه
والرياحات التي يُصِيبُ ^(١) منزلاً ^(٢) . وفي هذا الصنف نريد حُسن الحديث ،
وحفظ الأخبار والأعمال والأشعار .

[والرابع] ومنزلاً ما يوقف به الكمال حفظ ، فإنه ^(٣) محرض
فيه لبعض هذه فبالعرض ، وهي ^(٤) الفضائل الفكرية ، وهي العلوم ،
والعقل الذي يذكره أرسطو في السادسة ، وما جازى هذه ،
كصواب المسورة ، وجودة الاستنباط . وبعض الصناعات والمهنة
في هذه وسنذكرها بعد هذا . والفضائل الكلية ، كالسما
والنجدة والألف وحسن المعاشرة والرغبة والتودد والأمانة ،
والفضائل المظنوننة ، كاليسار وإفراط الصيرة والأنفة ، ويدخل
في هذه سائر ما ذكرناه في الصنف الأول وهذا قد يعقد منزلاً ^(٥)
أنه تولد في النفس خوفاً فتقويه الكرامة ، وسائر الخيرات

(١) [تعجب] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٢) [منه] في الأصل .

(٣) [وانه] في الأصل وهي [فانه] في [منا] .

(٤) [وفي] في الأصل .

(٥) [منزلاً] في قراءة [أُس] .

ويؤسسون به في هوائهم عند ألبهم ويعدونه ويعدونه به^(١).
فأما الأولى فإنها مذكورة^(٢) ومذكورة^(٣) ، وأكثر الناس في هذه السيرة
يهاها في سيرة ، ويركب عنرا ، ويندرها في جبره .

والثاني منها التي نحو الصورة الرومانية التي^(٤) في التحليل ،
وهذه أضاف منها ما يقدر به^(٥) نوع ما منه الانتقال ، كلباس
السلع في غير الحرب ، وكالعبس ، وسائر الرهاية النفاية .
وفي هذا يدخل ما يصفه^(٦) الملوك عندما تدخل إليهم العامة
والفرسان عظماء كالرسل . من اتخذ الآلات التي يسهل منظرها ،
وكلباسهم السلع في مجالسهم إلى سائر ما يجد مكتوباً في
التواريخ عنه ملوك الأمم .
والثالث منها ما يقدر به الألبان كالبسم والتودد

(١) [سرا] في الأصل .

(٢) هكذا في الرافض و [مفعوه] في الأصل .

(٣) هكذا في [مت] و [بجه] في قراءة [أس] .

(٤) [الذي] في قراءة [أس] .

(٥) [سرا] في الأصل .

(٦) [يصفه] في قراءة [أس] .

غير مكتوبه تجد هذه وراها نبداً ، وهذه يجلّ قدرها في بعض
 السير ، وفي بعضها يخس^(١) ، وقيل مه توجب^(٢) له هاتاه مفرداته ،
 لكنه أكثر في الأولى^(٣) ، وإنما عدت هذه نبداً ، لموقع الصورة
 الرومانية فيها . وعلى أمثال هاو لاي خاصه تنقضى على
 هاو لاي لأنه مه له هذه الطبيعة قد يرى ذلك بعض الناس
 سفاً لفنية ، لا سيما من كانه الأثلب عليه الأضال التي
 للصورة الرومانية . فانها قد تغلب في بعض الناس حتى يستوطنوا^(٤)
 جزء الدمار الخيس ، مما يلي^(٥) اجسامهم ، ويبرزونه للناس
 جزء الدمار الأثلب من انه بعضهم تبارن في ذلك . وذلك موجود
 كثيراً في هذا الزمه الذي كتبنا فيه هذا القول . وكانه في هذه
 البلاد في سيرة ملوك الطوائف أكثر هاو لاي يعرفونه بالتجسيم
 وتلقب هذه السير بالتجل ، ولذلك يقال انه التجل يذهب بالمال

(١) [خس] في الأصل .

(٢) [ما يوجب] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٣) [مه الأول] في الأصل .

(٤) [يستوطنوا] في قراءة [أسي] [يستوطنوا] في هامش الأصل .

(٥) [يل] في الأصل .

وأما أنه تكونه الأفعال نحو^(١) الصور الروحانية وهذه أصناف:
 الأول منها ما هو نحو^(٢) الصور الروحانية التي في الحس
 المشترك، وهذه الطائفة كثيراً ما تسمى الأولى، لكننا بغيره
 هي أشرفا، وبذلك^(٣) هي أخرى وهذه الأفعال هي إما مكتسبة،
 وإما طبيعية. أما المكتسبة، فهي الأحوال في تلك، وأشرفا كلها
 الملاهي، فأنه الدمار للأولى، والوانه الدمار لغيره، لأنظر
 تبقى الصور الروحانية في الحس المشترك، كما أدركنا مقدرة
 في اللباس والصور المدركة معه في آله واحد سواء كانت فيه
 أو خارجة عنه. وفي هذه تدخل أحوال المأكلة، وهيئات وضع
 المأكلة^(٤) والمشراب، والآخرة. وكثيراً^(٥) منه الناس يزدوج فيه
 هاتاه وزم هاولاي أقل. وقد توجب^(٦) آراء [١١٤٣] [١١٤٣]

(١) [نحو] في [مت] و[بجعه] في [أُس]

(٢) هكذا في [مت] و[بجعه] في قراءة [أُس]

(٣) [وتلك] في قراءة [أُس]

(٤) [المأكلة] في الأصل

(٥) هكذا في الأصل

(٦) يوجب في قراءة [أُس]

مطبقة على ذم^(١) أصل هادوي من الناس وفي أمثالهم يقول الشاعر:
«سبنا يا هذا وما ترك أهله الفلام^(٢)» .

فهاولان هم الذين أهلوا إلى الأرض، وفيهم قوله عز وجل: «وكان الذي

أتيناه آياتنا فانسخ من كتابه الشيطان فطاه من الغاوية، ولو شئنا

لرفضناه برها، ولكنه أهل إلى الأرض، واتبع هواه^(٣) . ومنه شأنه هادوي أنه

لا يباليوا^(٤) بما يفوتهم من الأفعال التي تلصق الرومانية أصلاً، وعند عرضته

عليه لم يقبل عيرا، ولا استقام البراء، غدار غزله^(٥) وتركه . «فمنه كل

الكلب أنه تحمل عليه يلث أو تركه يلث^(٦)» . وهادوي - كما قلنا - عاين

لكنهم موجودون، بل إنما يوجد كثيراً منه غلبة^(٧) هذه الطبيعة، وهادوي يختلفون بالأصل والاعتدال.

(١) [دعر] في قراءة [أس] .

(٢) لم تمكنه من تحديد شخص الشاعر إلا أنه هذا البيت قد يكون
منه صياغة ابنه باقة على أنه مجيد لبه الأبرص يقول: «تصبروا في نوح الصباي
والرأس قد شابه المنيب في الفرد

(٣) سورة الأعراف آية (١٧٥ - ١٧٦) .

(٤) [لا يباليوا] في قراءة [أس] .

(٥) غزله غزلاً وعزله له : لاقه منه عزلاً .

(٦) سورة الأعراف آية (١٧٦) .

(٧) [عليه] في قراءة [أس] .

الباب الرابع

والأفعال الإنسانية أما أنه تكونه العناية بها وجود الصورة الجسمية فقط ، وذلك مثل الأكل والشرب والشار والمكث ، فمما كانه منه هذه ضرورياً ، فهو مشترك ، ومما كانه ازدياد منه الضروري ، مثل العناية في اصناف الطعام والرواح ، وبالجملة فمما كانه المطلوب منه أكثر لئلا يفقد ، فهو جسماني محض وفي هذه يدخل السكر ، ولصعب الشطرنج ، والصيد للأنثى ، وصه جعل هذا وكده ، فهو جسماني محض ، وهذا الصنف قليل في الناس ، ومن هذا ليس لصورة الرومانية عنه قدر ، ولا يصعب بها وذلك لأفراط جسمانيته ، وهذا الصنف لما يوجب أكثر ذلك في اعتقابه ذوي الألباب ، وعلى أمثال هؤلاء ينقطع ثبوت شرف الإنسان ، ولذلك لما تنقل الأول عنه ابناس الأعم^(٢) على أيدي هؤلاء ، والسبب في ذلك يقدّر الإنسان أنه يأتي به ، إذا تأمله منه قبل نفسه ، وليس هذا الموضوع لايقاب^(٣) ، وجميع الآراء المكتوبة والثابتة^(٤)

(١) [حفل] في قرارة [أس] .

(٢) [لهم] في قرارة [أس] .

(٣) أو [لثقانه] .

(٤) [الرابعة] في قرارة [أس] .

آثار واحدة من هذه الروحانية. وأفعال الإنسان كلها - إذا كان جزء
مدينة - فضائياً المدينة. وذلك إنما يكون في المدينة الفاضلة
فقط، وأما في سائر المدن الأربع، وطائرتكيب^(٢) منها فانه كل واحد
من أهل هذه المدن ينصب^(٣) كل واحد من هذه غاية، ويؤثر منذئذ
فازاً التقطعات في المدينة الفاضلة غايات في غيرها.

(١) [فضائياً] في الأصل .

(٢) أو [يركب] .

(٣) [ينصبه] في الأصل .

[شرفه] ^(١) وخفته ^(٢) ، ولكل واحد من هذه جدي ^(٣) ، أو ضرر
 لذي الصورة ، وسنقل ذلك كله إذا وصلنا إلى القول فيه .
 وأيضاً فإنه الصور ^(٤) الرومانية لها هي موضوعاً مراتب
 هي برز أكثر روحانية ، وأقل روحانية ، فالصور التي هي
 الحس المشترك هي أقل المراتب الرومانية ، وهي أقرب الرومانية
 إلى الجسمانية ، ولذلك يصبر عنها بالصنم ، فيقال بأنه الحس
 المشترك فيه صنم المحسوس ^(٥) . ثم الصورة التي هي الخيالية
 وهي أكثر روحانية ، وأقل جسمانية ، ولذلك ينسب وجود
 الفضائل [Fol. 142v] النفسانية ثم التي هي القوة الذاكرة وهي
 أقل مراتب الصور الرومانية الخاصة . وكل واحد من هذه
 فهو للأنا ^(٦) محبوباً بالطبع ، ومثل ما يوجد أناه خلواً من

(١) [شرفه] ساقطه في الأصل وهي موجودة في [مت] .

(٢) [وخفته] هي قراءة [أوس] .

(٣) [جدي] في الأصل .

(٤) [الصور] في الأصل .

(٥) الجملة السابقة تقرأ في [مت] هكذا [أي يقال أنه في الحس المشترك

(٦) [موجود] في [مت] . صنم المحسوس .

كالتشويهاة^(١) والأضراس، فلنقسم^(٢) ما له حال نقص ما له حال
 له، كما يقال للردى الصوت أنه لا صوت له، وأما حال الأفعال،
 كما في الأحوال الجسمانية والنفسانية، وذلك مثل جهة الصورة،
 وأعداد الأعضاء والنفسانية، كالفضائل كلها، وبالحجالة فهي
 إما فضائل جسمانية، أو فضائل نفسانية، أو فضائل فكرية،
 أو نقائص^(٣) هذه؛ إذ كانت لسانه^(٤) بالطبع ولم تكن
 بالأكتاب، ومصرها صنف أكثر، وهو^(٥) الصور المكتوبة،
 وهذه أصناف: إما صنائع، وإما قوى، وإما أخلاق، وإما قوى
 فكرية، وإما أفعالها. ومصرها صنف أكثر، مثل النسب^(٦)
 وينقسم^(٧) الى — — — — —

(١) كالتشويهاة [في قراءة] أ س .

(٢) [فليس] في قراءة] أ س .

(٣) [نقائص] في قراءة] أ س .

(٤) [الأسان] في قراءة] أ س .

(٥) [وهو] في الأصل .

(٦) [النسب] في] عت .

(٧) [وينقسم] في] عت .

صورة شخص، منه نوع لم يصدره من انه يرى اهل البلاد
 الشمالية الفيل ^(١)، فتلك المرتبة ^(٢) لتلك الروحانية انما هي
 للنوع لا للروحانية ^(٣)، عند ذلك تكونه عند الانسان عوض
 النوع. ومنه هذه صنف آخر، وهو انه يرى الانسان لصفاً،
 غيرت في النفس مخافة، وهذا يحدث في النفس اثرآ، لكنه
تأثر ^(٤) عام، كذلك كل من فتكونه هذه ارضيآ تنزل بدلاً من
 النوع، وهذه لا يؤثر عزها الأخبار، فلا فائدة فيها الا
 بالعرض كما قلناه.

ومرنا حاله حال، وهذه الصنف، مرنا حاله طبيعية مثل
 الولد والوالد، وبالجملة فتكون الرحم فانه - عند ذري رحمه -
 ذو صورة روحانية، ويقع عنه حديث. ومرنا حاله ارضيآ
 حال طبيعي، اما حال نفس او حال كمال، فاما حال النفس

(١) [القبول] في قرارة [أسي].

(٢) [الزينة] في قرارة [أسي].

(٣) [أسي] رخيص [وهي] بعد الروحانية وقبل عند.

(٤) [بأثر] في قرارة [أسي].

نقل :

الصور الرومانية منزا ماله مال ومنزا حاله حال له، فالذي
 له حال له في النفس فهو^(١) الصور الرومانية، اما اذا حصلت
 مجردة وكانت من الأنواع الموجودة كثيراً، كالإنسان، فانه
 اذا رأى انساناً ما وحصلت رومانية^(٢) في النفس، لم يكن^(٣)
 لديه الرومانية رتبة^(٤)، ولا اثرتها في النفس أثراً، فانه
 خطرت على البال، وذكرته، فبالضبط، وذلك^(٥) مثل انه يلحق
 انساناً على الجرى الطبيعي في خلقته، وعلى الجرى الحصاد
 في رتبة، فتلك الصور الرومانية الحاصلة عنه لا تخطر
 بالبال، بل بالضبط، وذلك عندما يخطر بالبال الطرف^(٦)،
 فيخطر جزء الجملة، فذلك بالضبط، ولما انه يرى الانسان

(١) [فهي] في الأصل .

(٢) [رومانية] في قراءة [أيس] .

(٣) [لم يكن] في [صت] .

(٤) [رتبة] في قراءة [أيس] .

(٥) [فذلك] في قراءة [أيس] .

(٦) [الطريق] في قراءة [أيس] .

يُقَالُ لَهُ^(١) الْقَوَى ، وَقَدْ لَحِظْتَ هُنَا فِي الْعِلْمِ الْمُدْرِي ، وَاحِدًا
 الصنف الثالث من الأفعال ، فَرَزُو مَوْلا مِنْ فَعْلِيهِ مِنْفَضِل
 أَحَدُهُمَا مِنْ الْآخَرِ . وَالْفِعْلُ الَّذِي هُوَ كَالْمَبْدَأِ ، فَرَزُو بِالْأَخْتِيَارِ
 وَالثَّانِي فَلَيْسَ لِلْأَخْتِيَارِ فِيهِ مَحْظٌ ، فَلَزِمَ أَنْ يَدْخُلَ فِي^(٢) الْأَخْتِيَارِ
 مَا مِنْهُ اخْتِيَارِي ، وَالثَّانِي^(٣) خَالِئًا تَنْظُرُ فِيهِ صَيَاحٍ آخَرُ^(٤) .

(١) [لِزَا] فِي الْأَصْلِ وَالْإِصْحَاقِ [لَهُ] .

(٢) [فِي مَا] فِي الْأَصْلِ وَ[فِي] فِي الرِّحَابِ .

(٣) يُعْنِي الْقِسْمَ الثَّانِي مِنْ الْفِعْلِ الثَّانِي مِنْ الصَّنْفِ الثَّلَاثِ .

(٤) هُنَا نَجِدُ ابْنَهُ بِأَجَبَةٍ يَقَسِّمُ الْأَفْعَالَ الْأَخْتِيَارِيَّةَ إِلَى ثَلَاثَةِ

أَقْسَامٍ : أَوَّلًا الْأَخْتِيَارِي بِالْإِلَهَادِ . ثَانِيًا مَا هُوَ صِنْفُ اخْتِيَارِي

وَهُوَ مَا لَا يَسْتَطِيعُ الْإِنْسَانُ أَنْ يَكُنَّ فِيهِ حَيْثُ يَشَاءُ كَمَا هُوَ الْحَالُ

فِي أَفْعَالِ الصَّنْفِ الْأَوَّلِ ، ثَالِثًا مَا بَدَأَتْهُ بِالْأَخْتِيَارِ كَأَنَّهُ بِالْإِلَهَادِ .

وَالْفَرْقُ بَيْنَ الْقِسْمِ الثَّانِي وَالثَّلَاثِ هُوَ أَنَّهُ أَفْعَالُ الْقِسْمِ الثَّانِي

كَالْمَلَكَةِ وَالْفَلَاحَةِ تَدْفُلُ فِرَاحًا قَدَرَةُ الْبَارِي وَالْقَضَاءُ وَالْقَدَرُ

وَلَيْسَ لِلْإِنْسَانِ اخْتِيَارٌ كَامِلٌ فِرَاحٌ مِمَّنْ هُوَ الْقِسْمُ الثَّلَاثِ يَمْلِكُ

الْإِنْسَانُ قَدَرًا وَطَلَقَهُ فِي بَدْوِ الْفِعْلِ ثُمَّ يَتْرَكُهُ إِلَى الطَّبِيعَةِ تَتَوَلَّى

أَمْرَهُ .

الأطفال الإنسانية من حيث ما يكونه كل جزء منها باختيار، ولذا
 يمكنه للأنسان أن يقف حيث يشاء^(١) من ذلك الفعل، كالحياة
 والكافة وما شاكل هذه الصناعات، ومنها ما الاختيار^(٢) أكثر
 اجزائها، غير أنه الغاية منها شيء آخر، وما يشترك^(٣) فيه قوة
 ليست ناطقة، كالملاحة [Fol. 174] والفلانة، ومنها ما يوجب
 للأنسان بدوه^(٤)، فإذا فعل حاله أنه يفعل تولى^(٥) الفعل محرر
 أكثر إلى تمام الفعل كالإيلاد، فإنه إذا القى الأنسان المنزلي
 الرصم لم يمكنه عنه اختياره كونه الجنين ولا مده امره شيء،
 فاما الصنف الأول فيختص باسم الجنس، ولذا يقال له^(٦)
 صنایع ومهنة، واما الصنف الثاني الذي تحته الفلانة والملاحة

(١) يمكنه الأنسان أن يقف حيث شاء [في] [مت]

(٢) للاختيار [في] قرارة [أسي]

(٣) [تشاركه] [في] [مت] والمجمل في [مت] هكذا: [وهو ما شاركه...]
 وهذا أوضح

(٤) [بدوها] [في] الأصل.

(٥) [تولا] [في] [مت].

(٦) [لها] [في] الأصل والأصح [له].

(١) عَمَّا يُؤُونَا ، وما احتاج المتنبّي أن يقول ؛ در فرغت منه بأكالي
 الى الكذب (٢) ، والأفعال الطائفة عن (٣) بافتيّا - صرفاً . وكل
 نحو من القوى الأربع - او مجموعها - للساطقة (٤) فيه مدخل .
 وللأفتيّا فيه مدخل ، ولما كانت الأفعال الانائية هي
 الاختيارية كانه كل فعل من أفعال هذه القوى يكمه للناطق
 فيها مدخل . والنظام والترتيب في أفعال الأناس انما هو
 من اهل الساطقة ، وهما للناطق من اهل الطائفة ، التي
 هرت العادة انه يقال لها العافية (٥) .

(١) [لما صدقنا يؤونا بما] في قراءة [أس] .
 (٢) [طوى الجزيرة من جاني هذا] الشطر الأول من هذا البيت ...
 والمراد بالجزيرة جزيرة قور وهي ما بين دجلة والفرات . يقال انه
 المتنبّي قال هذا البيت عندما جاءه خبر وفاة اخت سيف الدولة . فقال
 ابو الطيب يربها ٣٥٢ هـ . ديوانه المتنبّي دار صادر - بيروت ١٩٥٨ ص ٤٣٣

(٣) [عنه] في قراءة [أس] .
 (٤) [للناطق] في قراءة [أس] و [الأربع الناطقة] في [مت] .
 (٥) وهي [العافية] في [مت] وفي [مت] زيادة ، فهي هكذا
 [العافية والعادة] وعلى هذا يختلف المعنى قليلاً

هي بعد هذا . ولذا قد يعدها قوم في الأفعال الاختيارية ، وقوم
 في الأفعال التي لها اختيار فيها ، وأما الثالثة فأفعالها أيضاً
تَبَعِيَّةٌ ^(١) برزده ، وهي لنا أيضاً باضطرار لئلا كانت انفعالات ، إلا
 أنه منها ما هو ادخل في باب الاختيار ، كالبحر ، ومنها ما
 هو أقرب إلى الاضطرار ، وهو الشمس ، إلا أنها كلها قد يمكننا ^(٢)
 - إذا شئنا - أن لا ننفل منها ، كاللربص الحمر ، والندثر من البرد ،
 طائرنا ، وأما القوة الثانية فلها أفعال وانفعالات ^(٣) ،
 فاما الأنفعالات الحاصلة عنها فمجرها كجرى الحس ، وأما الأفعال
 الكامنة عنها فهي اختيارية ، إذا كانت ^(٤) ثانية . وأما إذا كانت
 برهمية فهي باضطرار ، كما قلناه في الأقاويل التي قلناها في
 شرح السابعة من السماع ^(٥) . وأما القوة الأولى فانه المقصود به
 والنصور فيها باضطرار ، ولو كانا باختيار لنا صرفنا - - ←

(١) [تبعيه] في قرارة [أسي] وسبيرة في [مت]

(٢) [تمكننا] في قرارة [أسي] وهي [يمكننا] في [مت]

(٣) [انفعال] في الأصل

(٤) [أذا] في الأصل

(٥) يعني السماع الطبيعي

فلا ينب^(١) الى الحيوان اهدأ ، ولذله يسيرها قوم الطبيعية
ويسمونه الخامسة طبيعة وأما^(٢) افعال القوة السادسة فهي
بالإفطار هرفاً ، ولا شركة بيننا وبينه افعال الاختيار ، وأما
افعال القوة الخامسة فهي أيضاً لا باختيار اهدأ ، ولا بإفطار
هرفاً . وتنفل من الإفطارية بانه المحرك في الجسم ، وإنما تحتاج
الى التحرك . وهي المادة التي هي الغذاء . وبالمجمل فانه المتحرك
مثل افعال الجرح وما شاكله . وأما الرابعة فهي أيضاً مثل افعال
القوة الخامسة ، غير اننا اخترنا للاختيار ، وذلك أنه
الغذاء ضروري فهو قوام الجسد . وأما القاء المني في انثى مولده^(٣) ،
فليس بضروري ولا تقود اليه الشهوة ضرورية ، وذلك بينه
بنفسه ، فالاختيار اذا أدى اليه ، وهي القاء البذر في
انثى مولده^(٤) ، فهذا فعل اختياري وسنقول في الافعال كيف

- (١) [نـبـه] في الأصل وهي [نـبـه] في [متـ] الا اننا قد
تكونه [نـبـه] بخلاف قراءة [أـسـ] التي تقرأ [نـبـه] .
(٢) [فاماً] في قراءة [أـسـ] .
(٣) [تولد] في قراءة [أـسـ] .
(٤) [تولد] في قراءة [أـسـ] .

فَنَقُولُ : كل جسم كائِنْ ^(١) فاسد فله صورته مُرتَّباً في الوجود ، أولاً
 الروحانية العامة ، [Fol. ١٦١/٧] وهي الصورة العقلية وهي النوع . والثانية
 الصورة الروحانية الخاصة والثالثة الصورة الجسمية . فاما ^(٢)
 الروحانية الخاصة فلها ثلاثا مُرتَّباً : أولاً معناها الموجود في القوة
 الذاكرة ، والثانية الرسم الموجود في القوة الطهيّة ، والثالثة ^(٣)
 الصّنع الحاصل في الحس المشترك . فالصورة ^(٤) مَرْنًا خاصة ومَرْنًا عامة ،
 والعامة هي المقولات الكلية ، والخاصة مَرْنًا روحانية ومَرْنًا
 جسمية .

وكل شأن - علم ما تقدم - فله أجناس من القوى ؛ أولاً
 القوة الفكرية ، والثانية القوى الروحانية البدنية ، والثالثة
 القوة الحسية ، والرابعة القوة المولدة ، والخامسة القوة
 الفاذية وما يفتقر مَرْنًا ، والسادسة القوة الرُطبية .
 فاما ماله من السابعة والخامسة ،

(١) هكذا في [مت] .

(٢) [واما] في [مت] .

(٣) [الثالث] في الأصل .

(٤) [فالصورة] في الأصل .

فصل ٣

ولأننا نريد أن يكون ما نقوله مستهدفاً ، تقتصر^(١) على ما
يَلْتَمِ بِهْ ذلِكَ دونه أن نُرَدِّفَهُ بما يَحْرُكُ^(٢) النفس اليه ،
فلذلك رأينا أنه نستعمل في هذا الفصل مضافاً إلى الأفعال
البلاغية الصنف الذي يعرف بالأفعال الانفعالية ، التي^(٣)
إذا تصورنا الطائي التي فيها يَلْتَمِ التدبير لم تصور شائفة^(٤)
فقط ، بل تصورنا بخيال يخص النفس البرهيمية لتتصوره
كما ذللك ، فتدغم له وتتحرك عما يقتضيه القول وذلك
كما يصرف في جميع الصناعات كالكتابة ، فانه القول الذي يتم
عليها تتقوم به الكتابة في النفس ، واما انقاز افعال
الكتابة ، واعتماد انقاز افعالها فالحركة اليها استجار أفر
تخص النفس البرهيمية .

(١) [يقتصر] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٢) [تحرك] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٣) [لكن] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٤) [سازجه] في قراءة [أُس] . ولكننا اذا اتبعنا قراءة [أُس] فانه نفس لا

موجوداً^(١) للصور الجسمانية - كيف كان وجوده - ولنا محتاج
في ذلك إلى اشتراط انه يكون موائم احدهما بالآخر، حسب
ما اشتراطه في الذات في الصور العقلية، بل انما محتاج
الى ما ذكرناه فقط، وهو انه يكون موجوداً للصور
الجسمانية؛ لأنه هذه الصور الروحانية خاصة كما قلناه
قبل، ويكون بالعرض اذا لم يكن في الصور الجسمانية، كما
يعرض ذلك في الالهباخ، وما يعرض ذلك عند غلط
الحواس وسائر الأضاف التي عددناها قبل. وقد يكون
من غلط القوة الفكرية ويشترك في هذه الصور^(٢) الروحانية
الخاصة مع المفقولات، مثل أنه يقترنه وجوده في أنه فيظهر
أنه احدهما الآخر.

(١) [موجود] في الأصل .

(٢) [الصور] في الأصل . انه باقبة يستخدم عبارة (الصور)

ليفي الصور، وهذا شائع في كتاباته ولا سيما هذا الكتاب .

على انه يلاحظ في مواضع متعددة انه ابن باجة لا يبعاً كثيراً باتباعه

التقليد السائد في الاستعمال اللغوي ولا سيما في الضمائر فهو لا

يربط الضمير ربطاً صحيحاً بالفاعل او المفعول كما يلاحظ بسهولة .

سبيرة به ، وهذه واضافوا يعظم موقعها في السير^(١) المعبودة ، فمن يظن بالعارف بها
الحكمة ، ويظن انرا هي الحكمة ، ويرى الجمهور فيها ، وكثير من خواص اصنام هذه المدة
انرا الثقيل الذي يذكره^(٢) ارسطو في السادة^(٣) . فاذا سمعوا ما شرطه في الثقيل
من كونه المتقيل خافداً ، نبت ازهازهم عنه ذلك ، فكثير منهم يرى انه ذلك وعونه
ونقصاً في الادراك ، وضرب عنه البلاء ، ولذلك يفضل^(٤) قوم معاوية على علي
به ابي طالب^(٥) رضي الله عنه في الحزم ، فاذا تعقب ذلك كله ظهر انه الامر بخلاف
ما ظنوا وسببه ذلك فيما بعد هذا .

واما وجود المحمولات للصور الرومانية بالذات ، فانه شرايط ما بالذات
للصور الرومانية بالأطراف فهي المقولات ، وقد تلخص ذلك في كتاب
البرهان . واما في الصور الرومانية الخاصة ، فانما هو أنه يكون ذلك

(١) [الصور] في الأصل و[السير] في هامش الأصل .

(٢) [تذكره] مع تشديد اللام في قراءة [أسي] .

(٣) يعني المقالة السادة من كتاب الأطلال الى نيقوماخوس .

(٤) [تفضل] مع تشديد الضاد في قراءة [أسي] .

(٥) من الواضح انه ابنه باقره يربط قضية الصراع بين علي بن ابي طالب

وبينه معاوية بموضوع العدالة ، ولهذا فهو يأخذ جانب علي .

على انه هذا الموقف قد يلقي بعض الضوء على ما يسمى بشيخ الفيلسوف .

من ضنايع^(١) الطهنيين ، وأما فيما ليس يحس - سواء كانه منه شأنه
 أنه يحس ، غير أنه غايب ، أما لأنه قد فسد الجوهر ، [Fol. 171]
 ذو الصورة الرومانية ، وأنه كانه حاضراً فيكونه غائباً عنه المحس ،
 وهذا إنما هو أكثر ، فيما يتناول زمانه عدوه ، فله اسباب
 أخر ، إحصاؤها ليس بصير^(٢) ، غير أنه إحصاؤها فيما نحن
 بسبيله فضل ، إذ ليس نقصد لإحصاء أخصاف التدبير ، بل إنما
 نقصد التدبير الصادر ، لأنه أفضل التدبير ، ولأنه قد يمكنه
 أنه ينال المتوحد الصادق الذاتية به ، فأما الاستحسان الكذب
 فإنه إنما يدخل في إثالة الصادق أهل المدح ، ولكنه لا يكذب
 البحت^(٣) ، بل يكذب الألفاظ ، وهذا كله قد استقصى^(٤) في العلم
 المذني . ونحن إنما نقصد فيما نحن بسبيله تدبير المتوحد ،
 ومنه الصور الرومانية الكاذبة يحويه الرياء^(٥) والمكر ، وقوى آخر

(١) [منه ضنايع] - لاقطه في قرارة [أُس]

(٢) [بصير] في قرارة [أُس]

(٣) [البحث] في قرارة [أُس]

(٤) [يستقصى] في قرارة [أُس]

(٥) [الرياء] في قرارة [أُس]

صورة مصر الرومانية، ووضع النيل منزلاً في الحس المشترك، عند من
 لم يشاهده، كما هو وجوده فلا؛ لأنه الحس المشترك لم يجمع مع
 القويته. فانه اتفق اجتماعاً عند اناسه، صار عنده مدينة
 الفلظ^(١)، ووضع النيل منزلاً، كما هو في الوجود، وشاهد
 الصور الرومانية كما هي في وجودها، ولما صور الاشياء الرومانية
 الحاصلة عن الذكر - وهي التي تأخذها^(٢) القوى عنه، فكلها وكل
 محولاتها وظنونها، الا ما اتفق انه يقع بها اليقينية، بالوجه
 الذي ذكرناه، وهو بالعرض. ولما الصور الرومانية الكاذبة.
 فتقع^(٣) عن وجوه كثيرة منزلاً في الحواس الخاصة، انه يكون بالعرض،
 مثل انه يكون الانسان في دغاه الصنوبر زماناً طويلاً، فيسود
 وجهه، فيظن انه لونه اسود، وكذلك في الاصوات وسائر الحواس.
 فاقاً في الحواس المشتركة، فله ذلك أخاليط الحواس، مثل
 ما يرى المتحرك في البحار الجبال تجري ومنه هذه فتقسم^(٤) اصناف

(١) قد يكون هذا المثال زيادة من الناسخ الذي كانه يعي في مصر

(٢) [تأخذها] في الأصل .

(٣) [فينقع] في قراءة [أسم].

(٤) [فأتم] في قراءة [أسم].

الظلم^(١)؛ لأنه متى فعل ذلك أجمعت القوى، وأمكن ذلك، وذلك كله ظن، وفعل ما ظنوا أخر خارج عن الطبع. وهذه الفاية التي ظنوها، إذ^(٢) لو كانت صادقة وغاية للتوحد، فادراكها بالعرض لا بالذات؛ فلو أدركت لما كان منها مدينه، ولبقى أشرف أجزاء الثناء ففند لا عمل له، فكان وجوده باطلاً، وكانت تبطل^(٣) جميع التعاليم، والعلوم السدنة، التي هي الحكمة النظرية، وهذه فقط، بل والصناعات الظنوية، كالنحو وما جازمه، فبرهذه الوجوه يقع اليقين في محمولات الصور الروحانية بالذات. وقد يقع بالعرض في^(٤) الأخبار وتواترها^(٥)، إلا أنه ذلك إنما يكونه صه اجتماع ما للقوة الفكرية مع القوة الذاكرة، ولذلك إذا لم يتحد مصر الحس، لم تحضر صورة الشيء، كما هو في الوجود، مثال ذلك أنه في مصر النيل بهذا قد وقع اليقين، غير أنه

(١) [الظلم] في قراءة [أس]

(٢) [إذ] زائدة في الأصل

(٣) [وكانه] في الأصل

(٤) [من] في قراءة [أس]

(٥) [وتواترها] في قراءة [أس]

الروحانية مقام تلك، ولما كانت هذه تكذب عند افتراقها، وشعروا
 بصدقها عند اجتماعها رأيا، ظنوا اجتماعها هو^(١) السعادة
 القصوى، ولما كانت عند اجتماعها تحضر لها اهتمامت له صور
 غريبة، ومحسنة بالقوة هائلة المنظر، وانفس^(٢) أهن
 كرامة^(٣) في الوجود، ظنوا أنه الفاية أدراك هذه. ولذلك
 يقول الفزائي أنه أدراك مدركات روحانية، وشهد الجوهر
 الروحانية، وعرف^(٤) تعظم^(٥) ما شاهد يقول الشاعر وكان ما
 كان مما لست أذكره^(٥)، ولذلك^(٦) تزعم^(٦) الصوفية أنه أدراك
 السعادة القصوى، قد يكون بلا تعلم، بل بالتفرخ وبأنه
 لا يخلو طرفة عينه^(٧) ذكر — — — — — ←

(١) [هي] في الأصل .

(٢) [انفساً] في الأصل .

(٣) [كرامة] بضم الكاف في قراءة [أس] .

(٤) [عرفت تعظم] بتشديد الراء والظاء في قراءة [أس] .

(٥) ابنة باقية يذكر هذا البيت من الشعر ويتخذ نفس الموقف في رسالة الوداع ص ٢١

(٦) [تزعم] في قراءة [أس] .

(٧) [منه] في الأصل .

انه تجعل صوفه ، او مرآه عند فيه^(١) ، فيظهر غيرا - شبح النفس ، فانه
 النفس قد يكونه من الخفاء بحيث لا تدركه الحواس . فالحس يقع
 اليقينه في الصور الخائيه وقد يوقعه القياس ، مثال ذلك هذا
 حائط صيني^(٢) ، فله بان ، غير انه القياس انما يقع صورته الشيء
 الروحانية الفكرية ، فلذلك تقع في الحس المشترك على خلاف ما
 كانت عليه ، أوهي عليه من التكييفات التي يدركها الحس مرزا .
 ولذلك يختلف الحس المشترك ، فيمده شاهد ذلك البنيانه ، في
 امضار ضم ذلك الباقي . وسبب اختلافه هو انه لا يجمع في القوى
 السود التي تحضر الصور الروحانية ، كما كانت في وجودها
 الجسماني ؛ فلذلك اذا اجمعت القوى [Fol. 140v] السود ،
 حضرت الصورة الروحانية ، كأنها محسوسة ، لأنها عند اجتماعها
 يكونه الصدف ضرورية ، ويشاهد العجب من فعلها ، وهكذا
 هو الذي ظنه الصوفيون غاية قصوى للأذهان . ولذلك^(٣)
 يقولون في دعائهم ، بحمدك الله وعينه الجمع ؛ لأنهم - بقصورهم
 عن الصور الروحانية المحضة - قامت عندهم هذه الصورة

(١) [فاه] في الأصل .

(٢) [وكذلك] في الأصل .

يعلمه ، فيظنه انه نوى . فاما اليقينية في محولات الصور الخاصة ،
 فهي المحولات التي توجد^(١) استقامتها في الصور الجسمانية ، فلذلك تدرك
 بالحس ، فهذه ضرورة يجب ان تمر بالحس المشترك . فمنه هذه ما
 يكتفى ، في اليقينة به ، بخاصة واحدة وهو ما كان محسوساً خاصاً ،
 كاللونه للبصر ، والصوت للسمع وسائر ما قيل في الحس والحسوس ،
 من الأحوال التي هي ضرورية في ذلك . ومنها المحسوسات المشتركة ،
 فلا يكتفى في اليقينة بها بخاصة واحدة ، هي تتفاوت على الحواس ؛
 وربما اهدى الى القوة الفكرية في ذلك ، مثال ذلك هذا المري^(٢)
 هي ؟ فانه لا يكتفى فيه بالنظر ، دون اللمس ، فانه قد يكون
 مفهوماً عليه ، ودون القوة الفكرية في ان هذا المري^(٣) هي .
 قد يكون به انطباق الصروف فلا يتنفس ، ويعدم جميع الأفعال
 الحيوانية ، وانما بقى من أفعال الحي ما يدركه اللمس ، خذ انه
 لا يفيد اليقينة فيه ، فتستعمل القوة الفكرية بأشياء أكثر
 حس فيه . مثال ذلك انه يفيد ، فيخرج منه دم حار ، ومثل

(١) [توجد] في الأصل .

(٢) [المري] بضم اليم في قراءة [أ.س.] .

(٣) [المري] في قراءة [أ.س.] .

أُسْرِعْ اخْتِزَاعًا ، وَقَدْ لَحِصَ ذَلِكَ أَرِسْطُو فِي كِتَابِهِ فِي الرِّيْطُورِيْقَا ، ^(١) وَأَمَّا
الصُّوْرُ ^(٢) الرُّوْحَانِيَّةُ الْكَازِبَةُ فَمَا لَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُ وَجُودٌ أَمَّا أَنْ لَا يَكُونَهُ
 مَوْضُوعُهُ مَوْجُودًا كَمَا ذَلِكَ فِي الْأَرْضَانِ ، أَوْ يَكُونَهُ مَوْضُوعُهُ مَوْجُودًا
 غَيْرَ أَنَّهُ لَيْسَ فِيهِ ذَلِكَ الْمَحْمُولُ . وَالْمَحْمُولُ فِي الْكَازِبَةِ أَمَّا أَنْ لَا يَكُونَهُ
 مَثَالُ ذَلِكَ مَا كَانَتْ الْعَرَبُ تَحْكِيهِ عَنْ زُرْقَاءِ الْيَمَامَةِ ^(٣) وَتَأْبِطُ شَرًّا ^(٤)
 وَمَا تَحْكِيهِ ^(٥) النَّضَارِيُّ عَنْ قَوْمٍ يَبْنُونَ الرِّهَابَ كُلَّ بِكْمَا لَهُمْ ، مِمَّنْ أُنْزِمَ
 قَتْلُوا ، ثُمَّ أَهْبُوا ، ثُمَّ أَهْرَقُوا ، ثُمَّ أَهْبُوا ^(٦) ، وَهَذَا يَرُودُ أَنَّهُ أَمْرٌ إِيَّاهِ .
 وَأَمَّا مَا حَكَّتْهُ الْعَرَبُ ، فَإِنَّهُ فِي الظَّنِّ ، وَأَمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَهُ مُمْكِنًا فِي
 الْحَقِيقَةِ ، مَثَالُ ذَلِكَ : أَنْ يَكُونَهُ زَيْدٌ - وَهُوَ غَيْرُ نَحْوِي - نَحْوِيًّا ،
وَأَمَّا أَنْ لَا يَكُونَهُ ؟ فَإِنَّهُ النَّحْوُ يَكُونُهُ مُمْكِنًا فِي أَنْسَانِهِ مَا ، غَيْرَ أَنَّهُ لَا

^(١) وَمَعْنَاهُ الْخَطَابَةُ ، قِيلَ أَنْهُ اسْمُهُ نَقَلَهُ إِلَى الْعَرَبِيِّ وَفَسَّرَهُ الْفَارَابِيُّ ،
 (كَتَافُ الظَّنُونَةِ عَنْ أَسَاسِ الْكُتُبِ وَالْفُنُونِ) لِلْكَاتِبِ الْجَلِيِّ - الْجُلد الأول .

^(٢) [الصُّوْرَةُ] فِي الْأَصْلِ .

^(٣) [زُرْقَاءُ الْيَمَامَةِ] مِنْ أَسَاطِيرِ الْعَرَبِ .

^(٤) [تَأْبِطُ شَرًّا] هُوَ ثَابِتٌ بِهِ جَابِرٌ بِهِ سَفِيَانَةٌ بِهِ كَعْبٌ بِهِ هَرَبٌ بِهِ نَعْمٌ بِهِ سَعْدٌ بِهِ فَرَحٌ
 انْظُرْ فِهْرَةَ أَسَابِ الْعَرَبِ لِلضَّيْنِ طَبْعَةُ أَصَاغَرَةَ [١٩٤٨]

^(٥) [يَحْكُو بِهِ] فِي الْأَصْلِ .

^(٦) [أَهْبُوا] فِي الْأَصْلِ .

^(٧) [وَأَنَّهُ] فِي قِرَاءَةِ [أُسْرَا] .

فقد^(١) يكون ذلك عند طرف نقيض أصداً ، وذلك الظن الصادق (إنما
 نشأ لديه التصديق فقط ، والحديث نشأ إليه التصور والتصديق معاً
 وقد لحق هذا كله أرسطو في الثانية مع الحس والمحسوس ، وأما
 هذه فهي زاوية على الأمر الطبيعي لكثير ما هب إلهيه ولا هذه
 يحدث عن صناعة للنزاع في الأقل مع الناس ، بل الأمر الطبيعي هو
 المتوسط ، وهو وجود الظن مختلطاً ، وأفضل هذه اليهودية أنه
 تكون أكثر ظنونه صادقة ، وأنه لا تختلط إلا بما شأنه [Fol. 170]
 ذلك ، وأخيراً الحالات أنه يظهر في أكثرها الكاذب ، وذلك أنه يظهر
 أبداً ما هو على الأقل ، وهذا يعرف بالبصير الظن ، والآخر ظن ما
 هو على الأكثر في ذلك الموضوع ، بحسب الأحوال التي تكون حاضرة ،
 إما في الموضوع ، وإما فيما يتعلق به ، ولا ينقطع بها ، أما الموهوم
 أو أكثرها ، ويرجع بحسب ذلك ما هو على التساوي أو على الأقل ،
 أما ضرورياً وإما على الأكثر ، وهذا لا أسم له . وأما ما يوجد
 هذا له كدته تجريبه ، وذلك بالامعان^(٢) في النسب ، وهو لا ي
 يرفضه بالمحتكيات ولذلك قليلاً ما يندحونه ؟ لأنه السباب

(١) [ولا] في قراءة [أس]

(٢) [بالامعان] في الأصل

وجودها أثر مدخل^(١) في هذا القول . وايضاً فانها موجودة في الفرد
 من الناس في النار من الزمان ، فلا يتقدم^(٢) من هذا الصنف من الموجودات
 صناعة أهدأ ، ولا نحو تدبير انساني ، فذلك لا مدخل له في هذا
 القول ، ويثبته انه تكونه امثال هذه الالزامات الالهية . ومنه كانت له هذه
 القوة سمي محدثاً ، ومنهم حمزة بن الخطاب - في المعنى - على ما رواه الحديث
 ومنه هو لاي أصحاب الظنوه الصادقة . والفرد بينهما ولاي وبين
 الحديث انه هو لاي يتقدم عندهم بالوضع أحد جزئي التناقض ، على
 شريطة كل مطلوب على ما يتقدم عند الناس كلهم ، في سببه^(٣)
 الى ذلك انما الطرف الكاذب ، في ظنه^(٤) بدأ على غير قياس ،
 وذلك في أغلب احواله ، والمحدث ينشأ اليه الأمر الصادق ، وونه
 انه يتقدم ونقيضه معاً ، وونه تذكر^(٥) يذكره بذلك ، فلهذا
 يتوجه الى علم ذلك بفكر ولا قياس ، - - - ←

(١) [مدخل] في الأصل .

(٢) [ولد] في قراءة [أ س] .

(٣) [فنشئ] بضم الهمزة وتشديد السين في قراءة [أ س] وهي قراءة مقبولة ايضاً

(٤) [ويظنه] في قراءة [أ س]

(٥) [تذكر] في قراءة [أ س] .

كما نتجّل ببلاد ياجوج وماجوج ، ونحن لم نحسها ؛ فهذه الرسوم
 الرومانية لم تمر بالحس المشترك ، فلذلك أكد هذه كاذبة .
 وقد تلخص كيف تكونه صراحة في الثانية منه كتاب الحس والمحس ،
 فلذلك اشترط في هذه انه تكون مرت بالحس المشترك ؛ فاما ما
 كان من صرخ صراحة ، ولم يمر بالحس المشترك ، فقد مر بالحس
 المشترك ما يقوم مقامه وهو اسمه ، أو ما يدل عليه ، ومر
 بالظهور^(١) واشترط في الذكر ، وهذه قد تكون صراحة ، كأمري
 القيس ، وقد تكون كاذبة ، كليلة ودمنة ، وهذا انما يعبر
 في الأخبار الموضوعة . وقد يكون صنف آخر لم يمر بالحس
 المشترك شخصه ، ولا اسمه ، ولا ما يدل عليه ، وقد يكون
 منه قبل العقل الفاعل ، ويتوسط القوة الناطقة ، لاسيما
 في الأمور المستقبلية التي هي بالقوة ، وذلك في الرؤيا الصراحة
 وفي الكرامات التي تذكر ، وقد تلخص امر هذه في آخر الثانية
 منه كتاب الحس . وهذه لا^(٢) تكون باختيار انشاء ولاله^(٣) في

(١) [بالصور] في الأصل .

(٢) [فلا] في الأصل .

(٣) [والآله] في قراءة [أس] .

فصل :

الأمر الموهوبه لشيء ما في الاعتقاد اما صادقة واما
 كاذبة ، واما بالذات واما بالعرض ، واما يقينية واما ظنونة ،
 وظاهر عند من كان له بصيرة بصناعة المظهر انه اليقينية إنما
 تكون صادقة ضرورية ، واما الظنونة فقد تكون كاذبة وتكون
 صادقة . ونحن فيما نحن بسبيله نجعل ما بالعرض [١٦٩٧/٢٥٨] في
 الظنونة الصادقة والصور الرومانية - كيف كانت - فقد يكذب
 بها الإنسان او يصدر ، فانه الحس قد يكذب . مثال ذلك هي
 المحرورية^(١) ، فالأشياء^(٢) التي يناط بعجزها عن كاذب ، وكذلك
 نظم أضافه من العرض كاذب ، فالإنسان ، بالصور الرومانية
 المختلفة ، صادقاً وكاذباً . وفضل الصور ما كان منها صادقاً أو^(٣)
 بالحس المشترك ، لأننا قد نتخيل الأمور الثابتة البعيدة^(٤)
 عندها ، مثل تخيل أمرئ القيس ، ونتخيل أيضاً ما لا نشهده

(١) المحرور هو الذي غلبت عليه المرأة (بكر المص) وهي إحدى الطبائع الأربع -
 أنظر لآله العرب ، الجزء الخامس -

(٢) بالأشياء [في قراءة] أوس .

(٣) [أوس] في قراءة [أوس] .

(٤) [المصدق] في قراءة [أوس] .

الخاصة التي بينها وبينه الشخص؟ فإنه كلما وجدت النسبة
الخاصة ففقط جسمية ومن أجلها وجدت النسبة الخاصة،
فإذا ارتفعت الجسمية، وصارت روحانية محضة لم يبق
لها إلا نسبتها العامة، وهي نسبتها إلى الشخاص.

وكذلك أيضاً إذا ارتفعت الجسمية أصلاً من تلك الصور،
ولم^(١) يبق لها نسبة البراءة البوجه أكثر. وبنته أنه الحمد
إنما هو بناءه النسبيته، وأما العامة^(٢) فهي حمد الكل
على شخص من الشخاص، فيكون من القضية الشخصية
التي محورها كل. وأما النسبة الخاصة فيكون من القضية
الشخصية التي محورها شخص واحد. وأما سائر القضايا،
وأي النسبة بينها، فالقول فيها غير هذا الموضع،
وقد تلخص ذلك فيما كتبناه في العقولانية. وأما كيف
نقول أنه الجسمانية في هذه الروحانية على ما ذكرناه،
فقد تلخص في الثانية من كتاب الحس والمحسوس.

(١) هكذا في الأصل والدرج منه الواو زائدة.

(٢) يقصد [العامة].

أدركه مدرِك^(١) كالـتخيل، ونسبته العامة نسبة الى واحد واحد منه
شاهده؟ فإنه قد شاهده اعداد من الناس، وقد تلخص امر هذه
الصورة الرومانسية الخاصة وأصنافها في الحس والمحس، واستحقاق
القول فيها من جهة ما هي امور طبيعية، وأما هاتان النسبتان
فذكرت هناك دونه انه تلخص اصنافها، والسبب الثاني يستمد
اصناف هذه النسب حسب ما يجيء بعد هذا، وقد تبين هناك
انه الموجود في الحس المشترك هي أقطاب منازل الرومانسية ثم
الموجود في قوة التخيل، ثم الموجود في قوة الذكر، واعلاها
رببة والمكرها هو وجودها في القوة الناطقة، وانه هذه الثلاثة
كلها جسمانية. والجسمانية في الحس المشترك أكثر من الجسمانية^(٢)
الموجودة في التخيل، والجسمانية الموجودة في التخيل أكثر من
الجسمانية في الصور القوة الذاكرة، ولا جسمانية أصلاً
في صور^(٣) القوة الناطقة، ولذلك ترتفع^(٤) جملة النسبة

(١) [مدرِك] بفتح الراء في قراءة [أسي] وكلاهما مقبول .

(٢) هكذا في الأصل .

(٣) [صورة] في الأصل .

(٤) [يرتفع] في قراءة [أسي] .

وهو المفعولية ؛ واسم^(١) في هذا القول هذه المفعولية بالروحانية العامة ، واسم^(٢) ما دونها الى الصور الموجودة في الحس المشترك الروحانية الخاصة . وسنبين بعد هذا لم نخشى^(٣) هذا بالخاصة وذلك [Fol. 169] بالعامية . والصور^(٤) الروحانية العامة انما لها نية واحدة خاصة ، وهي نسبتها الى الانسان الذي يفتقرها ؛ ولما الصور الروحانية الخاصة فلها نسبتان : اهداهما خاصة وهي نسبتها الى الحس والافرى عامة وهي نسبتها الى الحاس المدرك لها . مثال ذلك صورة جبل أهد عند من أمته ، اذا كان غير شاهد له ؛ فتلك صورة الروحانية الخاصة لأنه نسبتها الى الجبل خاصة ، لأننا نقول ان الجبل ، ولا فرق عندنا في قولنا : « هذا جبل أهد » . ونحن نسير اليه في مكانة ، وهو موجود مدرك بالبصر ، أو نسير اليه وهو موجود في الحس المشترك ، بعد انه — — — — — ←

(١) هكذا في الأصل و[نسي] في قراءة [أسي]

(٢) [نسي] في قراءة [أسي] و[أسي] في الأصل .

(٣) [أخص] في الأصل .

(٤) [الصورة] في الأصل .

النفس، وهي الجوهرية في الحس المشترك وفي قوة التخيل وفي
 قوة الذكر. والصنف الأول ليس هيولانياً بوجه، وأما الصنف
 الثالث فله نسبة إلى الهيولي ويقال لها هيولانية^(١) لأنها
 اطفقولات الهيولانية (و) لأنها ليست روحانية بذاتها، إذ
 وجودها في الهيولي. وأما^(٢) الصنف الثاني فهو بهذا الوجه
 غير هيولاني أصلاً، إذ لم يكن^(٣) في وقت صدقها فمروية
 هيولانياً^(٤). وأما نسبة إلى الهيولي لأنه متمم للمفكولات^(٥)
 الهيولانية، وهو استفاد، أو فاعل لها وهو العقل الفعّال
 وأما الصنف الرابع فهو وسط بين اطفكولات الهيولانية والصور
 الروحانية، وأما الصنف الأول، فمتمم نفس عنه في هذا القول،
 إذ لا مدخل له فيما نريد أنه نقوله؛ وأما نستعمل في هذا
 القول الروحاني المطلق فهو العقل الفاعل، وما ينبغي إليه

(١) [هيولانيا] في الأصل.

(٢) [فأما] في قراءة [أُس].

(٣) [تكنه] في قراءة [أُس].

(٤) [هيولانية] في الأصل.

(٥) [الطفكولات] في قراءة [أُس].

منه حيث هي نفس ، بل منه حيث هي نفس متحركة ، فالفن (١) والروح
 اثباته بالقول واحد بالوضوح . والروحاني منسوب الى الروح
 اذا دلّ على المصن الثاني ، ويدلونه به على الجواهر الثلاثة
 المتحركة لخواصها ، وهذه ضرورة ليست أمراً بل هي صورة
 للأجسام ، اذ كل جسم فهو متحرك ، وشكل هذه اللفظة غير
 عربي وهي دخيلة في لغة العرب (٢) الصنف الذي جاء على
 غير قياس عند نحوّي العرب ، فانه المقتضية عندهم أنه يقال
 روي ، وإنما يتقاربا كذا المقتضونه في الفاظ قليلة ،
 مثل الجسمانية والنفائنة ، وأما الهيولانية فاللفظة
 دخيلة في لسانهم ، وكلما كان الجوهر أبعد عن الجسمانية
 كان أهله يربوا الاسم ، ولذلك يروى انه أهله الجواهر
 بها العقل الفعّال ، والجواهر المتحركة للأجسام المستديرة .
 والصورة الروحانية أصناف : اولها صورة الأجسام المستديرة ،
 والصنف الثاني العقل الفعّال والعقل المستقار ، والثالث
 المقتولات الهيولانية ، والرابع المقتاتي الموهودة في قوى

(١) [والنفس] في [أُس]

(٢) [في] في الأصل .

الباب الثالث

القول في الصور الروحانية :

والروح يقال في لسان العرب على ما يقال^(١) عليه
النفس ، ويتعلم المتعلمون بأشكال ، فتارة يريدونه
به الحار الفيزي الذي هو الآلة النفسانية الأولى ؛
فلذلك نجد الأطباء يقولون أنه الأرواح ثلاثة ؛ روح طبيعي
وروح حاس وروح محرك .
ويصفونه بالطبيعي الفدائي ، وإذ يوصونه الطبيعي في
صناعته على النفس الفاذية ، وتسمى^(٢) على النفس ، لا

(١) [يقال] في الأصل .

(٢) [يسمى] في قراءة [أس] .

الغضب، أُنْشِبه في هذا الوقت السبع^(١) في الأضداد، ولذلك^(٢) منه كانت نفسه
البرهية تغلب نفسه الناطقة، حتى يكون ينشئ عنه شهوته المخالفة لرأيه
دائماً، فهو أناسه سقوا البرهية هُذْ منه، وما أهن عاقل فيه انه برهية
لكن له فكرة اناسه يجبرها ذلك الفعل، فذلك تكون فكرته عند ذلك شرأ
زائداً في شره كاللفذ^(٣) المحمور في البدره المستقيم، كما يقوله ابقراط: «البدره الردي
كلما غذوته زدت شرأ». وقد لخصنا هذا فيما كتبناه في شرح السابعة من
السماع وتفسيره هناك. وقد تبين ما الفضل الأناني وما الفضل البرهيمي وما
الفضل الجواردي^(٤)، وهذه جميع الأفعال التي توجد للأناس وكل واحد من هذه جنس
لما تحته؛ فالفضل الجواردي طاهرانه افطر لا اختيار فيه كما قلنا^(٥) فليس لشيء اهدلاً
ولذلك ليس لنا انه لا نفع له لأنه الحركة فيه ليست من تلقائنا، والفضل البرهيمي
هو أيضاً لا منه أهدل شيء إلا انه من تلقائنا، ولذلك لمينا انه نقف من شئنا
فطاهر انه إذاً انما يجب انه تحد^(٦) الفايات في الأفعال الانسانية فقط [٢٠/٦٨٧]

(١) [السبع] في قراءة [أس].

(٢) [ولذلك] في قراءة [أس].

(٣) [اللفذ] في الأصل بدونه ههه.

(٤) [الجواردي] في الأصل إلا انرا صحته في الرأسي.

(٥) [قلنا] في الأصل إلا انه الرأى حذفته بإشارة زائدة.

(٦) أو [تحد].

انه يكون هذا الانسان فاضلاً بالفضائل الشكيلة ، حتى يكون متى
 قضت النفس الناطقة بشئ لم تخالف^(١) النفس البرهمية ، بل قضت
 بذلك الضرر منه جبراً انه الرأي قضى به ، وكونه النفس البرهمية
 برزده الحال هو ينزل الفضائل^(٢) الشكيلة ، فانه الفضائل الشكيلة
 انما هي تمام^(٣) النفس البرهمية ، فلذلك^(٤) كان الانسان الذي
 ضرورة فاضلاً بالفضائل الشكيلة ، فانه انه لم يكن فاضلاً برزده
 الفضائل وخالفته النفس البرهمية غيب العقل^(٥) ، كان ذلك الفصل
 اما ناقصاً او مخروفاً^(٦) او لم يكن أصلاً ، وكان عند فعله ذلك
 الفصل مكرها وكان عيراً عليه ، لانه النفس البرهمية سافرة
 وطبيعة للنفس الناطقة بالطبع ، الذي الانسان الذي هو على
 غير المجري الطبيعي من البقي الأهلوه فلذلك من افرط عليه

(١) [لم تعاند فيه] في [مت] .

(٢) هكذا في الأصل و [فضيله] في هامش الأصل .

(٣) [بما ص] في قراءة [أُس] و [تمام] في [مت] .

(٤) [ولذلك] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٥) [الفصل] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٦) [مخروفاً] في قراءة [أُس] .

البرهية خلوا من الانساني، لانه لا بد للانسان - اذا كانه على الحال الطبيعية في اكثر الامور الا في النادر - وانه كانه سبب حركته الانفصال، انه يفكر كيف يفعل ذلك، ولذلك يستخدم البرهية فيه الجزء الانساني ليجد ^(١) فعله، واما ^(٢) الانساني فقد يوجد خلواً من البرهية؛ والقطب داخل في هذا الصنف، ولكنه في ^(٣) هذه قد يصحح ^(٤) انفعال في النفس البرهية، فانه ^(٥) كانه معاوناً للرأي كانه الزهوى اليه اكثر واقوى، وانه كانه مخالفاً ^(٦) كانه الزهوى اضعف واقل . واما ^(٧) من يفعل الفضل لأجل الرأي والصواب، ولا يلتفت الى النفس البرهية ولا يحدث فيها، فذلك الانسان اقله به انه يكونه فعله ذلك الاهياً من انه يكونه انانياً، ولذلك يجب

(١) [ليجد] في قراءة [أس] .

(٢) [خاما] في قراءة [أس] .

(٣) هكذا في الأصل .

(٤) [فصيحياً] في قراءة [أس] .

(٥) [وانه] في قراءة [أس] .

(٦) [معانداً] في [ص] .

(٧) [خاما] في قراءة [أس] .

للسامع انه كانه شيئاً^(١) . فالفعل البرهيمي هو الذي يتقدمه في النفس
 الانفعال النفاثي فقط ، مثل التشرّي^(٢) او القضب أو الخوف
 وما شاكله ؛ والانثاني^(٣) هو ما يتقدمه امر يوجب به عند فاعله
 الفكر ، سواء^(٤) تقدم الفكر انفعال نفاثي أو احقبت الفكر ذلك
 [Fol. 168] بل اذا كان المحرك للانسان ما اوجبه الفكر منه جهة
 ما اوجبه الفكر او ما جانه ذلك ، سواء^(٥) كانت الفكرة
 يقينية او ظنونة . فالبرهيمي المحرك فيه ما يحدث في النفس
 البرهيمية من الانفعال ، والانثاني هو^(٦) المحرك فيه ما يوجد في
 النفس من رأي او اعتقاد . وعظم افعال الانسان في السير
 الدربع والمركب من هذا هو أيضاً من برهيمي وانثاني ، وقل ما يوجد^(٧)

(١) [سبباً] في الأصل .

(٢) [التشرّي] في [متة] .

(٣) [النفاثي] في [متة] .

(٤) [سوا] بدو به همزة في الأصل .

(٥) [سوا] بدو به همزة في الأصل .

(٦) هكذا في الاصل وهي زائدة .

(٧) [وقل ما يوجد للانسان] في [متة] .

(١) مفترع ، فانه هذا الفعل هو للأسانه منه جهة النفس البرهيمية ، وصل منه
 يكره مجزأً ضربه وعوداً خذته لأنه خذته فقط ، وهذه كلها افعال
 برهيمية ، فاما منه يكره لئلا يخذني غيره اوعه روية (٢) توجب كسره فذل
فعل اناني ، فكل فعل يفعله لا لينال به غرضاً (٤) غير فعل ذلك
 الفعل ، اومه جهة انه لا ينال به غرضاً ، فانه كان له غرض ينال
 به لم يلاحظ فذل الفعل برهيمي وفعله عنه النفس البرهيمية فقط .

مثال ذلك انه اكله انه اكل القراميا لتسرية اياه ، فاتفق
 له عن ذلك انه لانه بطنه وقد كان محتاجاً اليه ، فانه ذلك فعل
 برهيمي (٥) وهو فعل اناني بالعرض ، وانه اكله المقبّل (٦) الطبع لا
 لتسرية اياه بل لتليده بطنه ، واتفق مع ذلك انه كان شريفاً عنده
 فانه ذلك فعل اناني (٧) وهو برهيمي بالعرض ، وذلك انه عرض

(١) [مفترع] مع تشديد الزاي في قراءة [أسي] .

(٢) [روية] هكذا في [مت] و[روية] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٣) [وجب] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٤) [غرضاً] في الأصل وهي صحيحة إلا أنه [غرضاً] أسكن وأوقع وتنفع لفظاً مع ما يليها

(٥) [برهيمي بالذات] في [مت] .

(٦) [المقبّل] في قراءة [أسي] بخلاف الأصل .

(٧) [اناني بالذات] في [مت] .

منها موقع^(١) ، وقد خلصت هذه كلها في سبق ما قبلها . وكل ما يوجد للناس
 بالطبع ويختص به من الأفعال فهو باختيار ، وكل فعل يوجد
 للناس باختياره فلا يوجد لغيره من أنواع الأفعال ، والأفعال
 الأنانية الخاصة به هي ما تكونه^(٢) باختيار ، فكل فعل اناني
 فهو فعل باختيار . وأغني بالاختيار الإرادة الكلية عنه روية^(٣) .
 وأما الأوامر والألقاء^(٤) في الروح وبالحكمة الانفصالية^(٥) العقلية
 أنه جاز أن يكون في العقل انفصال يشارك^(٦) الإنسان - فانه الإنسان
 يختص بها . وإنما اجمع الى اشتراط الاختيار في الأفعال التي من
 جهة النفس البرهمية ، فانه الحيوان غير الناطق إنما يتقدم فعله ما
 يحدث في النفس البرهمية من أفعال^(٧) ، والإنسان قد يفضل ذلك
 من هذه الجهة ، كما يهرب الإنسان منه - - - ←

(١) [فرا] في قرارة [أسى] .

(٢) أو [ما يكونه] .

(٣) [روية] في قرارة [أسى] .

(٤) [والألقا] بدونه هجرة في الأصل .

(٥) [فالانفصالية] في الأصل .

(٦) [تشارك] في قرارة [أسى] .

(٧) [أفعال] في [مته] .

جميع هذه الأصناف بالقوة الفكرية وما لا يكون الا بـ (١) ، فلذلك

يوجد له التذكر ولا يوجد لغيره ؟ وقد استقصى ما يباينه (٢) به

الإنسان الحيوان غير الناطق .

فالإنسان (٣) لأنه من الأسطوانات تلحقه (٤) الأطفال الضرورية

التي لا اختيار له فيها ، كاللهوي من فوه والأهزاف بالنار وما

جانسه ؛ ومنه (٥) مشاركته للحي من وجهه فقط - وهو النبات -

يلحقه أيضاً الأطفال التي لا اختيار له (٦) فيها اهدأ كالأهتباس .

وقد يقع في هذه ضرب من الضرورة ، مثل ما يفضل الإنسان

عنه الخوف الشديد ، مثل شتم الصديقه وقتل الأخ والأب

على امر مملوك (٧) ، وهذه فلأختيار - - - ←

(١) [وتمتاز عنه جميع هذه القوة الفكرية] في [متة] .

(٢) [تباينه] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٣) [والإنسان] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٤) [فتلحقه] في الأصل .

(٥) [ومنه] في الأصل .

(٦) [لها] في الأصل و[له] في الرامش .

(٧) هكذا في الأصل و[مملوك] في الرامش .

الباب الثاني

فصل :

كل حيّ فانه يشارك الجمادات في امور ، وكل حيوانه فانه يشارك
الحيّ فقط في امور ، وكل اناسه فانه يشارك الحيوانه غير الناطقه في امور .
فالحي والجماد يشتركان فيما يوجد للاسطقس الذي ركبا منه ^(١) وذلك مثل
الرسوب الى اسفل طوعاً والصعود الى فوقه قداً ^(٢) وحاجباني ذلك .
وكذلك يشارك الحيوان [١٦٧. ٧٠] الحي في هذه ، اذ هما من اسطقس واحد ،
ويشاركه ايضاً بالنفس الفاذية والمولدة والنامية في افعالها ،
وكذلك يشارك الانسان الحيوان غير الناطقه في كل هذه
ويشاركه ايضاً في الحس والتخيل والذكر ، والأفعال التي
توجد له عند هذه وهي للنفس البرهية .. ويمتاز عنه

(١) [الاسطقس كنامنه] في [مت] .

(٢) [قداً] في [مت] و [قرهناً] في الأصل .

أو كيف يزيل عنه نفسه الأعراض التي تمنعه من العادة، أو عنه نيل ما يمكنه من
 أما يجب غاية رويته^(١) أو يجب ما استقر في نفسه، وأما حفظها، وذلك
 شبيه بحفظ الصحة، فلا يمكنه في السير الثالث^(٢) وتركب منها، فانه الذي
 يراه جالينوس أو غيره في ذلك شبيه بالكيمياء وصناعة النجوم. فهذا الذي
 يصفه طب النفوس، وذلك طب الأجسام، والحكومة طب المعاشرات. فبيته أنه
 هذين الصنفين يقطعه جملة في المدينة الأمية، فذلك لم يعد^(٣) في العلوم.
 وكذلك يقط هذا الذي نقوله من كانت المدينة كائنه، وتقط^(٤) صنفة هذا القول
 كما يقط علم الطب وصناعة القضاء وغير ذلك من الصناعات التي استنبطت بحسب
 التدبير الناقص، وكما انه ما في ذلك من الاراء الصادقة يرجع^(٥) الى ما في الطب منها
 الى الصناعات الطبيعية، وما في صناعة القضاء فيرجع الى الصناعة المدنية،
 كذلك ما في^(٦) هذا يرجع ما فيه الى الصناعة الطبيعية والصناعة المدنية.

(١) [رويته] في قراءة [أسي].

(٢) هكذا في الأصل والأصح [الأربع].

(٣) [يعد] في قراءة [أسي] و[يعدا] في الأصل.

(٤) [يقط] في قراءة [أسي].

(٥) كذلك في الأصل والأصح ارجح انما زائدة.

(٦) كذلك في الأصل والأصح ارجح انما زائدة.

سعادة المفرد ، وصواب التدبير انما يكون تدبير المفرد ، وسواء
 كان المفرد واحداً أو أكثر منه واحد ، عالم يجمع على أنفسهم امة
 أو مدينة ، وهو ^(١) هاولاي هم الذين يفتونهم الصوفية بقولهم الفراء ،
 لأنهم واحد كانوا في اوطانهم وبين اترابهم وجيرانهم ، غرباء
 في آرائهم قد سافروا بافكارهم الى مراتب آخر هي لهم كالأوطان ،
 الى سائر ما يقولونه .

ونحن في هذا القول نفقد تدبير هذا الإنسان المتوحد ،
 وبينه انه قد لحقه امر خارج عنه الطبع ، فنقول كيف يتدبر من
 ينال افضل وجودة ، كما يقوله الطبيب في الإنسان المفرد ^(٢)
 في هذه المدة كيف يتوجه ^(٣) هني يكون صحيحاً ، اما بانه يحفظ صحته
 كما كتب هاليبوس في كتاب حفظ الصحة ، واما بانه يسترجعها
 اذا زالت كما وصفته ^(٤) في صناعة الطب . كذلك هذا القول
 هو للنابة المفرد وهو كيف ينال السعادة اذا لم تكن موجودة ،

(١) [هولاء] تكتب [هولاي] أو [هاولاي] في الأصل .

(٢) يعني المريض .

(٣) هكذا في الأصل و[يتدبر] في قراءة [أس] .

(٤) أشد الى كتابة في الطب .

الاسم بخصوص، لأنه لا آراء كاذبة فيها؛ ولا يعموم، فإنه متى
كان، فقد مرهنة وانقضت أمورها وصارت غير كاملة.

والسير الأربع قد توجب فيها النوبة، ووجودهم هو سبب

حدوث المدينة الطاملة، على ما تبينه في غير هذا الموضع.

ولما كانت جميع السير التي في هذا الزمان، وفيما لاه قبلها من

معظم ما بلغنا خبره، اللهم إلا ما يحكي أبو نصر عنه سيرة

الفرس الأولى، كلها مركبة من السير الخمس، ومعظم ما نجده

فيها من السير الأربع؛ وتلخيص ذلك مقرر عنده لم يفرغ للفحص^(١)

عن السير الموجودة في هذا الزمان. بل الأصناف الثلاثة فيها^(٢)

موجودون^(٣) أو يمكن وجودهم^(٤) وهم النوبة^(٥) والحكام والأطباء،

ولما السعداء أنه يمكن وجودهم في هذه المدة فائما يكون^(٦) لهم

(١) [الفحص] في قراءة [أس].

(٢) [فيها] في قراءة [أس].

(٣) كذا في الأصل وذلك لأنه يعني اصناف الناس

(٤) كذا في الأصل.

(٥) [النوبة] في الأصل.

(٦) [يكونه] في قراءة [أس].

انما هو أو يتعلمه ^(١) من أكثر فيعلمه ^(٢)؛ أو يكون هناك رأي كاذب
 فيعتبر بكتبه انما هو ما، أو يكون فيرا علوم مغلطة لا يقصدونه
 في شيء منرا أو في أكثرها، ما فيرا أخذ المتناقضات ^(٣)، فيقع
 انما هو بالطبع أو يتعلمه من غيره على صادفه المتناقض فيه. وامامه
 وجه عمدت أو تعلم علماً صواباً لم يكن في المدينة، فليس لهذا الصنف
 اكتم يعمه. فاما من وقع على رأي صادفه لم يكن في تلك المدينة
 أو كانه فيرا نقيضه هو المصدق، فاشهر يسكنه النوبة، وكلما
 كانت مصداقهم أكثر واعظم موقفاً، كان هذا الاسم اوقع عليهم،
 وهذا الاسم يقال عليهم خصوصاً، وقد يقال بعموم على من هو ^(٤)
 يرى غير رأي أهل المدينة. كيف طه صادفاً أو لازماً، ونقل الهم
 هذا الاسم من السبب النابت من تلقاء نفسه بين الزرع. فلتنقص
 عنه بهذا الاسم الذي يرونه الآراء الصادقة، فبئس انه من خواص
 المدينة الطامة أنه لا يكون فيرا نوابت [Fol. 164] إذا قيل هذا

(١) [يتعلمه] في قراءة [أس].

(٢) [فيعلمه] في قراءة [أس] وهي بخلاف الأصل.

(٣) كذا في الأصل.

(٤) كذا في الأصل والأرجح انرا زائدة.

البند (١). ولكن السمويا ضارة بذاتها، إلا أنها نافعة له به علة؛ وقد تلخصت هذه الأمور في كتاب بنوعها هنا. فبنيته أنه كل رأي ^{غير رأيي} ماضيا يحدث في المدينة الطامنة فهو كاذب، وكل عمل يحدث فيها غير الأعمال الصادقة فيها فهو خطأ، وليس للمازب طبيعة محدودة، ولا يمكنه أن يعلم المازب أصداً؛ على ما تبينه في كتاب البرهانه. أما العمل الظأ فقد يمكنه أن يعمل لئلا به غرض آخر، وقد وضع في الأعمال التي أمكنه النظر فيها كتب كالحيل لبني ^(٢) شاكر^(٣) فإنه كل ما فيها لعب، وأشياء تقهر للتعجب ^(٤) بها، لا مقصد لها في مال الإنسان الذي، فالقول فيها شرارة وهزل، فإذ ليس يوضع ^(٥) في المدينة الطامنة أقاويل فيمنه رأي غير رأيها أو عمل غير عملها، وأما في المدن الأربع فقد يمكنه ذلك، فإنه قد يمكنه أن ^(٦) يحل هناك بعمل، فيرتدى إليه بالطبع

(١) [للبند] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٢) [عنها] في الأصل .

(٣) [لذي شاكر] في قراءة [أسي] . محمد وأحمد والحسن بنو موسى

به شاكر . يذكرهم ابنه النديم في الفهرست في أول حديثه عنه « أصحاب الحيل والأعداد وغير ذلك » الفهرست، القاهرة، ١٣٤٨ هـ، ص ٣٧٨ .

(٤) [يقصد التعجب] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٥) [توضع] في قراءة [أسي] .

(٦) [يحل] في قراءة [أسي] .

فيرا الى^(١) أكثر من صداقة الخلق وما جابته . وبالمجملّة الأمر في التي
 أسبابها القريبة^(٢) واردة من خارج ولا يستطيع البدن المحمّد الصّحة
 انه ينزف من نفسه في دفعها ، فانه قد شهد كثير من الأحماء ببراء
 براهم الطّبيعة من تلقاء انفسها ، الى ارباء أخر تشهد بذلك .
 فمنه خواص المدينة الطاملة انه لا يكون فيرا طبيب ولا قاض ، ومنه
 اللواحم العاقبة بالمدد الأربع البسيطة انه يفقد فيرا الى طبيب
 وقاض ؛ وكلما بعدت المدينة عن الطاملة ، كان الافتقار فيرا الى
 هذيه أكثر ، وكائن^(٣) فيرا مرتبة هذيه الصنفية من الناس أشرف .
 وبنيّة انه المدينة الفاضلة الطاملة قد اعطي فيرا كل اناس
 اخضل ما هو معه نحو ، وانه ارادها كلها صادقّة ، وانه لا
 رأي كاذب فيرا ، وانه اعمالها هي الفاضلة بالأطراف وهداها ،
 وانه كل عمل غيره فانه كان فاضلاً فبالإضافة الى فاد موجود ،
 فانه قطع عضو من الجسد ضار بذاته ، إلا انه قد يكون نافعا
 بالصحة له نرشته أفضى ، فيصح بقطعه — — — — —

(١) [في] في الأصل .

(٢) [الجزئية] في قراءة [أس]

(٣) [وكانه] في الأصل .

تلك السيرة تغيرت ^(١) تلك الآراء التي هي أقاويل كلية ، فصارت خبرية
بعد أنه كانت كلية ، وصارت بعد أنه كانت نافعة ضارة او طرحة . ولما
تتبعه ذلك اذا وقفت على ما كانه في الكتب الموضوعه في ذلك وقت
كل قول الى الزمان الذي بعد زمانه . ولما كانت المدينة الفاضلة
تختص بصم صناعة الطب وصناعة القضاء ، وذلك انه المحبة بينهم
اجمع فلا تباكي بينهم اصداً ، فذلك اذا عري جزء منها صد المحبة
ووقع التباكي ، اجماع الى وضع العدل واجتمع ضرورة الى ما يقوم
به ، وهو القاضي . وايضاً فانه المدينة الفاضلة افعالها كلها صواب ،
فانه هذا خاصتها التي تلزمها ، ولذلك ^(٢) لا يفتدي اهلها بالأقدية
الضارة ، فذلك لا يحتاجونه الى معرفة ادوية الأفتنانة بالظن ولا
غيره مما جانه ، ولا يحتاجونه الى معرفة مداواة الخمر ، اذ كانه ليس هناك
امر غير منتظم . وكذلك اذا استقلوا [Fol. 166v] الرياضة هشت
عند ^(٣) ذلك امراض كثيرة ، وبينه أنه ذلك ليس لها ، وعلى انه
لا يحتاج . - - -

(١) [يعترف] في قراءة [أس] .

(٢) [فذلك] في قراءة [أس] .

(٣) في الأصل [عند] وفي الرياضة [عند] .

وأيضاً فإنه كمال المنزل ليس منه المقصودة لذاتها ، إنما يراد به
تكميل المدينة أو غاية الأناة بالطبع ، وهو بيه انه القول فيه
جزء من القول في تدبير الأناة نفسه ، فعلى أي المرحلية كان
خروجها جزءاً منية ، والقول فيه جزء من القول في المرحلية ،
أو توطئة لغاية أخرى ، والقول فيه جزء من القول في تلك
الغاية . فمن هنا تبين انه القول في تدبير المنزل على ما هو
مُشهور ليس له جرد ولا هو علم ، بل أنه كان فوقاً ما ، كما
يصرح ذلك فيما كتبه البلاغيون في كتب الآداب التي يسكنها
نفسانية ، مثل كتاب كليله ودفنة ومثل كتاب حكماء العرب ،
المشتملة على الوصايا والأحوال المشورية . وأكثر ما يوجد هذا
الجزء من كتاب ، كما يوجد ذلك في الأبواب ^(١) التي تتضمنه ^(٢) صحيفة
السلطان ومعاشره الأخوان وما شاكل ذلك ؛ فإنه جدّ ذلك
إنما كان الصدارة ^(٣) منها وقتاً ما وفي سيرة سيره ؛ فإذا تفرّقت ^(٤)

(١) [كالأبواب] في الأصل

(٢) [يتضمنه] في قراءة [أس]

(٣) [للصدارة] في قراءة [أس]

(٤) [يصرف] في قراءة [أس]

القول^(١) فيه ، ومنه بلفظنا^(٢) كتبهم في تدبير المنزل فاعاويلهم بلاغية .
 وبينه ما قلناه أنه المنازل ، ما عدا المنزل الفاضل ، مرضى وكلها
منحرفة^(٣) ، وليست موجودة بالطبع وإنما وجودها بالوضع . ولذلك
 فضولها إنما هي بالوضع ، اللهم إلا فيما اشتركت فيه مع المنزل
 الفاضل ، فانه القول فيه له نظام معلوم ضروري ، وهذا^(٤) الجزء
 المشترك أو تكرر القول فيه علمي ، إذ ليس يخلو منزل^(٥) أنه
تكونه^(٦) فيه أمور كثيرة مشتركة مما شأننا أنه تكونه في المنزل الفاضل ،
 فانه أنه هذا منزل منه ذلك لم يمكنه أنه يبقى ولا كانه منزل^(٧) إلا
 باشتراك الأسم . فلنترك القول فيه ولننتج عنه أنه يفرخ للقول
 في الأمور الطوبى وقفاً ما .

(١) (للقول) في قراءة (أُس)

(٢) [لفظنا] في الأصل .

(٣) [منحرفة] في قراءة [أُس] . وهي مقبولة أيضاً

(٤) [وبهذا] في الأصل .

(٥) [يخلو منزل] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٦) [يكونه] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٧) هكذا في الأصل [منزل] في قراءة [أُس] .

المنزل الطباعي هو للأبناء فقط ، وبنيته انه الوجود الأفضل لما هو
جزء هو وجوده جزئاً ، ولذلك لم يجعل جزءاً منه الصناعة المدنية^(١)
تعبير المنزل ، اذ كان ذلك قد قيل في الصناعة المدنية ، وبنيته
هناك ما المنزل وكيف وجوده ، فانه وجوده الأفضل انه يكون
متركاً ، وكيف صفة اشتراكه . واما المنزل في غير المدنية
الفاصلة ، وهو في المدة الأربع التي تحدثنا ، فانه المنزل فيها
وجوده ناقص وانه فيه امرأ خارجاً عنه الطبع ، وانه ذلك المنزل
فقط هو الكامل الذي لا يمكنه فيه زياده إلا تعود^(٢) نقصاً
كما لأصبح السادة فانه الحكم هذا خاصته انه الزيادة فيه [Fol. 166]
نقصانه ، وانه سائر المنازل ناقص بالاضافة اليه ومريضه ، لأنه
الأموال التي يتباين بها المنزل الفاضل تؤدي الى هذه المنزل
وبواره ، ولذلك تشبه^(٣) المرض .
والقول في تدبير هذه المنازل الناقصة - وهي المرضي - قد تكلف قوم

(١) يعني السياسة المدنية .

(٢) [تعود] في الأصل ، [وتعود] في [أُس]

(٣) (يشبه) في قراءه (أُس)

تدبير محكم وقصته وحاجاته هذه الألفاظ ، فانه هذه الألفاظ
تتضمن وجود الصواب وحيثاً أكثر شريف ^(١) زائد له ؛ فانه الفعل
الصواب عند الجمهور كالجنس للفصل المقتض والمحكم وتلخيص هذا
في غير هذا الموضع .

والتدبير اذا قيل على الأطلاق كما قلناه ، دلّ على
تدبير المدبر أو قيل بتقييد فانه ينقسم بالصواب والخطأ . وقد يظهر
انه التدبير قد يعرى منه هذين المتقابلين ، واذا فحص عنه وتقصّب
ظهر انه هذين المتقابلين يلزمانه ضرورة ، وتقصّب ذلك قريب على
مدى كانه له ادنى وقوف على الفلسفة المدنية . فالصفاته اللزاه
يخصه باكم التدبير قد ينقسم ^(٢) الى الصواب والخطأ .

فاما تدبير المدبر فقد بيّنه امره فلاطيه في الحياة المدنية ،
وبيّنه ما ضمن الصواب فيه ومنه ايضاً يلحقه الخطأ ، وتكلف القول فيما
قد قيل فيه ، فاحكم فضلاً وجرماً وشرارة ^(٣) . واما تدبير المنزل ،
فانه المنزل بما هو منزل ، فهو جزء مدنية ، وبيّنه هناك انه ذلك

(١) [يزيد] في حرارة [أسي] .

(٢) (ينقسم) في الأصل .

(٣) [فضل أو جرم أو شرارة] في الأصل .

عليها التدبير تدبير المدد وتدبير المنزل ، وقل ما يطلع عليه التدبير
 حتى يقال تدبير المنزل بردف وتقييد ، فاما تدبير الحرب وسائر
 ذلك فهي اجزاء لـ تدبير النوعية ^(١) ، فاما تدبير الآله للعالم فاما
 هو تدبير بوجه آخر بصيد النسبة عنه اقرب المعاني تسبيرا ^(٢) ،
 وهكذا هو التدبير المطلق وهو أثر فزا ، لأنه انما قيل له تدبير
 للشيء المظنون به وبه ايجاد الآله تعالى العالم ^(٣) ، وبه
 انه هذا الصنف من الاسماء المشكلة أبعد اصناف المشكلة
 عنه التواطؤ ، ويكاد انه يكون مشتركا اشتراكا محضا ، فالجمهور
 يقولونه بتأكيد ، واما الفلاسفة فيقولونه باشتراك محض ، ولما
 يعرفونه في المشكلة بأنه يكون في شيء انه شبه شيء فسميه
 باسم ذلك الشيء . وهذا الصنف لم يلحق في الاسماء المشكلة
 لقلته ، ولذلك لا يردف الجمهور على تدبير الآله بالصواب
 فيقولونه في تدبيره العالم ^(٤) انه تدبير صواب ، ويقولونه انه

(١) هكذا في الأصل وهي [النوعية] في هامش الأصل .

(٢) [نسبا] في قراءة [أس]

(٣) [العالم] في قراءة [أس] بخلاف الأصل .

(٤) [تدبير العالم] بكسر اللام في قراءة [أس] و [تدبير] في الأصل .

يكونه ذلك بالفكر^(١) ، فإنه هذا مختص بالفكر^(٢) ولا يمكنه أن يوجد إلا فيه^(٣) ؛
ولذلك لا يمكنه أن يوجد إلا لأشانه فقط ، وما يقال عليه المدبر فاعلم هو
للتشبيه به . فالمدبر مقول بتقديم وتأخير ، وقد يقال التدبير على إيجاب
هذا التدبير على جهة ما هو متكونه ، وهو في أفعال الإنسان أكثر وأظهر ،
وفي أفعال الحيوان غير الناطقة أقل ذلك ، وإذا قيل التدبير على هذا الفرع قد
يقال بعموم ومخصوص ، وإذا قيل بعموم قيل في كل أفعال الإنسان كيف كانت ، فذلك
يقال في المهره وكذلك يقال في القوى ، إلا أنه في القوى أكثر وأشهر ، ولذلك [Fol. 165v]
يقال في ترتيب الأمور الحربية ولا يشار يقال في صناعة السكفة والحياكة ، وإذا
قيل على هذا الوجه فقد يقال أيضاً بعموم أكثر ومخصوص ، وإذا قيل بعموم قيل
في كل الأفعال التي تشتمل عليها^(٤) الصنایح^(٥) التي تسمى بالقوى ، وقد خصته في
العلم المدني ؛ وإذا قيل بمخصوص قيل على تدبير المدبر ، وما يقال عليه التدبير
يتقدم بعضه بعضاً بأشرف والأعمال ، وأشرف الأمور التي يقال

(١) [بالفكرة] في الأصل ، وهي [بالفكر الإنساني] في [مت] .

(٢) [بالفكرة] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٣) [منه] في قراءة [أُس] .

(٤) [عليه] في الأصل .

(٥) ابنه بالجه يميل إلى استبدال الهمزة بالياء فاصفة في وسط الكلمة وهو يقطرها
في آخر الكلمة كما سيلافظ منها بعد .

الباب الأول

ومنه كلامه رضي الله عنه في تدبير المتوحد .

قال ابو بكر بن الصائغ رحمه الله :

لفظة التدبير في لسان العرب يقال على معاني كثيرة قد أحصاها اهل لسانهم ،
وأشهر دلائلها ^(١) بالجملة على ترتيب افعال نحو غاية مقصودة - فلذلك ^(٢) ^(٣) ^(٤)
يطلقونها على من فعل فعلاً واحداً يقصد به غاية ما ، فإنه ما اعتقد في ذلك
الفعل انه واحد لم يطلع عليه التدبير ، وأما ما اعتقد منه انه كثير واقداره من حيث
هو ذو ترتيب سمي ذلك الترتيب تدبيراً ، ولذلك يطلقونه على الإله انه مدبر
العالم . وهذا قد يكون بالقوة وقد يكون بالفعل ، ولفظة التدبير دلائلها على ما
بالقوة أكثر وأشهر ؛ وبنيته انه الترتيب ^(٤) اذا كان في امور بالقوة فاعلمنا

(١) [دلائلها] في الأصل .

(٢) [جمع] في قراءة [أس] وهي [نحو] في خطوطة [مت] .

(٣) [ولذلك] في قراءة [أس] .

(٤) الترتيب بمعنى التدبير ولذلك يمكنه ان يكون التدبير

كتاب

تفسير التوفى

لابن باجه الاندلسي
المتوفى ٥٣٣ هـ